Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol 88 2013

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles M. Oreste Fiocco: An Absolute Principle of Truthmaking Daniel Alexander Milne: Everett¿s Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness Carlo Penco: Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate between Kripke and Künne Roberto Horácio De Sá Pereira: Phenomenal Concepts as Mental Files Ángel García Rodríguez: A Wittgensteinian Conception of Animal Minds Stefan Lukits: Carnap¿s Conventionalism in Geometry Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira: Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement Matthew Lee: Conciliationism Without Uniqueness Emanuel Viebahn: Against Context-Sensitivity Tests Christoph Kelp: How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology Ishtiyaque Haji: Event-Causal Libertarianism¿s Control Conundrums Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Salim Hirèche & Sandra Villata: Eating Animals and the Moral Value of Non-Human Suffering Simon Gaus: Folgt aus dem Unwert der Tierhaltung ein Verbot des Fleischkonsums? Jens Tuider: Dürfen wir Tiere essen? Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Ion Tănăsescu (ed.): Franz Brentano¿s Metaphysics and Psychology. Bucharest: Zeta Books. 2012. (Hamid Taieb) Biagio G. Tassone: From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano¿s Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012 (Mark Textor) Jens Glatzer: Schönheit. Ein Klärungsversuch. Frankfurt a.M. [u.a.]: Ontos-Verlag. 2012. (Philipp Dollwetzel) Peter Lamarque: Work and Object. Explorations in the Metaphysics of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. (Wolfgang Huemer)

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of ContentsAbhandlungen/ArticlesB.J.C. Madison: Peacocke¿s A Priori Arguments Against ScepticismManuel Pérez Otero: Modest Skepticism and Question Begging ProperTim Kraft: Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand istTommaso Piazza: An Epistemology for the Platonist? Platonism, Field¿s Dilemma, and Judgment-Dependent TruthKareem Khalifa: Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific AntirealismBo R. Meinertsen: Distinguishing Internal, External and Grounded RelationsMax Deutsch: The Paderewski Puzzle and the Principle of SubstitutionAdrian Frey: Logicism and Carnap¿s Logical Syntax Stefania Centrone & Wolfgang Künne: Bolzanos Zeichentheorie. Eine Untersuchung zu § 285 der WissenschaftslehreMarco Iorio: ,Sollen'Håkan Salwén: The Autonomy of Aesthetic VerdictsEssay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition2. Preis: Stefan Reining: Verpflichtungen gegenüber zukünftigen Generationen im Lichte der Goldenen RegelDiskussion/DiscussionDaan Evers: Two Objections to Wide-ScopingBesprechungen/Review EssaysChristian Kanzian: Zerfällt die Welt in Tatsachen?Daniel Von Wachter: Belief, Knowledge, and OmniscienceEdgar Morscher: W. V. Quine: Was von ihm weniger bekannt und dennoch interessant istBuchnotizen/Critical Notes

What one can know depends on one’s evidence. Good scientific theories are supported by evidence. Our experiences provide us with evidence. Any sort of inquiry involves the seeking of evidence. It is irrational to believe contrary to your evidence. For these reasons and more, evidence is one of the most fundamental notions in the field of epistemology and is emerging as a crucial topic across academic disciplines. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first major volume of its kind. Comprising forty chapters by an international team of contributors the handbook is divided into six clear parts: The Nature of Evidence Evidence and Probability The Social Epistemology of Evidence Sources of Evidence Evidence and Justification Evidence in the Disciplines The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of science and epistemology, and will also be of interest to those in related disciplines across the humanities and social sciences, such as law, religion, and history.

What entitles you to claims about your perceivable environment? Matthiessen suggests that it is neither your experience, nor the reliability of your cognitive processes, but rather your being in the right kind of perceptual situation.

How exactly could God achieve infallible foreknowledge of every future event, including the free actions of human persons? How could God exercise careful providence over these same events? Byerly offers a novel response to these important questions by contending that God exercises providence and achieves foreknowledge by ordering the times. The first part of the book defends the importance of the above questions. After characterizing the contemporary freedom-foreknowledge debate, Byerly argues that it has focused too narrowly on a certain argument for theological fatalism, which attempts to show that the existence of infallible divine foreknowledge poses a unique threat to the existence of creaturely libertarian freedom. Byerly contends, however, that bare existence of infallible divine foreknowledge cannot threaten freedom in this way; at most, the mechanics whereby this foreknowledge is achieved might so threaten human freedom. In the second part of the book, Byerly develops a model for understanding the mechanics whereby infallible foreknowledge is achieved that would not threaten creaturely libertarian freedom. According to the model, God infallibly foreknows every future event because God has placed the times that constitute the history of the world in primitive earlier-than relations to one another. After defending the consistency of this model of the mechanics of divine foreknowledge with creaturely libertarian freedom, the author applies it to divine providence more generally. A novel defense of concurrentism is the result.