Holding And Interpretation

In his illuminating introduction, Masud Khan, to whom Dr Winnicott's case notes were entrusted, relates this definite text of Holding and Interpretation: Fragment of an Analysis to an earlier phase of the treatment of the same patient described by Winnicott in his paper 'Withdrawal and Regression', also included in this volume. The case documents the therapeutic care of a highly gifted professional man who suffered a psychotic breakdown with acute depression, and who, through analysis, and hospital treatment, was gradually helped to recovery. It is remarkable for many things: Dr Winnicott's skill at 'holding' the patient in the analytical sessions, and providing guidance through sensitive interpretation; his ability to re-enforce the patient's sexual and ego functions; his instinctive recognition of the value of silence (as a way of showing trust, and of not destroying by intent); his capacity to accept the paradox that verbal communication can be both meaningful and a negation of psychic reality; and, not least, his acute judgment of when to stop the analysis.

Interpreting and holding are the two major functions of the psychotherapist. The former was exemplified by Freud and the latter by Winnicott. The author describes the development and use of both these modalities and shows how both are used in specific therapeutic problems.

At present there exists no empirically-motivated theory of how perceivers assign a grammatically-permissible interpretation to a sentence. Implicit in many investigations of language comprehension is the idea that each constituent of a sentence is interpreted by the perceiver at the earliest conceivable point, using all potentially relevant sources of information. A variety of counter examples are presented to argue against this implicit theory of sentence interpretation. It is argued that an explicit alternative theory is needed to specify which decisions are made at which points during interpretive processing and to spell out the principles governing the processor's preferred choice at points of ambiguity or uncertainty. Several specific issues are taken concerning how the processor assigns a focal structure to an input sentence, how it identifies the topic of the sentence, how implicit restrictors on the domain of quantification are interpreted and how the identification of the content of a restrictor may guide the processor's use of discourse information. Exploiting intuitions about preferred interpretations of ambiguous sentences as well as the results of both old and new experimental studies, a theory of the preferred interpretation of Determiner Phrases is presented. This work explores important, but overlooked questions in on-line sentence interpretation and attempts to erect some of the scaffolding for an eventual theory of sentence interpretation.

Is there a single right interpretation for such cultural phenomena as works of literature, visual artworks, works of music, the self, and legal and sacred texts? In these essays, almost all written especially for this volume, twenty leading philosophers pursue different answers to this question by examining the nature of interpretation and its objects and ideals. The fundamental conflict between positions that universally require the ideal of a single admissible interpretation (singularism) and those that allow a multiplicity of some admissible interpretations (multiplism) leads to a host of engrossing questions explored in these essays: Does multiplism invite interpretive anarchy? Can opposing interpretations be jointly defended? Should competition between contending interpretations be understood in terms of (bivalent) truth or (multivalent) reasonableness, appropriateness, aptness, or the like? Is interpretation itself an essentially contested concept? Does interpretive activity seek truth or aim at something else as well? Should one focus on interpretive acts rather than interpretations? Should admissible interpretations be fixed by locating intentions of a historical or hypothetical creator, or neither? What bearing does the fact of the historical situatedness of cultural entities have on their identities? The contributors are Annette Barnes, No&ël Carroll, Stephen Davies, Susan Feagin, Alan Goldman, Charles Guignon, Chhanda Gupta, Garry Hagberg, Michael Krausz, Peter Lamarque, Jerrold Levinson, Joseph Margolis, Rex Martin, Jitendra Mohanty, David Novitz, Philip Percival, Torsten Pettersson, Robert Stecker, Laurent Stern, and Paul Thom.

This title was first published in 2003. Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of "classical" works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is "interpretive" in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.

This book focuses on two themes: the first theme is the true self and the resonance of Winnicott's thinking with the contributions of other major psychoanalysts of the past half century; the second theme emerges from the first: the pursuit of authenticity, whether by patient or analyst.