Greed Chaos And Governance

Public choice theory should be taken seriously--but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.

"From healthcare to workplace conduct, the federal government is taking on ever more responsibility for managing our lives. At the same time, Americans have never been more disaffected with Washington, seeing it as an intrusive, incompetent, wasteful giant. The most alarming consequence of ineffective policies, in addition to unrealized social goals, is the growing threat to the government's democratic legitimacy. Understanding why government fails so often--and how it might become more effective--is an urgent responsibility of citizenship. In this book, lawyer and political scientist Peter Schuck provides a wide range of examples and an enormous body of evidence to explain why so many domestic policies go awry--and how to right the foundering ship of state.Schuck argues that Washington's failures are due not to episodic problems or partisan bickering, but rather to deep structural flaws that undermine every administration, Democratic and Republican. These recurrent weaknesses include unrealistic goals, perverse incentives, poor and distorted information, systemic irrationality, rigidity and lack of credibility, a mediocre bureaucracy, powerful and inescapable markets, and the inherent limits of law. To counteract each of these problems, Schuck proposes numerous achievable reforms, from avoiding moral hazard in student loan, mortgage, and other subsidy programs, to empowering consumers of public services, simplifying programs and testing them for cost-effectiveness, and increasing the use of "big data." The book also examines successful policies--including the G.I. Bill, the Voting Rights Act, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and airline deregulation--to highlight the factors that made them work.An urgent call for reform, Why Government Fails So Often is essential reading for anyone curious about why government is in such disrepute and how it can do better"--

This important book examines transatlantic economic relations in the 1990s, and in particular efforts by the United States and the European Union to establish new forms of governance to cope with increasing economic interdependence. The authors explain the development of transatlantic cooperation, culminating in the multi-leveled governance mechanisms of the New Transatlantic Agenda. They assess, as well, central questions about the nature of transatlantic governance, as reflected in competing international relations theories of intergovernmental, transgovernmental (technocratic), and transnational (civil society) relations. Bringing together leading scholars from political science and law, the book provides a rich mix of analytic and normative perspectives that will be an invaluable resource for scholars, students, and policymakers alike.

Critics of globalization claim that economic integration drains political authority from states: devolving authority to newly empowered regions, delegating it to supranational organizations, and transferring it to multinational firms and nongovernmental organizations. Globalization is also attacked for forcing convergence of state institutions and policies and threatening the ability of societies to chart their own democratically determined courses. In Governance in a Global Economy, Miles Kahler and David Lake assemble the contributions of seventeen leading scholars who have systematically investigated how global economic integration produces changes of governance. These authors conclude that globalization has created a new and intricate fabric of governance, but one that fails to match the stark portrait of beleaguered states. Exploring changes in governance across several policy areas (such as tourism, trade, finance, and fiscal and monetary policy), the authors demonstrate that globalization changes the policy preferences of some actors, increases the bargaining power of others, and opens new institutional options for yet others. By reintroducing agency and choice into our understanding of globalization, this book provides important new insights into the complex and contingent effects of globalization on political authority and governance. The introduction and the conclusion are by the editors; the contributors are James A. Caporaso, Benjamin J. Cohen, Barry Eichengreen, Zachary Elkins, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Gourevitch, Virginia Haufler, Michael J. Hiscox, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, Walter Mattli, Kathleen R. McNamara, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Jonathan Rodden, Ronald Rogowski, Beth A. Simmons, and Peter Van Houten.

The book offers the first systematic treatment of European, American and international 'standards law' in the English language.

This publication presents recent OECD papers on risk and regulatory policy. They offer measures for developing, or improving, coherent risk governance policies.

An interdisciplinary and international study addressing conflict of interest in different spheres and at different levels of governance.

This book offers a radical and provocative revision of the theory of separation of powers. It argues that, although designed to protect democracy, separation of powers is often used today to undermine it by concealing and centralising the exercise of power by public officials. The theory is then reinvented for the modern regulatory state.