Handbook On Statutory Interpretation

This book offers readers concise and user-friendly tools to help articulate the most powerful arguments to identify the legislative intent found in the statute. It provides: examples and illustrations from across Canada's federal and provincial jurisdictions; detailed analysis of the key judicial decisions and a table of cases that practitioners in particular will find extremely valuable, as well as a reproduction of both the Interpretation Act (Canada) and Interpretation Act (Quebec).

This book deciphers the often confusing and contradictory rules for interpreting legal documents and explains the way these rules relate to each other. The book goes beyond the content of the rules and focuses on their strategic use in constructing arguments and justifying outcomes.

"The modern principle is the official approach to statutory interpretation in Canada and is the foundation for the structure of this text. The modern principle focuses on the language of a statutory provision in light of its purpose, intent and context, and Hutchison devotes separate chapters to each of these aspects of statutory interpretation. The Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation also critiques the various facets of the modern principle with a view to help identify more convincing interpretations of legislative intent. In addition, it tackles complicated issues concerning both the temporal application of statutes, such as retroactivity and retrospectivity, and when legislation may interfere with "vested rights.""--Publisher's website.

Most new law is statutory law; that is, law enacted by legislators. An important question, therefore, is how should this law be interpreted by courts and agencies, especially when the text of a statute is not entirely clear. There is a great deal of scholarly literature on the rules and legal materials courts should use in interpreting statutes. This book takes a fresh approach by focusing instead on what judges should do once the legal materials fail to resolve the interpretive question. It challenges the common assumption that in such cases judges should exercise interstitial lawmaking power. Instead, it argues that--wherever one believes the interpretive inquiry has failed to resolve the statutory meaning--judges can and should use statutory default rules that are designed to maximize the satisfaction of enactable political preferences; that is, the political preferences of the polity that are shared among enough elected officials that they could and would be enacted into law if the issue were on the legislative agenda. These default rules explain many recent high-profile cases, including the Guantanamo detainees case, the sentencing guidelines case, the decision denying the FDA authority to regulate cigarettes, and the case that refused to allow the attorney general to criminalize drugs used in physician-assisted suicide.

Includes a table of cases (pages xi-xix) and a table of statutes (pages xx-xxxii).

Reprint of first edition (1896). "The following pages contain a condensed statement and exposition of the accepted canons and rules for the construction and interpretation of the written laws, whether constitutional or statutory. In accordance with the general plan of the Hornbook Series, these rules have been formulated somewhat after the manner of a code, expressed in brief black-letter paragraphs numbered consecutively throughout the book, and explained, developed, and illustrated in the text." --Preface, iii. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK [1860-1927] was also the author of the standard American law dictionary, A Dictionary of Law Containing Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern Including the Principal Terms of International, Constitutional, and Commercial Law, first published in 1891, and other works.

Suitable for students or practitioners, this authoritative overview of the legislative process and statutory interpretation moves smoothly and understandably between the theoretical and the practical. It contains in-depth discussion of such topics as theories of legislation and representation, electoral and legislative structures, extrinsic sources for statutory interpretation, and substantive canons of statutory interpretation. Reap the benefits of the authors' experience, opinions, and insight and gain a working knowledge of the area.

In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you using a gun in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. What, exactly, is textualism? Why is strict construction a bad thing? What is the true doctrine of originalism? And which is more important: the spirit of the law, or the letter? The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated.