Historical Turning Points In The German Air Force War Effort

Beskrivelse af situationen, der bevirkede et vendepunkt og problemer for Luftwaffe under 2. verdenskrig

he 20th century saw air power transformed from novelists' fantasy into stark reality. From string and canvas to precision weaponry and stealth, air power has progressed to become not only the weapon of first political choice, but often the only conceivable option. This rapid development has given rise to considerable debate and controversy with those holding entrenched views rarely slow to shout their case. Many myths have grown over the period, ranging from the once much vaunted ability of air power to win wars alone through to its impact as a coercive tool. This volume examines the theory and practice of air power from its earliest inception. The contributors have been drawn from academia and the military and represent some of the world's leading proponents on the subject. All significant eras on air power employment are examined: some are evidently turning points, while others represent continuous development. Perhaps more importantly, the book highlights the areas that could be considered to be significant, and invites the reader to enter the debate as to whether it constitutes a continuum, a turning point, or indeed a revolution.

Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.

The Development of the German Air Force, 1919 to 1939, first published in 1968, written by Professor Richard Suchenwirth, and revised and edited by Mr. Harry R. Fletcher, is one of a series of historical studies written for the United States Air Force Historical Division by men who had been key officers in or outstanding authorities on the German Air Force during World War II. The overall purpose of the series is twofold: 1) To provide the United States Air Force with a comprehensive and, insofar as possible, authoritative history of a major air force which suffered defeat in World War II, a history prepared by many of the principal and responsible leaders of that air force; 2) to provide a firsthand account of that air force’s unique combat in a major war, especially its fight against the forces of the Soviet Union. This series of studies therefore covers in large part virtually all phases of the Luftwaffe’s operations and organization, from its camouflaged origin in the Reichswehr, during the period of secret rearmament following World War I, through its participation in the Spanish Civil War and its massive operations and final defeat in World War II, with particular attention to the air war on the Eastern Front.

Adolf Hitler had high hopes for his conquest of Norway, which held both great symbolic and great strategic value for the Fuhrer. Despite early successes, however, his ambitious northern campaign foundered and ultimately failed. Adam Claasen for the first time reveals the full story of this neglected episode and shows how it helped doom the Third Reich to defeat. Hitler and Raeder, the chief of the German navy, were determined to take and keep Norway. By doing so, they hoped to preempt Allied attempts to outflank Germany, protect sea lanes for German ships, access precious Scandinavian minerals for war production, and provide a launchpad for Luftwaffe and naval operations against Great Britain. Beyond those strategic objectives, Hitler also envisioned Norway as part of a pan-Nordic stronghold—a centerpiece of his new world order. But, as Claasen shows, Hitler's grand expectations were never realized. Gring's Luftwaffe was the vital spearhead in the invasion of Norway, which marked a number of wartime firsts. Among other things, it involved the first large-scale aerial operations over sea rather than land, the first time operational objectives and logistical needs were fulfilled by air power, and the first deployment of paratroopers. Although it got off to a promising start, the German effort, particularly against British and arctic convoys, was greatly hampered by flawed strategic thinking, interservice rivalries between the Luftwaffe and navy, the failure to develop a long-range heavy bomber, the diversion of planes and personnel to shore up the German war effort elsewhere, and the northern theater's harsh climate and terrain. Claasen's study covers every aspect of this ill-fated campaign from the 1940 invasion until war's end and shows how it was eventually relegated to a backwater status as Germany fought to survive in an increasingly unwinnable war. His compelling account sharpens our picture of the German air force and widens our understanding of the Third Reich's way of war.

This book is the story of Russian aviation and Soviet Russia's progress in preparing its strength as an air power. It discusses the Russia-Germany connect post 1919, how Russians gained expertise from German know-how, and post World War II progress from Stalin to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The Battle of Stalingrad was a disaster. The German Sixth Army consisted of over 300,000 men when it approached Stalingrad in August 1942. On 2 February 1943, 91,000 remained; only some 5,000 survived Soviet captivity. Largely due to the success of previous aerial resupply operations, Luftwaffe leaders assured Hitler they could successfully supply the Sixth Army after it was trapped. However, the Luftwaffe was not up to the challenge. The primary reason was the weather, but organizational and structural flaws, as well as enemy actions, also contributed to their failure. This thesis will address why the Demyansk and Kholm airlifts convinced the Germans that airlift was a panacea for encircled forces; the lessons learned from these airlifts and how they were applied at Stalingrad; why Hitler ordered the Stalingrad airlift despite the logistical impossibility; and seek out lessons for today’s military. The primary reason for the Stalingrad tragedy was that Germany’s strategic leadership did not apply lessons learned from earlier airlifts to the Stalingrad airlift, and the U.S. military is making similar mistakes with respect to the way it is handling its lessons learned from recent military operations.