Germany Propaganda And Total War 1914 1918

Adolf Hitler, writing in Mein Kampf, was scathing in his condemnation of German propaganda in the First World War, declaring that Germany had failed to recognize propaganda as a weapon of the first order. This despite the fact that propaganda had been regarded, arguably for the first time, as an intrinsic part of the war effort. David Welch has written the first book to fully examine German society -- politics, propaganda, public opinion, and total war -- in the Great War. Drawing on a wide range of sources -- from posters, newspapers, journals, film, parliamentary debates, police and military reports, and private papers -- Welch argues that the moral collapse of Germany was due less to the failure to disseminate propaganda than to the inability of the military authorities and the Kaiser to reinforce this propaganda, and to acknowledge the importance of public opinion in forging an effective link between leadership and the people.

World War I was the first large-scale industrialized military conflict, and it led to the concept of total war. The essays in this volume analyze the experience of the war in light of this concept's implications, in particular the erosion of distinctions between the military and civilian spheres.

Adolf Hitler, writing in Mein Kampf, was scathing in his condemnation of German propaganda in World War I, declaring that Germany failed to recognise that the mobilization of public opinion was a weapon of the first order. This, despite the fact that propaganda had been regarded by the German leadership, arguably for the first time, as an intrinsic part of the war effort. In this book, David Welch fully examines German society - politics, propaganda, public opinion and total war - in the Great War. Drawing on a wide range of sources - posters, newspapers, journals, film, Parliamentary debates, police and military reports and private papers - he argues that the moral collapse of Germany was due less to the failure to disseminate propaganda than to the inability of the military authorities and the Kaiser to reinforce this propaganda, and to acknowledge the importance of public opinion in forging an effective link between leadership and the people.

As war raged in Europe, both Germany and Great Britain recognized the significance of United States neutrality on the conduct of the war. Both countries launched the first wave of war propaganda for the hearts and minds of Americans; the British sought to involve the United States as an active participant, while the Germans hoped to maintain at least some form of American neutrality. Once America entered the war in 1917, the United States government launched its own propaganda campaign. The president established the Committee on Public Information to rally the people to the war effort. As the war wound down, the Committee initiated still another campaign; this time the target was the Communists. This history details each campaign and examines the long-term effects of the government's first forays into mass persuasion.

World War I and Propaganda offers a new look at a familiar subject. The contributions to this volume demonstrate that the traditional view of propaganda as top-down manipulation is no longer plausible. Drawing from a variety of sources, scholars examine the complex negotiations involved in propaganda within the British Empire, in occupied territories, in neutral nations, and how war should be conducted. Propaganda was tailored to meet local circumstances and integrated into a larger narrative in which the war was not always the most important issue. Issues centering on local politics, national identity, preservation of tradition, or hopes of a brighter future all played a role in different forms of propaganda. --Provided by publisher.

This volume focuses on the extremity of anti-English feeling in Germany in the early years of the Great War, and on the attempt by writers, propagandists and cartoonists to redefine Britain as the chief enemy of the people and their cultural heritage.