Greek Democracy And The Junta

"More than half a century after the imposition of the dictatorship of the Colonels in Greece, a number of questions related to its nature, development and demise remains understudied and feebly answered. One of the most interesting -yet understudied- incidents of the dictatorship is its ill-fated self-transformation attempt into some form of civilian rule in 1973: the so-called 'Markezinis experiment', after the politician who assumed the task of heading the transition government and lead to elections. The whole venture lasted a mere eight weeks, faced heavy opposition from both the opposition elites and the civil society and eventually collapsed by a military hard-liners' coup. The story of this failed attempt raises a series of questions: what was the nature of the dictatorship of the Colonels, and why did it take it six years to seek some form of civilianisation? Were the intentions of Papadopoulos and Markezinis sincere, and were the politicians of the opposition right to refuse to legitimise the 'experiment'? What was the Polytechnic students' uprising role in the demise of the 'experiment'? Was there an American reaction, and was it the main reason for the collapse of the transition, as Markezinis claimed? The book seeks to address the above questions, and argues that the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment' paved the way for the actual transition of 1974 as it happened. The research is supported by foreign (British and American) archival resources, as well as by private archives and personal interviews. The book concludes by briefly seeking to trace some potential alternative paths for the failed self- transformation attempt, and by accounting for the long-term consequences of the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment'."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

This book examines the international dimensions of the Greek military dictatorship of 1967 to 1974 and uses it as a case study to evaluate the major shifts occurring in the international system during a period of rapid change. The policies of the major nation-states in both East and West were determined by realistic Cold War considerations. At the same time, the Greek junta, a profoundly anti-modernist force, failed to cope with an evolving international agenda and the movement towards international cooperation. Denouncing it became a rallying point both for international organizations and for human rights activists, and it enabled the EEC to underscore the notion that democracy was an integral characteristic of the European identity. This volume is an original in-depth study of an under-researched subject and the multiple interactions of a complex era. It is divided into three sections: Part I deals with the interaction of the Colonels with state actors; Part II deals with the responses of international organizations and the rising transnational human rights agenda for which the Greek junta became a totemic rallying point; and Part III compares and contrasts the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe, and analyses the different models of transition and region-building, and how they intersected with attempts to foster a European identity. The Greek dictatorship may have been a parochial military regime, but its rise and fall interacted with signifi cant international trends and can therefore serve as a salient case study for promoting a better understanding of international and European trends during the 1960s and 1970s. This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War studies, international history, foreign policy, transatlantic relations and International Relations, in general.

During the dictatorship of the Colonels in Greece, there was an attempt at self-transformation into some form of civilian rule in 1973: the so-called 'Markezinis experiment', named after the politician who assumed the task of heading the transition government and lead to elections. It lasted a mere eight weeks, faced heavy opposition from both the opposition elites and the civil society and eventually collapsed by a military hard-liners' coup. This book argues that the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment' paved the way for the actual transition of 1974 as it happened. Using British and American archival resources, as well as unique private archives and personal interviews, the book concludes by briefly seeking to trace some potential alternative paths for the failed self- transformation attempt, and by accounting for the long-term consequences of the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment'.

Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Politics - Miscellaneous, grade: 1,7, Marmara University, course: Turkish Greek relations, 26 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: This term paper shall take a deeper look at the military regimes in Turkey and Greece. For a better understanding of the historical background an overview over the military regimes in point 2 of the term paper is inevitable. After that in point 3 - the main part of the paper - a comparative analysis is carried out whereby at first the theoretical framework is pointed out before it comes to the actual comparison. My analysis focuses on the military regimes that were evoked by coups d' tat in both countries. With limitations to space I only draw attention to the last military regimes in both countries, meaning the junta in Greece from 1967-74 and in Turkey from 1980-83. Those timeframes are to be compared in this term paper. In the following part 4 I will also draw my attention to the role of the military in Greece and Turkey today, how the perception of the military changed and the role it is taking in the current society with regard to its power and influence. This will lead to a final estimation in the last part of the term paper.

During the dictatorship of the Colonels in Greece, there was an attempt at self-transformation into some form of civilian rule in 1973: the so-called 'Markezinis experiment', named after the politician who assumed the task of heading the transition government and lead to elections. It lasted a mere eight weeks, faced heavy opposition from both the opposition elites and the civil society and eventually collapsed by a military hard-liners' coup. This book argues that the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment' paved the way for the actual transition of 1974 as it happened. Using British and American archival resources, as well as unique private archives and personal interviews, the book concludes by briefly seeking to trace some potential alternative paths for the failed self- transformation attempt, and by accounting for the long-term consequences of the failure of the 'Markezinis experiment'.

Grækenlands historie med tyngde på perioden fra det "militære statskup" 21.4. 1967 gennemført ved hjælp af græske militære enheder, hvorved oberst Papadopoulos blev leder af "militærjuntaen". Om Cypern krisen og kong Konstatins mislykkede forsøg på at styrte juntaen samt juntaens besværligheder med de øvrige europæiske lande og Europarådet, landets indre forhold herunder den græske modstand mod juntaen anført af Papandreou