From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science The Case Against Belief

The average person has a rich belief system about the thoughts and motives of people. From antiquity to the beginning of this century, Stephen Stich points out, this "folk psychology" was employed in such systematic psychology as there was: "Those who theorized about the mind shared the bulk of their terminology and their conceptual apparatus with poets, critics, historians, economists, and indeed with their own grandmothers."In this book, Stich puts forth the radical thesis that the notions of believing, desiring, thinking, prefering, feeling, imagining, fearing, remembering and many other common-sense concepts that comprise the folk psychological foundations of cognitive psychology should not - and do not - play a significant role in the scientific study of the mind.

The examination and evaluation of folk psychology and lay cognition has been carried out predominantly in two domains: personality and social psychology, and the philosophy of psychology. Yet, work in these two areas has largely proceeded independently. The assumption on which this volume is founded is that a proper comparison between scientific cognition and folk ways of thought rests on an adequate study of both science and folk psychology. With this in mind, the author provides an analysis of the intricate, and often hidden, links between these two spheres. In doing so, the book poses two related questions. First, what is the nature of folk psychology and how is it related to scientific psychology? Second, of what should the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology consist? In answering these two questions, the author draws extensively from research and arguments in social psychology and social cognition, cognitive science, and the philosophy of science. The interdisciplinary approach gives the book a unique perspective that will be of interest to scholars working in social psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. Written in a concise and accessible style, this volume is suitable for undergraduate and graduate students as well as a general psychological audience.

Within the past ten years, the discussion of the nature of folk psychology and its role in explaining behavior and thought has become central to the philosophy of mind. However, no comprehensive account of the contemporary debate or collection of the works that make up this debate has yet been available. Intending to fill this gap, this volume begins with the crucial background for the contemporary debate and proceeds with a broad range of responses to and developments of these works -- from those who argue that "folk theory" is a misnomer to those who regard folk theory as legitimately explanatory and necessary for any adequate account of human behavior. Intended for courses in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and science, as well as anthropology and social psychology, this anthology is also of great value in courses focusing on folk models, eliminative materialism, explanation, psychological theory, and -- in particular -- intentional psychology. It is accessible to both graduate students and upper-division undergraduate students of philosophy and psychology as well as researchers. As an aid to students, a thorough discussion of the field and the articles in the anthology is provided in the introduction; as an aid to researchers, a complete bibliography is also provided.

This volume features the complete text of all regular papers, posters, and summaries of symposia presented at the 16th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Within the past ten years, the discussion of the nature of folk psychology and its role in explaining behavior and thought has become central to the philosophy of mind. However, no comprehensive account of the contemporary debate or collection of the works that make up this debate has yet been available. Intending to fill this gap, this volume begins with the crucial background for the contemporary debate and proceeds with a broad range of responses to and developments of these works -- from those who argue that "folk theory" is a misnomer to those who regard folk theory as legitimately explanatory and necessary for any adequate account of human behavior. Intended for courses in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and science, as well as anthropology and social psychology, this anthology is also of great value in courses focusing on folk models, eliminative materialism, explanation, psychological theory, and -- in particular -- intentional psychology. It is accessible to both graduate students and upper-division undergraduate students of philosophy and psychology as well as researchers. As an aid to students, a thorough discussion of the field and the articles in the anthology is provided in the introduction; as an aid to researchers, a complete bibliography is also provided.

Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and generalization from self) that are involved in our folk psychological practices.