Government Support To Private Infrastructure Projects In Emerging Markets

January 1998 For citizens to reap the full benefits of private investment in infrastructure, infrastructure prices must be high enough to cover costs, and private investors must assume commercial risk. Good macroeconomic policy matters because it affects the credibility of a price regime and especially the trust in currency convertibility essential for foreign investors. Driven by fiscal austerity and disenchantment with the performance of state-provided infrastructure services, many governments have turned to the private sector to build, operate, finance, or own infrastructure in power, gas, water, transport, and telecommunications sectors. Private capital flows to developing countries are increasing rapidly; 15 percent of infrastructure investment is now funded by private capital in emerging markets. But relative to needs, such private investment is progressing slowly. Governments are reluctant to raise consumer prices to cost-covering levels, while investors, mindful of experience, fear that governments may renege on promises to maintain adequate prices over the long haul. So investors ask for government support in the form of grants, preferential tax treatment, debt or equity contributions, or guarantees. These subsidies differ in how they allocate risk between private investors and government. Efficiency gains are greatest when private parties assume the risks that they can manage better than the public sector. When governments establish good policies-especially cost-covering prices and credible commitments to stick to them-investors are willing to invest without special government support. Privatizing assets without government guarantees or other financial support is possible, even where governments are politically unable to raise prices, because investors can achieve the returns they demand by discounting the value of the assets they are purchasing. But this is not possible for new investments (greenfield projects). If prices have been set too low and the government is not willing to raise them, it must give the investor financial support, such as guarantees and other forms of subsidy, to facilitate worthwhile projects that would not otherwise proceed. But guarantees shift costs from consumers to taxpayers, who subsidize users of infrastructure services. Much of that subsidy is hidden, since the government does not record the guarantee in its fiscal accounts. And taxpayers provide unremunerated credit insurance, as the government borrows based on its ability to tax citizens if the project fails, not on the strength of the project itself. This paper-a joint product of the Regulatory Reform and Private Enterprise Division, Economic Development Institute, and the Private Participation in Infrastructure Group-was presented at the conference Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure Projects: Averting a New-Style Debt Crisis, held in Cartagena, Colombia, May 29030, 1997. Mansoor Dailami may be contacted at [email protected].

For citizens to reap the ...

Governments have long recognized the vital role that modern infrastructure services play in economic growth and poverty alleviation. For much of the post-Second World War period, most governments entrusted delivery of these services to state-owned monopolies. But in many developing countries, the results were disappointing. Public sector monopolies were plagued by inefficiency. Many were strapped for resources because governments succumbed to populist pressures to hold prices below costs. Fiscal pressures, and the success of the pioneers of the privatization of infrastructure services, provided governments with a new paradigm. Many governments sought to involve the private sector in the provision and financing of infrastructure services. The shift to the private provision that occurred during the 1990s was much more rapid and widespread than had been anticipated at the start of the decade. By 2001, developing countries had seen over $755 billion of investment flows in nearly 2500 infrastructure projects. However, these flows peaked in 1997, and have fallen more or less steadily ever since. These declines have been accompanied by high profile cancellations or renegotiations of some projects, a reduction in investor appetite for these activities and, in some parts of the world, a shift in public opinion against the private provision of infrastructure services. The current sense of disillusionment stands in stark contrast to what should in retrospect be surprise at the spectacular growth of private infrastructure during the 1990s.

"Many of the problems are related to difficulties in sustaining cost-covering user fees for these sectors. This study aims to distill the experience over the last 15 years. The main factors in the growth and subsequent decline are examined. The report assesses the impact that the private provision of infrastructure has had on service delivery and analyzes the consequences for other important goals. Main policy lessons are provided for governments that seek to ensure that the supply of infrastructure services does not become a bottleneck to growth."--BOOK JACKET.

This paper examines trends in infrastructure investment and its financing in low-income developing countries (LIDCs). Following an acceleration of public investment over the last 15 years, the stock of infrastructure assets increased in LIDCs, even though large gaps remain compared to emerging markets. Infrastructure in LIDCs is largely provided by the public sector; private participation is mostly channeled through Public-Private Partnerships. Grants and concessional loans are an essential source of infrastructure funding in LIDCs, while the complementary role of bank lending is still limited to a few countries. Bridging infrastructure gaps would require a broad set of actions to improve the efficiency of public spending, mobilize domestic resources and support from development partners, and crowd in the private sector.

Many infrastructure privatizations still leave governments—and thus taxpayers—exposed to significant financial risks. This book examines these risks and considers how governments should respond to investors' requests for guarantees and other forms of government support. The report examines how governments can decide which risks to bear and which to avoid, how they can reduce the risks that private investors face without giving guarantees, and how they can measure, budget, and account for the risks they do take on.

Driving infrastructure development, notably mobilizing financial resources for infrastructure projects, has been challenging in many countries. This study includes two parts: an empirical analysis of macroeconomic risks associated with infrastructure booms, and a case study of four emerging economies about their practice of funding infrastructure development. The study shows that (i) there is no empirical evidence that rapid infrastructure growth would undermine contemporary macroeconomic performance, implying that room is created to accommodate infrastructure booms without compromising fiscal and external sustainability; (ii) banks may play an important role in financing infrastructure, but caution is needed to avoid directed lending and regulatory forbearance that the authorities may use to promote financing; (iii) capital market development is important to accommodate the usually high financing needs, and encouraging private investors to move into infrastructure would require regulatory and institutional improvements; and (iv) public support, including credit guarantees, may help bolster investors' confidence, but the authorities should carefully monitor and manage fiscal risks.

The purpose of this guide is to enhance the chances of effective partnerships being developed between the public and the private-sector by addressing one of the main obstacles to effective PPP project delivery: having the right information on the right projects for the right partners at the right time.