Germany And The Use Of Force

"Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a sophisticated and innovative framework to understand developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to '9/11' and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. The study then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the 'domestics' of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. The book concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture and argues that it will continue to define Berlin's approach to the use of force. Crucially, this may mean that Germany's perspectives may depart substantially from those of its key partners and allies. This book is essential reading for all those interested in contemporary European security as well as German politics"--Publisher's description.

In this study of German security policy after Iraq, Kerry Longhurst considers the evolution of Germany's peculiar approach to the use of force after the Cold War through the conceptual prism of strategic culture.

While developments in the 1990s saw Germany move away from its rigidly prohibitive stance towards the use of force, Berlin's policy in the war on terrorism suggested that Germany may be retreating into a new form of self-imposed restraint. In this first major English language study of German security policy after Iraq, Kerry Longhurst considers the evolution of Germany's peculiar approach to the use of force after the Cold War through the conceptual prism of strategic culture. The timeliness of this volume brings with it fresh analysis of the origins and substance of Germany's strategic culture, which the author subsequently explores in a contemporary context against the background of the changing role of the Bundeswehr from 1990--2003. The book also provides unique and in-depth analysis of Germany's troubled efforts at defense sector reform in the 1990s and considers the complex politics surrounding conscription.

The Politics of Military Force examines the dynamics of discursive change that made participation in military operations possible against the background of German antimilitarist culture. Once considered a strict taboo, so-called out-of-area operations have now become widely considered by German policymakers to be without alternative. The book argues that an understanding of how certain policies are made possible (in this case, military operations abroad and force transformation), one needs to focus on processes of discursive change that result in different policy options appearing rational, appropriate, feasible, or even self-evident. Drawing on Essex School discourse theory, the book develops a theoretical framework to understand how discursive change works, and elaborates on how discursive change makes once unthinkable policy options not only acceptable but even without alternative. Based on a detailed discourse analysis of more than 25 years of German parliamentary debates, The Politics of Military Force provides an explanation for: (1) the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse in German security policy after the end of the Cold War (discursive change), (2) the rearticulation of German antimilitarism in the process (ideational change/norm erosion) and (3) the resulting making-possible of military operations and force transformation (policy change). In doing so, the book also demonstrates the added value of a poststructuralist approach compared to the naive realism and linear conceptions of norm change so prominent in the study of German foreign policy and International Relations more generally.

Master's Thesis from the year 2003 in the subject Politics - Topic: German Foreign Policy, grade: 8 (of 10), University of Amsterdam (FMG), language: English, abstract: If we look back at more than a decade of united Germany’s foreign policy, there seems to be a shift away from the former military `culture of restraint`. Throughout the 1990s, German troops have been increasingly deployed in military operations `out of area` and for the first time since the Second World War participated in combat missions in the Kosovo War in 1999. Consequently, the “FRG has read the signs of the new time and feels ready to take on the role of a European power”. Has the reunited country actually gained power? Has the removal of the last boundaries of German sovereignty triggered a quest for more political autonomy that manifests itself in an increased military activity? Does this comparatively more `permissive` use of force indicate a fundamental shift away from former traditional principles of the Bonn Republic? Or does the Berlin Republic head toward a militarized German foreign policy in the context of Euro-Atlantic hegemony? It is Germany’s security policy as a cornerstone of foreign policy that I am going to examine between 1990 and 2003 to be able to make some inferences of foreign policy changes. Secondly, by looking of some factors that might have had an impact on these eventual changes one might additionally gain some further implications. The aim of this thesis is therefore twofold: I intend to contribute with this work to the debate whether since reunification change or continuity prevails in German foreign policy, while I additionally attempt a causal analyses of new elements in it. The scope of that debate will be in so far enhanced as it tries to generate causal inferences as well.

American policy makers must understand the fundamental limitations on what Germany can be expected to contribute in future NATO operations such as the peace implementation mission currently underway in Bosnia. This paper will therefore analyze the deep divisions which exist within Germany regarding the role of force in international relations. The first section concerns the influence of history, law, and military practice that have shaped current attitudes toward military power and the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. This is followed by an analysis of the positions of the major German political parties across the spectrum from Right to Left. Next, specific trends are identified which are working to force Germany toward a decision in favor of professionalizing its armed services. Finally, the impact of the gradual evolution of Germany's view of the role of force on its relations with the United States and the European Union is considered.

This book examines the ways in which the relationship between public opinion and the use of military force has developed since the end of the Cold War. It addresses the question of whether a democratic foreign policy is possible.

This book investigates, and explains, the extent to which different liberal democracies have resorted to the use of force since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The responses of democratic states throughout the world to the September 2001 terrorist attacks have varied greatly. This book analyses the various factors that had an impact on decisions on the use of force by governments of liberal democratic states. It seeks to explain differences in the security policies and practices of Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the UK regarding the war in Afghanistan, domestic counterterrorism measures and the Iraq War. To this end, the book combines the concepts of strategic culture and securitisation into a theoretical model that disentangles the individual structural and agential causes of the use of force by the state and sequentially analyses the impact of each causal component on the other. It argues that the norms of a strategic culture shape securitisation processes of different expressions, which then bring about distinct modes of the use of force in individual security policy decisions. While governments can also deviate from the constraints of a strategic culture, this is likely to encounter a strong reaction from large parts of the population which in turn can lead to a long-term change in strategic culture. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic culture, securitisation, European politics, security studies and IR in general.