Green Leviathan Or The Poetics Of Political Liberty

This book discusses the problem of freedom and the limits of liberalism considering the challenges of governing climate change and artificial intelligence (AI). It mobilizes resources from political philosophy to make an original argument about the future of technology and the environment. Can artificial intelligence save the planet? And does that mean we will have to give up our political freedom? Stretching the meaning of freedom but steering away from authoritarian options, this book proposes that, next to using other principles such as justice and equality and taking collective action and cooperating at a global level, we adopt a positive and relational conception of freedom that creates better conditions for human and non-human flourishing. In contrast to easy libertarianism and arrogant techno-solutionism, this offers a less symptomatic treatment of the global crises we face and gives technologies such as AI a role in the gathering of a new, more inclusive political collective and the ongoing participative making of new common worlds. Written in a clear and accessible style, Green Leviathan or the Poetics of Political Liberty will appeal to researchers and students working in political philosophy, environmental philosophy, and the philosophy of technology.

This book argues that contractarianism is well suited as a political morality and explores the implications of deploying it in this way. It promises to revive contractarianism as a viable political theory, breaking it free from its Rawlsian moorings while taking seriously the long-standing objections to it. It’s natural to think that the state owes things to its people: physical security, public health and sanitation services, and a functioning judiciary, for example. But is there a theory—a political morality—that can explain why this is so and who the state’s people are? This new contractarianism deploys a reversed state of nature thought experiment as the starting point of political theorizing. From this starting point it develops a political morality: a theory of the common ground of the role moralities attached to the various roles within the state. Contractarianism, so understood, can provide a basis for already popular ideas in political theory—such as political and legal liberalism—and overturn conventional wisdom, for example that the state is obligated to secure justice and that animals should have no legal standing. Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral and political philosophy.

The objective of the following collected volume is to encourage a critical reflection on the relationship between "power" and "non-power" in our contemporary "world" and, proceeding from various philosophical traditions, to investigate the multifaceted aspects of this relationship. The authors’ respective investigations proceed from an intercultural perspective and fall predominantly in the domain of political theory and philosophy. This volume takes an intercultural political perspective, which means, on the one hand, involving non-European philosophies in a global debate about power relations and their effects in the world and, on the other hand, confronting local traditions of thought with a global inquiry in order to enter into a philosophical-political dialogue with these traditions. An intercultural approach of this type to political philosophy seeks not only to join others in reflecting upon global problems, but also to decenter of our understanding of the world, drawing attention to new ways of thinking. Insofar as the authors of the planned volume deal with "concrete" philosophical-political problems unfolding in various regions of the world, they seek to shed light on burning issues like migration, human rights violations, dictatorship and language, global poverty, power asymmetries, experiences of injustice with the further goal of offering a particularly intercultural analysis of these problems along with approaches to resolving them. To date, there is no book that collects various essays from different countries and perspectives and poses political-philosophical problems from an intercultural point of view.

Across the world, AI is used as a tool for political manipulation and totalitarian repression. Stories about AI are often stories of polarization, discrimination, surveillance, and oppression. Is democracy in danger? And can we do anything about it? In this compelling and balanced book, Mark Coeckelbergh reveals the key risks posed by AI for democracy. He argues that AI, as currently used and developed, undermines fundamental principles on which liberal democracies are founded, such as freedom and equality. How can we make democracy more resilient in the face of AI? And, more positively, what can AI do for democracy? Coeckelbergh advocates not only for more democratic technologies, but also for new political institutions and a renewal of education to ensure that AI promotes, rather than hinders, the common good for the twenty-first century. Why AI Undermines Democracy and What to Do About It is illuminating reading for anyone who is concerned about the fate of democracy.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

This book draws connections and explores important questions at the intersection of the debates about relational autonomy and relational equality. Although these two research areas share several common assumptions and concerns, their connections have not been systematically explored. The essays in this volume address theoretical questions at the intersection of relational theories of autonomy and equality and also consider how these theoretical considerations play out in real-world contexts. Several chapters explore possible conceptual links between relational autonomy and equality by considering the role of values—such as agency, non-domination, and self-respect—to which both relational autonomy theorists and relational egalitarians are committed. Others reflect on how debates about autonomy and equality can clarify our thinking about oppression based on race and gender, and how such oppression affects interpersonal relationships. Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches is the first book to specifically address the relationship between these two research areas. It will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in social and political philosophy, moral philosophy, and feminist philosophy.

This book explores a topic that has recently become the subject of increased philosophical interest: how can imagination be put to epistemic use? Though imagination has long been invoked in contexts of modal knowledge, in recent years philosophers have begun to explore its capacity to play an epistemic role in a variety of other contexts as well. In this collection, the contributors address an assortment of issues relating to epistemic uses of imagination, and in particular, they take up the ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. These constraints are explored across several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modality and modal knowledge, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Taken as a whole, the contributions in this volume break new ground in explicating when and how imagination can be epistemically useful. Epistemic Uses of Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind.