How To Manage Fiscal Risks From Subnational Governments

Subnational governments can create sizable fiscal risks for central governments. In addition to impacting service delivery at the grassroots level, unsustainable subnational finances can be a continuous drain on central resources. The need for stronger public financial management systems and capacities to analyze and manage risks at the subnational government level cannot be overemphasized. Central governments need to develop sound institutional mechanisms to systematically monitor the health of subnational finances to be able to proactively manage associated risks. This How to Note provides a framework for central governments that seek to assess and manage fiscal risks stemming from weak subnational finances. It analyzes the sources of subnational finance vulnerabilities and argues that central governments would benefit from putting in place the following: (1) a stronger regulatory framework, (2) improved fiscal reporting, and (3) enhanced central oversight. The lessons distilled from the international experience are particularly useful for developing economies where the management of risks can be improved.

A number of member countries have expressed interest in advice regarding disclosure and management of fiscal risks (defined as the possibility of deviations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time of the budget or other forecast). This paper analyzes the main sources of fiscal risks and—building on an overview of existing practices in a wide range of countries—provides practical suggestions in this area, including a possible Statement of Fiscal Risks and a set of Guidelines for Fiscal Risk Disclosure and Management.

October 1998 Many governments have faced serious fiscal instabilities as a result of their growing contingent liabilities. But conventional fiscal analysis and institutions fall short in addressing contingent fiscal risks. What approaches in fiscal analysis and standards for public sector management would foster sound fiscal performance? And how can policymakers be made accountable for recognizing the long-term costs of both direct and contingent forms of government activity in their decisions? Governments are increasingly exposed to fiscal risks and uncertainties for three main reasons: * The increasing volume and volatility of international flows of private capital. * The state's transformation from financing services to guaranteeing that the private sector will achieve particular outcomes. * Moral hazards arising in markets because the government is perceived to have residual responsibility for market outcomes. Sources of fiscal risk may be direct or contingent (a liability only if a particular event occurs). Whether direct or contingent, they are either explicit (recognized as a government liability by law or by contract) or implicit (a moral obligation reflecting public expectations and pressure from interest groups). The recent Asian crisis revealed that major moral hazards exist in markets and that sizable hidden fiscal risks may arise from contingent forms of government support. Governments must understand and know how to handle contingent liabilities if they are to avoid the danger of sudden fiscal instability and realize their long-term policy objectives. They can reduce fiscal risks by incorporating contingent liabilities into their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. Governments can address fiscal risk through three channels in particular, says Polackova: * By including contingent and implicit financial risks in their fiscal analysis and (to deter moral hazard in the market) by publicly acknowledging the limits of state responsibilities. * By reflecting the cost of contingent liabilities in policy choices, budgeting, financial planning, reporting, and auditing. * By developing institutional capacity to evaluate, regulate, control, and prevent financial risk in both the public and private sectors. Given the increasingly serious implications of contingent government liabilities for the fiscal outlook of countries, Polackova argues that it is time for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others to: * Incorporate government contingent fiscal risks in their analysis of a country's fiscal sustainability, policies, and institutions. * Require countries to disclose information regarding their exposure to contingent fiscal risks. * Help countries embrace contingent liabilities in their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to enhance the Bank's analytical and operational work in public finance. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve theirmanagement of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.

This paper presents various models of control with advantages and disadvantages, the balance of which would make it more or less suitable to a particular country's circumstances. As these circumstances evolve—as fiscal and macro imbalances improve or worsen—the preferable model may change over time. Although appealing in principle, sole reliance on market discipline for government borrowing is unlikely to be appropriate in many circumstances. This is so, because one or more of the conditions for its effective working frequently are not realized in each particular country. The increasing worldwide trend toward devolution of spending and revenue-raising responsibilities to subnational governments seems likely to come into growing conflict with systems of administrative controls by the central government on subnational borrowing. Rules-based approaches to debt control would appear preferable, in terms of transparency and certainty, to administrative controls and also to statutory limits defined in the context of the annual budget process, the outcome of which may be unduly influenced by short-term political bargaining.

Comprehensive analysis and management of fiscal risks can help ensure sound fiscal public finances and macroeconomic stability. This has been underscored by the global financial crisis and the more recent collapse in commodity prices, which starkly illustrate the vulnerability of public finances to risk. Indeed, over the past quarter century, governments experienced on average an adverse fiscal shock of 6 percent of GDP once every 12 years, with some of the largest stemming from financial crises. Countries need a more complete understanding of these potential threats to their fiscal position. Existing fiscal risk disclosure and analysis practices tend to be incomplete, fragmented, and qualitative in nature. A more comprehensive and integrated assessment of the potential shocks to government finances, in the form of a fiscal stress test, can help policymakers simulate the effects of shocks to their central forecasts and their implications for government solvency, liquidity, and financing needs. Comprehensive, reliable, and timely fiscal data covering all public entities, stocks, and flows are a necessary foundation for such analysis. Countries should also enhance their capacity to mitigate and manage fiscal risks. Fiscal risk management practices are often blunt, ad hoc, and too focused on imposing limits on the creation of exposures. Countries need to expand their toolkits for fiscal risk management and adopt the use of instruments to transfer, share, or provision for risks. In doing so, countries need to weigh the possible benefits from reducing their exposure to shocks against the financial and other costs of the policies that may be needed. Finally, countries should make greater use of probabilistic forecasting methods when setting long-run objectives and medium-term targets for fiscal policy. The paper illustrates how simple probabilistic tools can be used to map the uncertainty around medium-term trajectories for public debt. In combination with fiscal stress tests, these tools can provide valuable information regarding the probabilities that a country will stay within the debt ceilings embedded in their fiscal rules. The Fund is playing an important role in supporting improvements in fiscal risk analysis and management among its members. This includes technical assistance in constructing public sector balance sheets; developing institutions and capacity to identify specific fiscal risks and to quantify their potential impact; undertaking fiscal stress tests; and integrating risks into the design of medium-term fiscal targets.

Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are popular around the world, in part because they allow governments to secure much-needed investment in public services without immediately having to raise taxes or borrow. Yet, PPPs pose a fiscal danger because a government's desire to avoid reporting immediate liabilities may blind it to future fiscal costs and risks. Although PPPs may not blemish governments' reported fiscal statements in the short term, they do create fiscal obligations. This increases fiscal vulnerability and can result in poorly-designed PPPs. The extent of the danger depends on the fiscal institutions that shape and constrain government decisions toward PPPs. Such fiscal institutions affect decisionmaking incentives. Better fiscal institutions therefore can increase the chance that PPPs will be well designed and appropriately used.