Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol 92 2015

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles M. Oreste Fiocco: An Absolute Principle of Truthmaking Daniel Alexander Milne: Everett¿s Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness Carlo Penco: Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate between Kripke and Künne Roberto Horácio De Sá Pereira: Phenomenal Concepts as Mental Files Ángel García Rodríguez: A Wittgensteinian Conception of Animal Minds Stefan Lukits: Carnap¿s Conventionalism in Geometry Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira: Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement Matthew Lee: Conciliationism Without Uniqueness Emanuel Viebahn: Against Context-Sensitivity Tests Christoph Kelp: How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology Ishtiyaque Haji: Event-Causal Libertarianism¿s Control Conundrums Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Salim Hirèche & Sandra Villata: Eating Animals and the Moral Value of Non-Human Suffering Simon Gaus: Folgt aus dem Unwert der Tierhaltung ein Verbot des Fleischkonsums? Jens Tuider: Dürfen wir Tiere essen? Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Ion Tănăsescu (ed.): Franz Brentano¿s Metaphysics and Psychology. Bucharest: Zeta Books. 2012. (Hamid Taieb) Biagio G. Tassone: From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano¿s Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012 (Mark Textor) Jens Glatzer: Schönheit. Ein Klärungsversuch. Frankfurt a.M. [u.a.]: Ontos-Verlag. 2012. (Philipp Dollwetzel) Peter Lamarque: Work and Object. Explorations in the Metaphysics of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. (Wolfgang Huemer)

Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one’s simply having good reasons for some belief and one’s actually basing one’s belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature—a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason—there is hardly any widely accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together 16 essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The chapters in this collection are divided into two broad categories: (i) the nature of the basing relation; and (ii) basing and its applications. The chapters in the first section are concerned, principally, with positively characterizing the epistemic basing relation and criticizing extant accounts of it, including extant accounts of the relationship between epistemic basing and propositional and doxastic justification. The latter chapters connect epistemic basing with other topics of interest in epistemology as well as ethics, including: epistemic disjunctivism, epistemic injustice, agency, epistemic conservativism, epistemic grounding, epistemic genealogy, practical reasoning, and practical knowledge.

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

The book is a first detailed discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour, a compilation of writings on the subject from the last fifteen months of his life. The origin and significance of the remarks are explained along with a remark-by-remark guide to what Wittgenstein says. In addition to serving as an account of the thought recorded in the text, the book provides an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s treatment of colour concepts and an account of his distinctive philosophical style. Remarks on Colour is shown to be a good way into the philosophy, to reveal a great deal about how Wittgenstein approaches philosophy, and to bring out features of his thought elided, if not missed, by more general studies, especially those that focus on more finished work.

The paradoxes about truth are the subject of extensive research. Developing an original approach, this book argues that we should diverge from classical logic and presents a number of formal theories of truth. Also included is a beginner-friendly introduction to semantic paradoxes, and a discussion of alternative non-classical theories.