Human Error In Aviation

Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.

This edited textbook is a fully updated and expanded version of the highly successful first edition of Human Factors in Aviation. Written for the widespread aviation community - students, engineers, scientists, pilots, managers, government personnel, etc., HFA offers a comprehensive overview of the topic, taking readers from the general to the specific, first covering broad issues, then the more specific topics of pilot performance, human factors in aircraft design, and vehicles and systems. The new editors offer essential breath of experience on aviation human factors from multiple perspectives (i.e. scientific research, regulation, funding agencies, technology, and implementation) as well as knowledge about the science. The contributors are experts in their fields. Topics carried over from the first edition are fully updated, several by new authors who are now at the fore of the field. New material - which represents 50% of the volume - focuses on the challenges facing aviation specialists today. One of the most significant developments in this decade has been NextGen, the Federal Aviation Administration's plan to modernize national airspace and to address the impact of air traffic growth by increasing airspace capacity and efficiency while simultaneously improving safety, environmental impacts and user access. NextGen issues are covered in full. Other new topics include: High Reliability Organizational Perspective, Situation Awareness & Workload in Aviation, Human Error Analysis, Human-System Risk Management, LOSA, NOSS and Unmanned Aircraft System. Comprehensive text with up-to-date synthesis of primary source material that does not need to be supplemented New edition thoroughly updated with 50% new material and full coverage of NexGen and other modern issues Instructor website with test bank and image collection makes this the only text offering ancillary support Liberal use of case examples exposes readers to real-world examples of dangers and solutions

As part of the national effort to improve aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chartered the National Research Council to examine and recommend improvements in the aircraft certification process currently used by the FAA, manufacturers, and operators.

Most aviation accidents are attributed to human error, pilot error especially. Human error also greatly effects productivity and profitability. In his overview of this collection of papers, the editor points out that these facts are often misinterpreted as evidence of deficiency on the part of operators involved in accidents. Human factors research reveals a more accurate and useful perspective: The errors made by skilled human operators - such as pilots, controllers, and mechanics - are not root causes but symptoms of the way industry operates. The papers selected for this volume have strongly influenced modern thinking about why skilled experts make errors and how to make aviation error resilient.

In this book the author applies contemporary error theory to the needs of investigators and of anyone attempting to understand why someone made a critical error, how that error led to an incident or accident, and how to prevent such errors in the future. Students and investigators of human error will gain an appreciation of the literature on error, with numerous references to both scientific research and investigative reports in a wide variety of applications, from airplane accidents, to bus accidents, to bonfire disasters. Features include: - an easy to follow step by step approach to conducting error investigations that even those new to the field can readily apply. - summaries of recent transportation accidents and human factors literature and relates them to the cause of human error in accidents. - an approach to investigating human error that will be of interest to both human factors psychology and industrial engineering students and instructors, as well as investigators of accidents in aviation, mass transportation, nuclear power, or any industry that is to the adverse effects of error. Based on the author's over 18 years of experience as an accident investigator and instructor of both aircraft accident investigation techniques and human factors psychology, it reviews recent human factors literature, summarizes major transportation accidents, and shows how to investigate the types of errors that typically occur in high risk industries. It presents a model of human error causation influenced largely by James Reason and Neville Moray, and relates it to error investigations with step by step guidelines for data collection and analysis that investigators can readily apply as needed.

Since the 1950s, a number of specialized books dealing with human factors has been published, but very little in aviation. Human Factors in Aviation is the first comprehensive review of contemporary applications of human factors research to aviation. A "must" for aviation professionals, equipment and systems designers, pilots, and managers--with emphasis on definition and solution of specific problems. General areas of human cognition and perception, systems theory, and safety are approached through specific topics in aviation--behavioral analysis of pilot performance, cockpit automation, advancing display and control technology, and training methods.

The investigation and modelling of aviation accident causation is dominated by linear models. Aviation is, however, a complex system and as such suffers from being artificially manipulated into non-complex models and methods. This book addresses this issue by developing a new approach to investigating aviation accident causation through information networks. These networks centralise communication and the flow of information as key indicators of a system’s health and risk. This holistic approach focuses on the system environment, the activity that takes place within it, the strategies used to conduct this activity, the way in which the constituent parts of the system (both human and non-human) interact and the behaviour required. Each stage of this book identifies and expands upon the potential of the information network approach, maintaining firm focus on the overall health of a system. The book’s new model offers many potential developments and some key areas are studied in this research. Through the centralisation of barriers and information nodes the method can be applied to almost any situation. The application of Bayesian mathematics to historical data populations provides scope for studying error migration and barrier manipulation. The book also provides application of these predictions to a flight simulator study for the purposes of validation. Beyond this it also discusses the applicability of the approach to industry. Through working with a legacy airline the methods discussed are used as the basis for a new and prospective safety management system.

Human error is cited over and over as a cause of incidents and accidents. The result is a widespread perception of a 'human error problem', and solutions are thought to lie in changing the people or their role in the system. For example, we should reduce the human role with more automation, or regiment human behavior by stricter monitoring, rules or procedures. But in practice, things have proved not to be this simple. The label 'human error' is prejudicial and hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or malfunctions. This book takes you behind the human error label. Divided into five parts, it begins by summarising the most significant research results. Part 2 explores how systems thinking has radically changed our understanding of how accidents occur. Part 3 explains the role of cognitive system factors - bringing knowledge to bear, changing mindset as situations and priorities change, and managing goal conflicts - in operating safely at the sharp end of systems. Part 4 studies how the clumsy use of computer technology can increase the potential for erroneous actions and assessments in many different fields of practice. And Part 5 tells how the hindsight bias always enters into attributions of error, so that what we label human error actually is the result of a social and psychological judgment process by stakeholders in the system in question to focus on only a facet of a set of interacting contributors. If you think you have a human error problem, recognize that the label itself is no explanation and no guide to countermeasures. The potential for constructive change, for progress on safety, lies behind the human error label.