Great Power Strategies The United States China And Japan

This book provides a comparative study of the strategies of great powers in the Asia-Pacific, namely, the United States, China and Japan, known as the Pacific Three. It examines the evolution of each power’s strategic thinking and analyzes the three powers’ respective foreign policies and internal debates in the policymaking process. It analyzes the three countries’ conflict and cooperation from past to the present. It stresses the importance of the interactions between internal and external factors in the policymaking process, and emphasizes the great significance of these interactions for international relations theory. For example, it highlights the role of strategic advisers in think tanks and government agencies in the United States, Japan's informal and balanced policymaking process, and the impact of traditional culture in China, especially Confucianism, and the part played by Chinese think tanks.

Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China demonstrates how structural and domestic variables influence how East Asian states adjust their strategy in light of the rise of China, including how China manages its own emerging role as a regional great power. The contributors note that the shifting regional balance of power has fueled escalating tensions in East Asia and suggest that adjustment challenges are exacerbated by the politics of policymaking. International and domestic pressures on policymaking are reflected in maritime territorial disputes and in the broader range of regional security issues created by the rise of China.Adjusting to power shifts and managing a new regional order in the face of inevitable domestic pressure, including nationalism, is a challenging process. Both the United States and China have had to adjust to China's expanded capabilities. China has sought an expanded influence in maritime East Asia; the United States has responded by consolidating its alliances and expanding its naval presence in East Asia. The region's smaller countries have also adjusted to the rise of China. They have sought greater cooperation with China, even as they try to sustain cooperation with the United States. As China continues to rise and challenge the regional security order, the contributors consider whether the region is destined to experience increased conflict and confrontation.ContributorsIan Bowers, Norwegian Defence University College and Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Daniel W. Drezner, Tufts University, Brookings Institution, and Washington Post Taylor M. Fravel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, Norwegian Defence University College and Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Chung-in Moon, Yonsei University and Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea James Reilly, University of Sydney Robert S. Ross, Boston College and Harvard University Randall L. Schweller, The Ohio State University ystein Tunsjø, Norwegian Defence University College and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Wang Dong, Peking University

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

China's reemergence as a great power over the next few decades represents the primary strategic challenge for the U.S.-Japan security alliance and for the East Asian security landscape writ large. A clearer understanding of the fundamental underpinnings and trajectory of China's foreign policy and security strategies toward the region is necessary to navigate these challenges and assure stability and prosperity in Asia. As such, this report seeks to illuminate the new Chinese leadership's preoccupations, priorities, and policy predilections so that key stakeholders in East and Southeast Asia can determine how they can contribute both individually and collectively to keeping Asia safe and prosperous in a period of great uncertainty and diminishing resources.

Stunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think about—and rethink—international order and security? Japan's "opening," German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev's "new thinking" molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policy—and in other cases their equally surprising absence?The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing so depends on a particular nexus of policy expectations, national experience, and ready replacement ideas. In a sweeping comparative history, Legro explores the sources of strategy in the United States and Germany before and after the world wars, in Tokugawa Japan, and in the Soviet Union. He charts the likely future of American primacy and a rising China in the coming century. Rethinking the World tells us when and why we can expect changes in the way states think about the world, why some ideas win out over others, and why some leaders succeed while others fail in redirecting grand strategy.

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

"A superb book.…Mearsheimer has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers."—Barry R. Posen, The National Interest The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

This open access book assesses the profound impact of Japan’s aspirations to become a great power on Japanese security, democracy and foreign relations. Rather than viewing the process of normalization and rejuvenation as two decades of remilitarization in face of rapidly changing strategic environment and domestic political circumstances, this volume contextualizes Japan’s contemporary international relations against the longer grain of Japanese historical interactions. It demonstrates that policies and statecraft in the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s era are a continuation of a long, unbroken and arduous effort by successive generations of leaders to preserve Japanese autonomy, enhance security and advance Japanese national interests. Arguing against the notion that Japan cannot work with China as long as the US-Japan alliance is in place, the book suggests that Tokyo could forge constructive relations with Beijing by engaging China in joint projects in and outside of the Asia-Pacific in issue areas such as infrastructure development or in the provision of international public goods. It also submits that an improvement in Japan-China relations would enhance rather than detract Japan-US relations and that Tokyo will find that her new found autonomy in the US-Japan alliance would not only accord her more political respect and strategic latitude, but also allow her to ameliorate the excesses of American foreign policy adventurism, paving for her to become a truly normal great power.