Government Response To Report On Private Finance Projects And Off Balance Sheet Debt

A report that recommends a reform of the way, financial liabilities arising from private finance projects (PFPs) are treated in public accounts. It also deals with the growth in the secondary market for PFPs where investors sell on their stake in a project, in many cases once the construction period of that project has been completed.

This report recommends a reform of the way financial liabilities arising from private finance projects (PFPs) are treated in public accounts. The Government should publish figures for total PFP liabilities as a separate item alongside figures for public sector net debt. The Committee believes that PFPs' whole life approach to projects, in which the private contractor is responsible for long-term maintenance as well as construction, can have benefits and could be adopted more widely in public procurement. PFPs' scope could be broadened to include the transfer of further risks to the private sector, including those of some mainstream services (for example, in the health and education sectors), rather than just ancillary services as at present. The report also deals with the growth in the secondary market for PFPs where investors sell on their stake in a project, in many cases once the construction period of that project has been completed. The Committee is concerned that the ability of construction companies to do this might negate one of the key advantages of PFPs over traditional procurement - that the developers have an ongoing responsibility for maintenance and are therefore motivated to use high quality materials and construction processes. The Committee queries some aspects of the value for money tests public authorities are required to undertake when comparing estimates of costs for PFPs with traditional procurement.

The COVID-19 crisis, which has sent economies in South Asia and around the world into a deep recession, has highlighted South Asia’s rising debt levels and sizable hidden liabilities. State-owned enterprises, state-owned commercial banks, and public-private partnerships have been at the center of the rising debt wave and the latest pandemic response. Historically,South Asia has relied on these direct public interventions more than other regions. The interventions have helped governments tackle key development challenges and rapidly deliver relief measures during crises. However, because of their inefficiencies and weak governance, the interventions are also a significant source of public indebtedness and macrofinancial risks. Hidden Debt examines the trade-off between tackling development challenges through direct state presence in the market and avoiding unsustainable debt due to economic inefficiencies of such off†“balance sheet operations, which greatly leverage public capital. The study recommends a reform agenda based on the four interrelated principles of purpose, incentives, transparency, and accountability (PITA). The reforms can mitigate the risks that off†“balance sheet operations will become the source of the next financial crisis in South Asia.

This book discusses the reform and improvement of Chinese legislation on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs), the goal being to help its implementation in China satisfy international standards. In this regard, current Chinese laws are found to be insufficient when it comes to reducing risks to PFIPs, due to certain shortcomings. Therefore, the corresponding legislation must be reformed and improved.The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions drafted by UNCITRAL are discussed as the international standards that can effectively guide this reform; other countries’ laws on PFIPs provide supplementary reference material.Given the rapid rise in the use of PFIPs in China, this book offers a strong theoretical basis for improving Chinese legislation. It also provides general suggestions that can be applied to the reform of laws on PFIPs in any country.

There are legitimate concerns being expressed about the continuing financial cost of PFI for public organisations such as NHS Trusts. The Committee believes that some of the Government's case for using PFI has not been based on robust analysis, but on ill-founded comparisons and invalid assumptions. The costs and benefits identified in business cases need to be revisited after contracts are signed and periodically thereafter, to inform future procurement decisions. In particular, the Committee's view is that the Government should revisit the tax assumptions it builds into the cost and benefit case for PFI. Taxpayers could get a much better deal from PFI, and the taxpayer's position is also made worse by poor transparency of investor and contract information alongside patchy public sector commercial skills. The Treasury and departments should make full use of existing contractual rights of access and further investor information to increase transparency and find ways for taxpayers to get a share of the profits made by PFI contractors. At present, PFI deals look better value for the private sector than for the taxpayer. Private sector funds have built up portfolios of PFI projects from the large market that government has created, benefiting from potential economies of scale without any obligation to share such volume gains. Government, in contrast, has a fragmented approach and is not making use of its bulk buying power. The Treasury is seeking further efficiency savings, but achieving any savings on existing contracts will depend on voluntary agreements with investors and suppliers.

By setting up an Infrastructure Financing Unit, HM Treasury helped reactivate the lending market for private finance projects which was putting government PFI programmes in doubt as a result of the credit crisis. While the extra finance costs for projects in 2009 were value for money in the short term to stimulate the economy, the Treasury should not presume that continuing the use of private finance at current rates will be value for money. In line with policy on acting to stimulate the economy, the Treasury and other government departments gave priority to closing deals at the prevailing market rates, even if this meant the public sector paying more, and the banks carrying less risk. Analysis by the NAO suggests that higher financing costs increased the annual charge of PFI projects by six to seven per cent and that between £500 million to £1 billion of higher cost has been built in over 30 years, partly offset by an increased public sector share of refinancing gains. The NAO also considered whether reconsidering business cases would have improved value for money. The NAO found that this might have put policy objectives to give a boost to the economy at risk and would not have been a reasonable yardstick to assess the protection of value for money. The NAO recommends that there now be a thorough project by project review of the forward programme to apply more exacting and narrower criteria than applied to projects at the height of the crisis

This timely book examines the legal regulation of Public_Private Partnerships (PPPs) and provides a systematic overview of PPPs and their functions. It covers both the contractual relationships between public and private actors and the relationships be