Games Threats And Treaties

Organised in 3 parts, and using modern game theory as an analytical tool, this book analyses the difficult art of commitment in international relations. No knowledge of game theory is needed for this book.

In The Breach of a Treaty: State Responses in International Law, Maria Xiouri examines the relationship between responses to the breach of a treaty, namely between the termination of the treaty or the suspension of its operation and countermeasures.

At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought.

In the contemporary discipline of conflict resolution, adjudication and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are often seen as antagonistic trends. This important book contends that, on the contrary, it is the bringing together of these trends that holds the most promise for an effective system of international justice. With great insight and passion, built firmly on a vast knowledge of the field, Lars Kirchhoff exposes the contemporary structural barriers to effective conflict resolution, defining where adjudication ends and ADR—and particularly the recent development of mediated third party intervention from an ‘art’ to a veritable ‘science’—must come into play. The work starts by defining the challenges, potentials and shortcomings of different approaches to conflict resolution in an interdependent world—where the multiplicity of actors, topics and interests involved even in seemingly bilateral conflict situations is clearly manifest—and goes on to define useful models and connect the various elements relevant for the resolution of conflicts in a transparent way. In the course of its investigation the book accomplishes the following: • illustrates the various departure points and perspectives scholars of conflict resolution have taken as the basis for their work; discusses who should become involved in conflicts as a third party and by which techniques this should occur; systematically conveys the nature and consequences of intervention through mediation, focusing on the method’s critical challenges; and clarifies the particular model of international mediation under development through UN initiatives. In approaching these intertwined topics, the author draws concrete conclusions for the realms of international law and related disciplines as well as for the organizational context of the United Nations. He explores such diverse scenarios as conflicts between States, conflicts involving international organizations, and—in accordance with the changing parameters of international law—even conflicts involving individuals, clarifying which constellations can be tackled by international mediation and which conflicts should be dealt with by other forms of diplomacy or adjudication. It is the conviction of many intermediaries and scholars that the considerable potential inherent in resolving conflicts peacefully is rarely put into practice. Although some of the reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the influence of scholarly debate, in many instances the reasons for failure of peaceful resolution processes are more structural or systemic in nature. It is the great virtue of this book that it establishes enough clarity in an unclear and complex field to make concrete and workable recommendations in these instances, and for that reason it will be of immeasurable value and benefit to all scholars, policymakers, and activists dedicated to the pursuit of peace.

This book contributes to the theatrical discussions of equilibria that rest on error--in which we include mistaken choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the people intended to play them. Our study of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question, considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim at the improvement of their usefulness. Discussing the possibility of changing both game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts at improvement.

Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield.

A perceptive and provocative history of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East that illuminates the unique challenges and barriers Kissinger and his successors have faced in their attempts to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “A wealth of lessons for today, not only about the challenges in that region but also about the art of diplomacy . . . the drama, dazzling maneuvers, and grand strategic vision.”—Walter Isaacson, author of The Code Breaker More than twenty years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk—a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013—has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand. Now, in an attempt to understand the arc of American diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he returns to the origins of American-led peace efforts and to the man who created the Middle East peace process—Henry Kissinger. Based on newly available documents from American and Israeli archives, extensive interviews with Kissinger, and Indyk's own interactions with some of the main players, the author takes readers inside the negotiations. Here is a roster of larger-than-life characters—Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Hafez al-Assad, and Kissinger himself. Indyk's account is both that of a historian poring over the records of these events, as well as an inside player seeking to glean lessons for Middle East peacemaking. He makes clear that understanding Kissinger's design for Middle East peacemaking is key to comprehending how to—and how not to—make peace.

For over 60 years, Israel’s foreign policy establishment has looked at its regional policy through the lens of a geopolitical concept named "the periphery doctrine." The idea posited that due to the fundamental hostility of neighboring Arab countries, Israel ought to counterbalance this threat by engaging with the "periphery" of the Arab world through clandestine diplomacy. Based on original research in the Israeli diplomatic archives and interviews with key past and present decision-makers, this book shows that this concept of a periphery was, and remains, a core driver of Israel’s foreign policy. The periphery was borne out of the debates among Zionist circles concerning the geopolitics of the nascent Israeli State. The evidence from Israel’s contemporary policies shows that these principles survived the historical relationships with some countries (Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia) and were emulated in other cases: Azerbaijan, Greece, South Sudan, and even to a certain extent in the attempted exchanges by Israel with Gulf Arab kingdoms. The book enables readers to understand Israel’s pessimistic – or realist, in the traditional sense – philosophy when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy. The history of the periphery doctrine sheds light on fundamental issues, such as Israel’s role in the regional security system, its overreliance on military and intelligence cooperation as tools of diplomacy, and finally its enduring perception of inextricable isolation. Through a detailed appraisal of Israel’s periphery doctrine from its birth in the fifties until its contemporary renaissance, this book offers a new perspective on Israel’s foreign policy, and will appeal to students and scholars of Middle East Politics and History, and International Relations.