German Military And The Weimar Republic

This military biography examines the man who sought to rebuild the Germany Army after WWI—and the rival who stoked the rise of Nazism. After Germany’s devastating defeat in the First World War, General Hans von Seekt became Chief of the Army Command at the Reichewehr Ministry of the Weimar Republic. His job was to rebuild the shattered German army and repair the nation’s standing on the world stage. The punitive terms of the post-war settlement made these ambitious goals nearly impossible, but the most significant challenges von Seekt faced came from within Germany. Von Seekt aimed to build a modern and efficient military with a main strategy of peaceful defense purposes. This original and far-sighted policy was opposed by his rival, General Erich Ludendorff, who led a nationalistic movement seeking revenge for Germany’s defeat. Ludendorff proposed to rebuild the once-mighty German imperial army as a major international force. The failure of von Seekt's experiment was tragically mirrored by the fall of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany.

General Hans von Seekt (1866-1936) was the military counterpart of the Weimar Republic who attempted to restore Germany's international acceptance and security following defeat in World War I and the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. The failure of both led eventually to the rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Hans von Seekt was from the traditional German officer caste, served with distinction on the war and became Chief of the Army Command at the Reichewehr Ministry of the Weimar Republic and Germany's 'supreme soldier' and major military strategist. His role was to rebuild the shattered German army in face of the punitive terms of post-war settlement imposed by the victorious Entente Powers which drastically reduced its strength and imposed crippling financial conditions. He aimed to build a modern and efficient military - a new German army - with a main strategy of peaceful defense purposes, and to re-introduce Germany into the community of nations. This original and far-sighted policy was opposed by the movement seeking revenge for defeat - a 'stab in the back' - led principally by his rival, General Erich Ludendorff, whose aim was rebuild the once-mighty German imperial army as a major international force. The failure of von Seekt's experiment was mirrored by the fall of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany.

This book traces the development of the German Army League from its inception through the earliest days of the Weimar Republic. Founded in January 1912, the League promoted the intensification of German militarism and the cultivation of German nationalism. As the last and second largest of the patriotic societies to emerge after 1890, the League led the campaign for army expansion in 1912 and 1913, and against the growing influence of socialism and pacifism within Germany. Attempting to harness popular and nationalist sentiment against the government's foreign and domestic policies by preying on Germans' fears of defeat and socialism, the League contributed to the polarization of German society and aggravated the international tensions which culminated in the Great War. Coetzee combines an analysis of the League's principal personalities and policies with an exploration of the inner workings of local and regional branches, arguing that rather than having served solely as a barometer of populist nationalist sentiment, the League also reflected the machinations of men of education and prominence who believed that an unresponsive German government had stifled their own careers, dealt ineffectually with the prospect of domestic unrest, and squandered the nation's military superiority over its European rivals.

Civil-military relations have been a consistent theme of the history of the Weimar Republic. This study focuses on the career of General Walther Reinhardt, the last Prussian Minister of War and the First Head of the Army Command in the Weimar Republic. Though less well known than his great rival, Hans von Seeckt, Reinhardt's role in forming the young Reichswehr and his writings on warfare made him one of the most important and influential military figures in interwar Germany. Contrary to the conventional view that civil-military relations were fraught from the outset, the author argues, Reinhardt's contribution to the military politics of the Weimar Republic shows that opportunities for reform and co-operation with civilian leaders existed. However, although he is primarily seen as a liberal General, this study demonstrates that he was motivated by professional military considerations and by the specter of a future war. His ideas on modern warfare were amongst the most radical of the time.

A revolutionary tradition did not exist in the Imperial German Army. But during the years 1918-1944 events occurred which produced such an impact on the moral fibre of the German Officer Corps that eventually a few of them participated in a conspiracy against Hitler. This work seeks only to throw light on those aspects of German military history that portray the gradual disintegration of the monolithic structure of the German Army that occurred prior to 20 July 1944. The study has been divided into four major parts: the revolutionary days following the defeat of World War I, 1918-1920; the development of the Reichswehr and the rise to power of Hitler, 1920-1933; the transition from Reichswehr to Wehrmacht, 1933-1938; and the period of active opposition to Hitler, 1938-1944. The analysis, generally, follows a chronological course, and results in an examination of those events which influenced the German officers who were the field commanders of World War II. In this tragedy, it would appear that the German Officer Corps was less to blame for its actions—or lack of action within the broader framework of the German nation—than has often been believed to be the case, primarily because the actions of the officers were often the result of factors beyond the control of soldiers. Such a conclusion may be at variance with that of other writers on the subject. The weight of evidence examined, however, will not support a different conclusion, particularly when one analyzes the conduct of tactical units at Field Army and lower echelons of command. In this century the soldiers of the German Army have undergone two severe tests. It remains only for history to establish the answer to this question: Has this been the German Army’s guilt or the German Army’s fate?

This work examines, among other topics, the personal oath of loyalty that the officers of the German army swore to Adolf Hitler on August 2, 1934. It discusses how the majority of officers--those who did not become conspirators against him--complied with Hitler's orders until May 1945 despite his cruel treatment of soldiers, militarily unsound strategy and tactics, and the widespread destruction and crimes he and his forces committed. The oath taken by the officers had a strong psychological effect among a proud corps with a long history of obedience and honor, causing them to follow Hitler until the end even though they knew they were fighting a losing battle. The author also examines why and how only a few officers, the conspirators, began to break away, lose trust in Hitler, oppose him and finally stage an assassination attempt. The work traces the development within the German army from 1918 of the philosophies of loyalty and disloyalty--and obedience and disobedience--as challenged by the Hitlerian oath of loyalty.