How Terrorist Groups End

How terrorist groups end -- Policing and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo -- Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador -- Military force and Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- The limits of America's Al Qa'ida strategy -- Ending the 'war' on terrorism.

Annotation This work answers questions concerning the length of time that terrorist campaigns last and when targeting leadership finishes a group. It examines a wide range of historical examples to identify the ways in which almost all terrorist groups die out.

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post-al-Qaeda world.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.

Across the world governments proclaim that they will never ‘negotiate with evil’. And yet they always have and always will. From jungle clearings to stately homes and anonymous airport hotels, Talking to Terrorists puts us in the room with the terrorists, secret agents and go-betweens who seek to change the course of history. Jonathan Powell has spent nearly two decades mediating between governments and terrorist organisations. Drawing on conflicts from Colombia and Sri Lanka to Palestine and South Africa, this optimistic, wide-ranging, authoritative book is about how and why we should talk to terrorists. ‘Essential reading’ Independent ‘Fascinating’ Sunday Times Now includes a new Afterword - Talking to ISIL *Perfect for fans of The Looming Tower*

The new edition of this best-selling insight into terrorism today has been fully updated and revised to include what the author terms the new ‘militant Moslem international.’ Drawing directly on the words and ideas of terrorists themselves, this book is an examination of patterns, current trends and future threats in terrorism worldwide. It explores the ideology and psychology, the politics and policies, the strategies and operations of many active small groups and major insurgencies. The terrorist leader emerges as a calculating, innovated and often well-educated person whose use of violence against the innocent is calibrated for maximum effects. The closing chapter is a stimulating discussion of the problems of counter-terrorism, making several key recommendations. Terrorism Today will be essential reading for students of terrorism, counter-insurgency and international security.

Domestic terrorist groups, like all violent nonstate actors, compete with governments for their monopoly on violence and their legitimacy in representing the citizenry. Battle for Allegiance shows violence is neither the only nor the most effective way in which nonstate actors and governments work to achieve their goals. As much as nonviolent strategies are a rarely considered piece of the puzzle, the role of the audience is another crucial piece often downplayed in the literature. Many studies emphasize the interactions between the government and the terrorist group at the expense of the constituency, but the constituency is the common cluster for both actors to gain legitimacy and to demand its allegiance. In fact, the competition between the two actors goes far beyond who is superior in terms of military force and tactics. The hardest battles are fought over the allegiance of the citizens. Using a multimethod approach based on exclusive interviews and focus groups from Turkey and large N original data from around the world, Seden Akcinaroglu and Efe Tokdemir present the first systematic empirical analysis of the ways in which terrorist groups, the government, and the citizens relate to each other in a triadic web of action. They study the nonviolent actions of terrorist groups toward their constituencies, the nonviolent actions of governments toward terrorists, and the nonviolent actions of governments toward the terrorist group’s constituencies. By investigating the causes, targets, and consequences of accommodative actions, this book sheds light on an important, but generally ignored, aspect of terrorism: interactive nonviolent strategies.

This book examines the question of when terrorism works. Determining if political violence is effective and, if at all possible, when it is effective, is vital for both intellectual and practical reasons. The volume contains chapters from scholars who have been at the forefront of the efficaciousness debate and argues that terrorism can be effective in delivering tactical returns but is largely ineffective in realizing strategic goals. The book considers the pros and cons of choosing coercive intimidation to serve political ends from both a theoretical perspective and case study approach. It also outlines some of the methodological problems inherent in the academic debate that has taken place thus far on the subject, and suggests ways forward for making future scholarship in this area more inclusive, systematic and dialogically fruitful than it has been to date.