From Mahan To Pearl Harbor

A major work by one of Japan’s leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on Japan’s rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan’s sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan’s ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans. Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s—the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930—the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States—namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941—in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the ""ghost"" of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660--1783) was one of the most influential books on military strategy in the first half of the 20th century. A core text in the naval war colleges of the United States, Britain, and Japan, Mahan's book shaped doctrine for the conduct of war at sea. Adams uses Mahan's ideas to discuss the great Pacific sea battles of World War II and to consider how well they withstood the test of actual combat. Reexamining the conduct of war in the Pacific from a single analytic viewpoint leads to some surprising conclusions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the recapture of the Philippines, and the submarine war. Naval historians and armchair strategists alike will find much food for thought in these engrossing pages.

Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War—the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.–China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past.

In this absorbing account of the origins of the Asia-Pacific War, historian John Gripentrog argues that competing ideologies of world order—chiefly the rift between liberal internationalism and Pan-Asian regionalism—lay at the heart of the conflict. Drawing from a rich diversity of primary and secondary sources, the author also examines the Japanese government’s vigorous cultural diplomacy in the U.S., which sought to win over American hearts and minds and soft-pedal its imperialist ambitions in Asia. The result is a book that both challenges and amplifies standard interpretations of US-Japan relations in the interwar era, while weaving diplomatic, political, intellectual, and cultural history. Moreover, the author’s wide-angle lens offers readers insights into a fascinating assemblage of historical actors—from Japanese and American diplomats, politicians, and military leaders, to cosmopolitan art enthusiasts and major league baseball players.

It was a miracle three years in the making, a testimony to American fortitude and ingenuity—and perhaps the key to why the United States won a war that after Pearl Harbor seemed hopeless. Impeccably researched, Avenging Pearl Harbor is colorfully written, personal, chilling, visceral. Historian Keith Warren Lloyd brings his gift for injecting life and personalities and heretofore untold stories of the men and women involved-–members of what became known as The Greatest Generation—whose heroism and sacrifice brought about the miraculous new life of a sleeping military force that was reeling and on its knees. It is a story has never before been told in such detail and with such vibrancy. On the night of 24 October 1944, a force of two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers from the Imperial Japanese Navy steamed into Surigao Strait in the Philippines. Their objective: to attack the invasion fleet of General Douglas MacArthur’s army in Leyte Gulf. Alerted by scouting PT boats, the U.S. 7th Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf prepared a deadly trap. Waiting for the enemy force were six American battleships and supporting cruisers and destroyers. Oldendorf performed the classic naval maneuver of “crossing the T” which allowed the American ships to fire broadsides at the oncoming Japanese vessels, while the enemy could only fire with their forward turrets. When the smoke cleared, the Japanese fleet had been all but annihilated. Among the victorious American battleships were the Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, California, and Tennessee, five of the eight dreadnoughts that had been bombed at Pearl Harbor. The five ships had been raised, repaired, modified, and re-manned. After three long years, they finally had their revenge. Avenging Pearl Harbor takes readers from the attack on Pearl Harbor, telling the story of the severe damage dealt to each ship and the incredible acts of courage performed by the sailors of each crew that morning. It continues with how each ship was raised and repaired—Herculean in scope-- and the mustering of new commanders, officers and crewmen. The final drama unfolds as of each ship returns triumphantly to the battle fleet, and the ultimate triumph at the battle of Surigao Strait.

This volume provides comprehensive information on the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the differing perspectives accompanying it.

This book provides a penetrating look into Franklin D. Roosevelt's strategy to bait Adolf Hitler into declaring war on America in order to defeat Germany militarily, thus preventing the Nazis from developing the atomic bomb. In late 1939, President Roosevelt learned that Hitler was attempting to develop an atomic bomb to use against the United States. The president responded by directing his own scientific community to develop an atomic bomb and began making plans to go to war with Germany. However, he was hampered by public opinion, with 80 percent of the American people against U.S. involvement in another ground war in Europe. Roosevelt seized an opportunity in 1940, when Japan and Nazi Germany formed a military alliance. To bait Germany into war, FDR shut down Japan's war-making economy, prompting Tokyo to attack Pearl Harbor. A few days later, Hitler declared war on America. Using declassified documents, this book shows how Pearl Harbor was not about Japan; it was about the United States going to war with Germany. It reveals how the U.S. Navy's intelligence gathering system could break virtually any Japanese naval code, but Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, was kept in the dark about the impending Pearl Harbor attack by his own government.

The Road to Pearl Harbor offers a timely examination of the conflict in the Pacific prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and offers lessons applicable to understanding contemporary Great Power flash points between Asia and the West. This volume brings together renowned historians and analysts of grand strategy to map out the fateful decisions that culminated in war. The contributors take a pragmatic view of the policy and strategy options, as well as the decisions made by the leaders of the great powers. This important history underscores that the choices made by political, military, and naval leaders mattered in determining questions of war and peace. Highlighting Japan's war against China and the protracted resistance of Chiang-Kai-shek's Nationalist regime, The Road to Pearl Harbor provides historical context for understanding the struggle for mastery in Asia and decisions for war. The book also makes an important contribution to interwar naval history by examining the views of the Japanese navy's leaders, who wanted to build up their navy to defeat Britain and the United States at sea. This history is certainly relevant, as the concluding chapter demonstrates in an eye-opening examination of the current views held by Chinese naval officers about how to fight a future war in the Pacific.