From Action To Ethics

This book is the product of a multi-year dialogue between leading human rights theorists and high-level representatives of international human rights NGOs (INGOs). It is divided into three parts that reflect the major ethical challenges discussed at the workshops: the ethical challenges associated with interaction between relatively rich and powerful northern-based human rights INGOs and recipients of their aid in the South; whether and how to collaborate with governments that place severe restrictions on the activities of human rights INGOs; and the tension between expanding the organization's mandate to address more fundamental social and economic problems and restricting it for the sake of focusing on more immediate and clearly identifiable violations of civil and political rights. Each section contains contributions by both theorists and practitioners of human rights.

Originally published in 1972, and now with a new Preface by Michael Campbell, this collection of essays on closely related issues in moral philosophy looks at different aspects of people’s understanding of their own and others’ actions in ethical dimensions. The book discusses the ways in which the understanding both of man’s own nature and of the nature of the world in which he lives, is a function of his social existence. It discusses questions about the character of moral deliberation and decision, the nature of the human will and its connections with action, and the extent to which an individual’s moral reasonings must claim universal applicability.

Julian Wuerth offers a radically new interpretation of Kant's theories of mind, action, and ethics. As the author of a Copernican turn in philosophy, Kant places the mind at the center of his philosophy, and yet his theory of the mind remains an enigma. Wuerth begins with a revolutionary new interpretation of this theory of mind. This new interpretation considers a far wider range of Kant's recorded thought from across his philosophical corpus than previous interpretations and advances in tandem with an interpretation of the foundations of Kant's transcendental idealism and his metaphysics of substance. Against traditional empiricist approaches, Wuerth demonstrates that Kant argues that we are conscious of our own noumenal substantiality and simplicity. But against rational psychologists, Kant draws on the teachings of his transcendental idealism to strip the conclusions of our noumenal substantiality and simplicity of their "usefulness." In the Paralogisms and elsewhere, Kant thus argues that we are not licensed to conclude our substantiality and simplicity in a sense that entails our permanence, our incorruptibility, or our immortality. Wuerth goes on to undertake a ground-breaking study of Kant's notoriously vast, complex, and opaque account of the mind's powers, and argues that Kant structures his system of philosophy on this system of the mind's powers. He next confronts the persisting stumbling block of interpretations of Kant's ethics--Kant's theory of action--and shows that Kant rejects intellectualist theories of action that reduce practical agents to pure reason. He argues that Kant's practical agent is shown to exercise a power of choice, or Willkur, subject to two irreducible conative currencies: moral motives and sensible incentives. While our intellectual nature provides us with insight into morality and in turn with moral motives, our sensible nature provides us with distinct-in-kind sensible incentives. Immoral choices at odds with the former can thus nonetheless be coherent choices in harmony with the latter. Finally, Wuerth applies these new findings about Kant's theory of mind and action to an analysis of the foundations of Kant's ethics. He rejects the dominant constructivist interpretation in favor of a moral realist one. At the heart of Kant's Enlightenment ethics is his insistence that the authority of a moral law rests in our recognition of its truth, not in an alleged commitment unfettered by truth. Kant guides us to clarity regarding the moral law, across his writings and across his various formulations of the moral law, using a single elimination of sensibility process that rejects the pretences of sensibility to isolate reason and its insights into moral right and wrong. Because moral authority issues from the cognition of pure practical reason and because sensibility can present coherent alternatives to moral choice, moral virtue requires more than mere clarity in cognition. Kant instead recognizes the centrality to moral living of the ongoing cultivation of our capacities more broadly, including our capacities for cognition, feeling, desire, and character.

Leading philosophers explore responsibility from a variety of perspectives, including metaphysics, action theory, and philosophy of law. Most philosophical explorations of responsibility discuss the topic solely in terms of metaphysics and the "free will" problem. By contrast, these essays by leading philosophers view responsibility from a variety of perspectives—metaphysics, ethics, action theory, and the philosophy of law. After a broad, framing introduction by the volume's editors, the contributors consider such subjects as responsibility as it relates to the "free will" problem; the relation between responsibility and knowledge or ignorance; the relation between causal and moral responsibility; the difference, if any, between responsibility for actions and responsibility for omissions; the metaphysical requirements for making sense of "collective" responsibility; and the relation between moral and legal responsibility. The contributors include such distinguished authors as Alfred R. Mele, John Martin Fischer, George Sher, and Frances Kamm, as well as important rising scholars. Taken together, the essays in Action, Ethics, and Responsibility offer a breadth of perspectives that is unmatched by other treatments of the topic. Contributors Joseph Keim Campbell, David Chan, Randolph Clarke, E.J. Coffman, John Martin Fischer, Helen Frowe, Todd Jones, Frances Kamm, Antti Kauppinen, Alfred R. Mele, Michael O'Rourke, Paul Russell, Robert F. Schopp, George Sher, Harry S. Silverstein, Saul Smilansky, Donald Smith, Charles T. Wolfe

Over the course of the last decade, Constantine Sandis has advanced our understanding of the role action plays in determining our ethics and motives. In this collection of his best essays in the philosophy of action, Sandis brings together updated versions of his writings, accompanied by a new introduction. Read collectively they demonstrate the breadth of his interests and ability to relate to broader issues within the culture, connecting debates in philosophical psychology about motivation, negligence, and moral responsibility with Greek tragedy, social psychology, and literature. Along this path from action to ethics, Sandis engages with Hegel, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Ricoeur, Davidson, and Dretske, together with contemporary authors such as Jennifer Hornsby and Jonathan Dancy. As he responds to each thinker and theme, he develops his own philosophical position, the key thesis of which is that philosophy of action without ethics is empty, ethics without philosophy of action is blind.

Through the analysis of forty ethical dilemmas drawn from real-life situations, Ethics in Action guides the reader through a process of moral deliberation that leads to the resolution of a variety of moral dilemmas. Fosters critical thinking by evaluating the reasons people give to support their choices and actions Challenges the paradigm of moral relativism that often impedes efforts to resolve moral dilemmas Incorporates international perspectives often lacking in texts published for a U.S. audience

Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" is considered to be one of the most important treatises on ethics ever written. In an incredibly detailed study of virtue and vice in man, Aristotle examines one of the most central themes to man, the nature of goodness itself. In Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics," he asserts that virtue is essential to happiness and that man must live in accordance with the "doctrine of the mean" (the balance between excess and deficiency) to achieve such happiness.

More than twenty years after its publication, Peter Singer's Ethics into Action continues to inspire new activists through its portrayal of Henry Spira and the animal rights movement. With a new preface from the author, this edition celebrates the continued importance of social movements and provides a path towards furthering changes in our world.