German Disarmament After World War I

German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31: the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions. These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany’s ability to pose a military threat to European security. This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world. This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.

Originally published in 1985 The Decision to Disarm Germany offers a fresh approach to Britain’s First World War and Paris Peace Conference policy on the question of German military disarmament. It offers interpretations based on extensive research into unpublished records and private papers and provides important new conclusions about British policy. The book shows the interaction of domestic concerns and strategic considerations in the wartime development of British thinking on the issue of post-war German disarmament and in the post-Armistice formulation and implementation of Britain’s German disarmament policy. It establishes the crucial interrelationship in British thinking and policy between German disarmament and general disarmament. It also shows the interwar consequences of wartime attitudes and peace conference policy.

At the end of World War II, the Allies were unanimous in their determination to disarm the former aggressor Germany. As the Cold War intensified, however, the decision whether to reverse that policy and to rearm West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet threat led to disagreements both within the US government and among members of the nascent NATO alliance. The US military took the practical view that a substantial number of German troops would be required to deter any potential Soviet assault. The State Department, on the other hand, initially advocated an alternative strategy of strengthening European institutions but eventually came around to the military’s position that an armed West Germany was preferable to a weak state on the dividing line between the Western democracies and the Soviet satellite states. Sheldon A. Goldberg traces the military, diplomatic, and political threads of postwar policy toward West Germany and provides insights into the inner workings of alliance building and the roles of bureaucrats and military officers as well as those of diplomats and statesmen. He draws on previously unexamined primary sources to construct a cogent account of the political and diplomatic negotiations that led to West Germany’s accession to NATO and the shaping of European order for the next forty years.

British lawyer and Brigadier-General John Hartman Morgan served as Deputy Adjutant-General in Berlin from 1919-1923 at the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control—a term used in a series of peace treaties concluded after World War I (1914-1918) between different countries. Each of these treaties was concluded between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (consisting of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) on the one hand, and one of the Central Powers like Germany, Turkey or Bulgaria. One of the terms of such treaties required conversion of all of the Central Powers’ military and armaments related production and related facilities into purely commercial use. The decision and the modus operandi to ensure this rested with a Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control. The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control was also entrusted with a number of other responsibilities, including (a) setting the number of customs officials, local urban and rural police, forest guards and other officials under the control of the Government of the central power concerned; and (b) receiving information relating to the location of the stocks and depots of arms, munitions and war material and their operations. It was during this period of 1919-1923 that Brig.-Gen. Morgan witnessed German attempts to build up their army contravening the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and he published his findings in October 1924 in the Quarterly Review, titled “The Disarmament of Germany and After.” However, it would not be until after World War II that he would decide to elaborate on this theme—the result is the present volume, Assize of Arms: The Disarmament of Germany and Her Rearmament (1919-1939). First published in 1945, it was intended to be published in two volumes; however, owing to Brig.-Gen. Morgan’s passing in 1955, it remained as a single volume. A valuable addition to any World Wars library.

Since the beginning of modern warfare, one of the favorite crusades of the international peacemakers has been toward disarmament. This book investigates the British origin of the disarmament idea--from World War I through the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. It traces the development of disarmament as a war aim, with special reference to the influence of British Liberal thought, and President Wilson's acceptance of disarmament as one of his Fourteen Points. Disarmament is related to the other Allied war aims and to theLiberal and Labor parties during the war period. Particular attention is paid to the influence of public opinion and the British press. Neither an attack on nor an apology for the fiasco which followed, this is a lucid analysis of the events, tensions, personalities, and self-interests which led to the failure of an ideal.

This book examines the formulation and the implementation of the Royal Navy's policy towards German naval disarmament after the Second World War.

This probing examination of the period just before and after Hitler came to power corrects many misconceptions about German rearmament. Drawing on previously unexploited sources, Edward Bennett unravels German military plans and shows their implications, undermining the notion that Hitler's accession represented a radical break with Germany's past. He also lays bare the fears and rivalries that hindered the West's response, particularly at the 1932-1933 World Disarmament Conference. Originally published in 1979. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.