How Did Markets React To Stress Tests

We use event study methods to compare the market reaction to U.S. and EU-wide stress tests performed from 2009 to 2013. Typically, stress tests have a positive impact on stressed banks’ returns. While the 2009 U.S. stress test had a large positive outcome, the impact of subsequent U.S. exercises decreased over time. The 2011 EU exercise is the only EU-wide stress test that resulted in a significant negative market reaction. Comparing past exercises suggests that the qualitative aspects of the governance of stress tests can matter more for stock market participants than technical elements, such as the level of the minimum capital adequacy threshold or the extent of data disclosure.

We use event study methods to compare the market reaction to U.S. and EU-wide stress tests performed from 2009 to 2013. Typically, stress tests have a positive impact on stressed banks' returns. While the 2009 U.S. stress test had a large positive outcome, the impact of subsequent U.S. exercises decreased over time. The 2011 EU exercise is the only EU-wide stress test that resulted in a significant negative market reaction. Comparing past exercises suggests that the qualitative aspects of the governance of stress tests can matter more for stock market participants than technical elements, such as the level of the minimum capital adequacy threshold or the extent of data disclosure. --Abstract.

Annual stress tests have become a regular part of the supervisors’ toolkit following the global financial crisis. We investigate their capital market implications in the United States by looking at price and trade reactions, information asymmetry and uncertainty indicators, and bank activities. The evidence we present supports the notion that there is important new information in stress tests, especially at times of financial distress. Moreover, public disclosure seems to help reduce informational asymmetries. Importantly, public disclosure of stress test results (and methodology) does not seem to have reduced private incentives to generate information or to have led to distorted incentives.

Despite increased need for top-down stress tests of financial institutions, performing them is challenging owing to the absence of granular information on banks’ trading and loan portfolios. To deal with these data shortcomings, this paper presents a market-based structural top-down stress testing methodology that relies in market-based measures of a bank's probability of default and structural models of default risk to infer the capital losses they could experience in stress scenarios. As an illustration, the methodology is applied to a set of banks in an advanced emerging market economy.

Credibility is the bedrock of any crisis stress test. The use of stress tests to manage systemic risk was introduced by the U.S. authorities in 2009 in the form of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. Since then, supervisory authorities in other jurisdictions have also conducted similar exercises. In some of those cases, the design and implementation of certainelements of the framework have been criticized for their lack of credibility. This paper proposes a set of guidelines for constructing an effective crisis stress test. It combines financial markets impact studies of previous exercises with relevant case study information gleaned from those experiences to identify the key elements and to formulate their appropriate design. Pertinent concepts, issues and nuances particular to crisis stress testing are also discussed. The findings may be useful for country authorities seeking to include stress tests in their crisis management arsenal, as well as for the design of crisis programs.

The recent financial crisis drew unprecedented attention to the stress testing of financial institutions. On one hand, stress tests were criticized for having missed many of the vulnerabilities that led to the crisis. On the other, after the onset of the crisis, they were given a new role as crisis management tools to guide bank recapitalization and help restore confidence. This spurred an intense debate on the models, underlying assumptions, and uses of stress tests. Current stress testing practices, however, are not based on a systematic and comprehensive set of principles but have emerged from trial-and-error and often reflect constraints in human, technical, and data capabilities.

This Technical Note discusses key findings of stress testing on the United States under the Financial Sector Assessment Program. Several stress tests were used to quantify the potential impacts of risks and vulnerabilities in banking and non-banking sectors. The stress tests run by the authorities and by companies under the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) suggest that most large bank holding companies (BHCs) are resilient to shocks similar to the last crisis. For BHCs, the IMF staff’s solvency stress tests over the initial stressed period are largely in line with the DFA stress testing results, and suggest that the system is generally robust, although some BHCs would fall below the hurdle rate in the stressed environment.

Spurred by the success of the first stress test of US banks toward the end of the global economic crisis in 2009, stress testing of large financial institutions has become the cornerstone of banking supervision worldwide. The aim of the tests is to determine which banks are adequately capitalized under severe economic shocks and to order corrective measures for those that are vulnerable. In Banking’s Final Exam, one of the world’s leading experts on banking regulation concludes that the tests administered on both sides of the Atlantic suffer from fundamental weaknesses, leading to a false sense of reassurance about the safety and soundness of the banking system. Some weaknesses can be corrected within the existing bank-capital regime, but others will require bold reforms—including higher minimum capital requirements for the largest and most systemically-important banks. The banking industry is likely to resist these reforms, but this book explains why their objections do not hold water.