Germany And The Diplomacy Of The Financial Crisis 1931

Using documents only recently available, this pioneering book explores the interaction of German, British, French, and American policy at a time when the great depression and the growing political power of the Nazis had created a European crisis--the only such crisis between 1910 and 1941 in which the United States played a leading role. The author uses contemporary records to rectify the later accounts of such participants as Herbert Hoover, Julius Curtius, and Paul Schmidt. He describes the negotiations of the major powers arising out of the Austro-German plans for a customs union, and relates this problem to the question of terminating reparations and war debts. He shows how the Governor of the Bank of England directed British foreign policy into bitter opposition to France and how the German government sought to exploit the German private debt to Wall Street. Edward Bennett comes to the conclusion that the Br ning government, contrary to widely held opinion, received fully as much help as it deserved, while the Western powers were already showing the disunity and irresponsibility which proved so disastrous in later years. Although primarily a diplomatic history, this book also offers fresh information on pre-Hitler Germany, MacDonald's Britain, the Hoover administration, and the early career of Pierre Laval.

Germany's financial collapse in the summer of 1931 was one of the biggest economic catastrophes of modern history. It led to a global panic, brought down the international monetary system, and turned a worldwide recession into a prolonged depression. The crisis also contributed decisively to the rise of Hitler. Within little more than a year of its onset, the Nazis were Germany's largest political party at both the regional and national level, paving the way for Hitler's eventual seizure of power in January 1933. The origins of the collapse lay in Germany's large pile of foreign debt denominated in gold-backed currencies, which condemned the German government to cut spending, raise taxes, and lower wages in the middle of a worldwide recession. As political resistance to this policy of austerity grew, the German government began to question its debt obligations, prompting foreign investors to panic and sell their German assets. The resulting currency crisis led to the failure of the already weakened banking system and a partial sovereign default. Hitler managed to profit from the crisis because he had been the most vocal critic of the reparation regime responsible for the lion's share of German debts. As the financial system collapsed, his relentless attacks against foreign creditors and the alleged complicity of the German government resonated more than ever with the electorate. The ruling parties that were responsible for the situation lost their credibility and became defenceless in the face of his onslaught against an establishment allegedly selling the country out to her foreign creditors. Meanwhile, these creditors hesitated too long to take the wind out of Hitler's sails by offering debt relief. In this way, a financial crisis soon developed into a political catastrophe for both Europe and the world.

Based on new archival research, this is the first comprehensive study of the failure of international co-operation to combat the Great Depression. The book explores the impact of protectionism, reparations and war debts, as well as the more well known disagreements on monetary issues which, together, helped to prolong the most profound economic depression of the twentieth century. The economic and diplomatic lessons drawn from this period by the major powers - particularly German intelligence as to the deep divisions in Anglo-American economic relations - also provide an important contribution to understanding the origins of the Second World War and the diplomatic and economic order created in its aftermath.

The continuity issue has been a theme in German historiography for half a century. Historians have examined the foreign policy of Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany that led to two world wars. Dr. William Young examines the continuity of German Foreign Office influence in the formulation of foreign policy under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck (1862-1890), Kaiser William II (1888-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), and Adolf Hitler (1933-1945). He stresses the role and influence of strong German leaders in the making of policy and the conduct of foreign relations. German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945 will be of value to individuals interested in the history of Germany, Modern Europe, and International Relations.

The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 was both an economic catastrophe and a watershed event in world politics. In American Power after the Financial Crisis, Jonathan Kirshner explains how the crisis altered the international balance of power, affecting the patterns and pulse of world politics. The crisis, Kirshner argues, brought about an end to what he identifies as the "second postwar American order" because it undermined the legitimacy of the economic ideas that underpinned that order—especially those that encouraged and even insisted upon uninhibited financial deregulation. The crisis also accelerated two existing trends: the relative erosion of the power and political influence of the United States and the increased political influence of other states, most notably, but not exclusively, China.Looking ahead, Kirshner anticipates a "New Heterogeneity" in thinking about how best to manage domestic and international money and finance. These divergences—such as varying assessments of and reactions to newly visible vulnerabilities in the American economy and changing attitudes about the long-term appeal of the dollar—will offer a bold challenge to the United States and its essentially unchanged disposition toward financial policy and regulation. This New Heterogeneity will contribute to greater discord among nations about how best to manage the global economy. A provocative look at how the 2007–2008 economic collapse diminished U.S. dominance in world politics, American Power after the Financial Crisis suggests that the most significant and lasting impact of the crisis and the Great Recession will be the inability of the United States to enforce its political and economic priorities on an increasingly recalcitrant world.

As the world shifts away from the unquestioned American hegemony that followed in the wake of the Cold War, the United States is likely to face new kinds of threats and sharper resource constraints than it has in the past. However, the country's alliances, military institutions, and national security strategy have changed little since the Cold War. American foreign and defense policies, therefore, should be assessed for their fitness for achieving sustainable national security amidst the dynamism of the international political economy, changing domestic politics, and even a changing climate. This book brings together sixteen leading scholars from across political science, history, and political economy to highlight a range of American security considerations that deserve a larger role in both scholarship and strategic decision-making. In these chapters, scholars of political economy and the American defense budget examine the economic engine that underlies U.S. military might and the ways the country deploys these vast (but finite) resources. Historians illuminate how past great powers coped with changing international orders through strategic and institutional innovations. And regional experts assess America's current long-term engagements, from NATO to the chaos of the Middle East to the web of alliances in Asia, deepening understandings that help guard against both costly commitments and short-sighted retrenchments. This interdisciplinary volume sets an agenda for future scholarship that links politics, economics, and history in pursuit of sustainable security for the United States - and greater peace and stability for Americans and non-Americans alike.