Hermeneutics As Epistemology

Historic Protestantism and evangelicalism has always been committed to the authority of Scripture and interested in the proper interpretation of the Bible. They uphold the motto: As Scripture says, God says; and as God says, Scripture says. Many today claim this type of reasoning is faulty, since individuals can no longer know the true meaning of Scripture because there are no stable metaphysical or epistemological frameworks. Moreover, they claim that approaches, such as the one presented by Carl F. H. Henry, no longer provide adequate grounds to address the pressing hermeneutical issues. This study responds to these types of claims showing each of these proposals is based upon faulty first principles or misrepresentations. This book surveys hermeneutical innovations and Henry's epistemological hermeneutic to show that Henry's epistemology is foundational to his hermeneutic, offering present-day evangelicals an epistemologically justified approach to hermeneutics as epistemology and methodology. The book will be of importance to those with interest in evangelical hermeneutics or philosophical hermeneutics in general. It provides a clear assessment of the impact of Carl F. H. Henry's epistemology and hermeneutic, and strives to respond to criticisms raised against his Augustinian, Reformed, revelational, cognitive-propositional hermeneutic.

Historic Protestantism and evangelicalism has always been committed to the authority of Scripture and interested in the proper interpretation of the Bible. They uphold the motto: As Scripture says, God says; and as God says, Scripture says. Many today claim this type of reasoning is faulty, since individuals can no longer know the true meaning of Scripture because there are no stable metaphysical or epistemological frameworks. Moreover, they claim that approaches, such as the one presented by Carl F. H. Henry, no longer provide adequate grounds to address the pressing hermeneutical issues. This study responds to these types of claims showing each of these proposals is based upon faulty first principles or misrepresentations. This book surveys hermeneutical innovations and Henry's epistemological hermeneutic to show that Henry's epistemology is foundational to his hermeneutic, offering present-day evangelicals an epistemologically justified approach to hermeneutics as epistemology and methodology. The book will be of importance to those with interest in evangelical hermeneutics or philosophical hermeneutics in general. It provides a clear assessment of the impact of Carl F. H. Henry's epistemology and hermeneutic, and strives to respond to criticisms raised against his Augustinian, Reformed, revelational, cognitive-propositional hermeneutic.

The goal of the investigation is a phenomenological theory of the methods and later the methodology of the human sciences, first of all the philological interpretation of texts. The first part is a critical reflection on the historical development of hermeneutics as method of interpreting texts and the tradition including the first steps toward the emergence of scientific methodological hermeneutics. Such reflections show that the development of hermeneutics is onesidedly founded in the development of hermeneutical consciousness, i.e. the changing attitudes in the application and rejection of cultural traditions. All methods and finally methodologies are onesidedly founded in the activities of the lifeworld. The second part is a first attempt to develop an outline of a general phenomenological theory of pre-methodical and methodical understanding in the lifeworld. The third part offers a critical phenomenologically guided analysis of methodological hermeneutics.

In the following three chapters, Ferraris examines the universalization of the domain of interpretation with Heidegger, the development of Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics with Gadamer and Derrida, and the relation between hermeneutics and epistemology, on the one hand, and the human sciences, on the other.

Hermeneutics can loosely be defined as the theory or philosophy of the interpretation of menaing. It is a central topic in the philosophy of the social sciences, the philosophy of art and language and in literary criticism. This book, first published in 1980, gives a detailed overview and analysis of the main strands of contemporary hermeneutical thought. It includes a number of readings in order to give the reader a first-hand acquaintance with the subjects and the debates within it.

In this book the author has brought together his long-standing interests in theory of scientific rationality and hermeneutic ontology by developing a hermeneutic alternative to analytic (and naturalist) epistemology of science. The hermeneutic philosophy of science is less the name of a new field of philosophical than a demand for a repetition of the basic philosophical questions of science from hermeneutic point of view. The book addresses chiefly two subjects: (I) The hermeneutic response to the models of rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge; (II) The specificity of hermeneutico-ontological approach to the cognitive pluralism in science.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.