Getting To Dayton

For over four years, Washington responded to war in Bosnia by handing the problem to the Europeans to resolve and substituting high-minded rhetoric for concerted action. Then, in the summer of 1995, the Clinton administration suddenly shifted course, deciding to assert the leadership that would prove necessary to end the war in Bosnia. This book—based on numerous interviews with key participants in the decisionmaking process and written by a former National Security Council aide—examines how the policy to end the war took shape. Getting to Dayton is a powerful case study of how determined individuals can exploit their positions to change U.S. government policy on crucial issues. In so doing, Daalder not only explains how Washington launched the diplomacy that culminated at Dayton, but also why the subsequent peace proved to be difficult to establish. Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 1995 to 1996 he served on the National Security Council staff as Director for European Affairs, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy for Bosnia. His most recent publications include The United States and Europe in the Global Arena (1998) and Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement (1997). He is co-author of Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo, which will be published in 2000.

*Finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Biography* *Winner of the Los Angeles Times Prize for Biography* *Winner of the 2019 Hitchens Prize* "Portrays Holbrooke in all of his endearing and exasperating self-willed glory...Both a sweeping diplomatic history and a Shakespearean tragicomedy... If you could read one book to comprehend American's foreign policy and its quixotic forays into quicksands over the past 50 years, this would be it."--Walter Isaacson, The New York Times Book Review "By the end of the second page, maybe the third, you will be hooked...There never was a diplomat-activist quite like [Holbrooke], and there seldom has been a book quite like this -- sweeping and sentimental, beguiling and brutal, catty and critical, much like the man himself."--David M. Shribman, The Boston Globe Richard Holbrooke was brilliant, utterly self-absorbed, and possessed of almost inhuman energy and appetites. Admired and detested, he was the force behind the Dayton Accords that ended the Balkan wars, America's greatest diplomatic achievement in the post-Cold War era. His power lay in an utter belief in himself and his idea of a muscular, generous foreign policy. From his days as a young adviser in Vietnam to his last efforts to end the war in Afghanistan, Holbrooke embodied the postwar American impulse to take the lead on the global stage. But his sharp elbows and tireless self-promotion ensured that he never rose to the highest levels in government that he so desperately coveted. His story is thus the story of America during its era of supremacy: its strength, drive, and sense of possibility, as well as its penchant for overreach and heedless self-confidence. In Our Man, drawn from Holbrooke's diaries and papers, we are given a nonfiction narrative that is both intimate and epic in its revelatory portrait of this extraordinary and deeply flawed man and the elite spheres of society and government he inhabited.

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This book examines the costs and benefits of ending the fighting in a range of conflicts, and probes the reasons why negotiators provide, or fail to provide, resolutions that go beyond just 'stopping the shooting.' A wide range of case studies is marshaled to explore relevant peacemaking situations, from the end of the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars, to more recent settlements of the late 20th and early 21st centuries—including large scale conflicts like the end of WWII and smaller scale, sometimes internal conflicts like those in Cyprus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Mozambique. Cases on Bosnia and the Middle East add extra interest.

The author reveals that from the outset, the military leaders set to execute the campaign had no clear strategic guidance on what the operation was to achieve, and he further argues that the airpower community's general focus on high-intensity wars hampered them from developing strategies to fit the political complexities of the Kosovo crisis."--BOOK JACKET.

Investigates ATPT influence on regional telephone companies in their relations with national labor unions.