Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol 83 2011

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of ContentsAbhandlungen/ArticlesB.J.C. Madison: Peacocke¿s A Priori Arguments Against ScepticismManuel Pérez Otero: Modest Skepticism and Question Begging ProperTim Kraft: Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand istTommaso Piazza: An Epistemology for the Platonist? Platonism, Field¿s Dilemma, and Judgment-Dependent TruthKareem Khalifa: Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific AntirealismBo R. Meinertsen: Distinguishing Internal, External and Grounded RelationsMax Deutsch: The Paderewski Puzzle and the Principle of SubstitutionAdrian Frey: Logicism and Carnap¿s Logical Syntax Stefania Centrone & Wolfgang Künne: Bolzanos Zeichentheorie. Eine Untersuchung zu § 285 der WissenschaftslehreMarco Iorio: ,Sollen'Håkan Salwén: The Autonomy of Aesthetic VerdictsEssay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition2. Preis: Stefan Reining: Verpflichtungen gegenüber zukünftigen Generationen im Lichte der Goldenen RegelDiskussion/DiscussionDaan Evers: Two Objections to Wide-ScopingBesprechungen/Review EssaysChristian Kanzian: Zerfällt die Welt in Tatsachen?Daniel Von Wachter: Belief, Knowledge, and OmniscienceEdgar Morscher: W. V. Quine: Was von ihm weniger bekannt und dennoch interessant istBuchnotizen/Critical Notes

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles M. Oreste Fiocco: An Absolute Principle of Truthmaking Daniel Alexander Milne: Everett¿s Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness Carlo Penco: Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate between Kripke and Künne Roberto Horácio De Sá Pereira: Phenomenal Concepts as Mental Files Ángel García Rodríguez: A Wittgensteinian Conception of Animal Minds Stefan Lukits: Carnap¿s Conventionalism in Geometry Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira: Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement Matthew Lee: Conciliationism Without Uniqueness Emanuel Viebahn: Against Context-Sensitivity Tests Christoph Kelp: How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology Ishtiyaque Haji: Event-Causal Libertarianism¿s Control Conundrums Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Salim Hirèche & Sandra Villata: Eating Animals and the Moral Value of Non-Human Suffering Simon Gaus: Folgt aus dem Unwert der Tierhaltung ein Verbot des Fleischkonsums? Jens Tuider: Dürfen wir Tiere essen? Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Ion Tănăsescu (ed.): Franz Brentano¿s Metaphysics and Psychology. Bucharest: Zeta Books. 2012. (Hamid Taieb) Biagio G. Tassone: From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano¿s Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012 (Mark Textor) Jens Glatzer: Schönheit. Ein Klärungsversuch. Frankfurt a.M. [u.a.]: Ontos-Verlag. 2012. (Philipp Dollwetzel) Peter Lamarque: Work and Object. Explorations in the Metaphysics of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. (Wolfgang Huemer)

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

This volume features 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. The contributors' essays focus on both foundational issues and applications of knowledge-first philosophy to other disciplines, including the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of perception, and ethics.

Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones. Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views? Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology.

Most of the times we open our mouth to communicate, we talk about things. This can happen because (some of) the linguistic expressions we use have semantic properties that connect them to extra-linguistic entities. Thanks to these properties, they may be used by us to refer to things. Or, as we may also say, they themselves refer to things, though in certain cases they do so only relative to a context of use. But how can we characterize the semantic properties in question? What exactly is reference? Philosophers have been trying to answer these questions at least since Plato's Cratylus, but not until the last century, when language occupied center-stage in philosophy, did the problem come to be felt as really pressing. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Gottlob Frege produced an account of reference that set the stage for the contemporary discussion. Nevertheless, around 1970 a number of powerful arguments against it were produced by Saul Kripke and others. As a result, many philosophers began to look at reference from a new perspective, which highlighted the crucial role played by wordly historical facts that may be unknown to the speakers. This semantic revolution, however, left us with a number of open problems. The eighteen original essays collected in this volume deal with many of these problems, thus contributing to our understanding of the nature of reference, its role in cognition, and the place it should be given in semantic theory.

In Form, Matter, Substance, Kathrin Koslicki develops a contemporary defense of the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism. According to this approach, objects are compounds of matter (hule) and form (morphe or eidos) and a living organism is not exhausted by the body, cells, organs, tissue and the like that compose it. Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of criteria of success. However, a plausible application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of concrete particular objects hinges on how hylomorphists conceive of the matter composing a concrete particular object, its form, and the hylomorphic relations which hold between a matter-form compound, its matter and its form. Koslicki offers detailed answers these questions surrounding a hylomorphic approach to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects. As a result, matter-form compounds emerge as occupying the privileged ontological status traditionally associated with substances due to their high degree of unity.