Hedwig Conrad Martius Ontological Phenomenology

This work is an introduction to the totality of the metaphysical philosophy of nature of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). Her own training and inclination as a realist phenomenologist enables a unique perspective on central issues in modern and contemporary (twentieth century) theoretical biology and physics. Here we find novel theories of, e.g., space and time, as well as development and evolution. This work is thus of interest to anyone studying the history of the phenomenological movement as well as religious cosmology. The philosophical basis for this cosmology is Conrad-Martius’ “realontology” which is a phenomenological account of the essence of appearing reality. The full elaboration of the modes of appearing of what is real enables the unfolding of an analogical theory of “selfness” within the order of nature culminating in an account of the coming to be of humans, for whom there is an essentially distinctive world- and self-manifestation for which she reserves the term “spirit.” Key to her position is the revival of ancient metaphysical themes in new transformed guises, especially potentiality and entelechy./div Nature’s status, as a self-actuation of world-constituting essence-entelechies, places Conrad-Martius in the middle of philosophical-theological discussions of, e.g., the hermeneutical mandate of demythologization as well as the nature of evolution. Of special interest is her insistence on both nature’s self-actuating and evolving powers and a robust theory of creation./div

This book focuses on the unique philosophical relationship between Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein. The two phenomenologists discussed and debated insights and ideas about the nature of the soul, phenomenology, personhood and individuality, animal life, nature, being, and God. This book brings together for the first time leading international scholars of phenomenology to explore the philosophical exchange between both Conrad-Martius and Stein. This is an important book for understanding the development of the phenomenological movement and key phenomenological ideas and methods. It provides a critical and comprehensive overview of the key issues that helped frame both phenomenologists’ philosophical trajectories. Additionally, the ideas of Conrad-Martius and Stein are mined to address contemporary questions surrounding such topics as personal identity, animal versus human personhood, contemporary atheism, and the relationship between religion and science. The book will have great appeal to phenomenologists, philosophers, and historians of philosophy.

This volume, the first of its kind written in English, interprets the realistic-phenomenological philosophy of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). She was a prominent figure in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, the first generation of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and was known as the “first lady of German philosophy”.The articles included in this collection deal with the two main themes constituting her realistic-metaphysical phenomenology: Being and the I. The new edition includes an additional chapter opening a new path into the study of Conrad-Martius with Heidegger. In addition, the collection includes a comprehensive Introduction that describes the personal background and the social and philosophical contexts behind Conrad-Martius’s thought, with an emphasis on the mutual influence and fertilization of the group of early phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The book is aimed at scholars of philosophy and educated readers.

In The Ontological Roots of Phenomenology: Rethinking the History of Phenomenology and Its Religious Turn, Anna Jani examines the common methodological background of phenomenology. Through attention to the phenomenon of being, the existential experience of religiosity can be phenomenologically described by the ontological difference between being and beings. Jani demonstrates that the methodological inquiries connect closely with the ontological source of phenomenology. First, she elaborates on the contributions of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein from the point of view of Heidegger’s influence on the early phenomenologists from Husserl’s students. Second, she analyzes Heidegger’s reinterpretation of his own earlier thinking after the “turn,” which is formulated in the idea of the “new beginning of philosophical thinking” in the Contributions to Philosophy. In the context of clarifying the difference between being and beings, her third hypothesis about Ricœur’s critique of Heidegger reveals an ethical level. The primordiality of the ethical dimension of the action reveals the ontological foundation of the hermeneutical-phenomenological situation.

This edited volume examines women's voices in phenomenology, many of which had a formative impact on the movement but have be kept relatively silent for many years. It features papers that truly extend the canonical scope of phenomenological research. Readers will discover the rich philosophical output of such scholars as Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Gerda Walther. They will also come to see how the phenomenological movement allowed its female proponents to achieve a position in the academic world few women could enjoy at the time. The book explores the intersection of social ontology, phenomenology, and women scholars in phenomenology. The papers offer a fresh look at such topics as the nature of communities, shared values, feelings, and other mental content. In addition, coverage examines the contributions of Jewish women to the science, who were present at the beginning of the phenomenological movement. This remarkable anthology also features a paper on Gerda Walther written by Linda Lopez McAlister, former editor of the feminist journal Hypatia, who had met Walther in 1976. This book features work from the conference “Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology,” held at the University of Paderborn. Overall, it collects profiles and analysis that unveil a hidden history of phenomenology.

This is the first translation into English of early phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysical Conversations, originally published in 1921. Conrad-Martius was one of Husserl’s first students, an important part of the Göttingen Phenomenology Circle and mentor to Edith Stein, Jean Héring, and other early phenomenologists. The present volume provides the full German and English texts of the conversations, a phenomenological discussion of the nature of the human, examining the nature of body, soul, and spirit, and drawing distinctions between plants, animals, humans, and various other beings. The volume also includes two important essays on phenomenology, in which Conrad-Martius distinguishes between the phenomenological approaches of Husserl, Heidegger, and the more ontological approach of the Göttingen school of phenomenology. She is critical of Husserl’s "transcendental" and Heidegger’s "existential" approach. The conversations illustrate her use of the phenomenological method for fundamental investigations into the nature (or Wesen) of things.

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties. Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on “the afterlife”. This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, “Who are you?” I, in answering, might say “I don’t know who in the world I am.” Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what “I” refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, “Who are you?” has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal “myself”. For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but “Who are you?” or “Who am I?” might be more anguished and be rendered by “What sort of person are you?” or “What sort am I?” Such a question often surfaces in the face of a “limit-situation”, such as one’s death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our “centers”, what we also will call “Existenz”. “Existenz” here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one’s being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one’s normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one’s non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of “vocation”. We will see that it has especial ties to one’s Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage “Yonder”.