Identification And Quantification Of The Proceeds Of Bribery Revised Edition February 2012

This study focuses on the identification and quantification of the proceeds of active bribery in international business transactions.

This study focuses on the identification and quantification of the proceeds of active bribery in international business transactions.

Non-trial resolutions, often referred to as settlements, have been the predominant means of enforcing foreign bribery and other related offences since the entry into force of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 20 years ago. The last decade has seen a steady increase in the use of coordinated multi-jurisdictional non-trial resolutions, which have, to date, permitted the highest global amount of combined financial penalties in foreign bribery cases. This study is the first cross-country examination of the different types of resolutions that can be used to resolve foreign bribery cases.

When people pay bribes to foreign public officials, how should the law respond? This question has been debated ever since the enactment of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and some of the key arguments can be traced back to Cicero in the last years of the Roman Republic and Edmund Burke in late eighteenth-century England. In recent years, the U.S. and other members of the OECD have joined forces to make anti-bribery law one of the most prominent sources of liability for firms and individuals who operate across borders. The modern regime is premised on the idea that transnational bribery is a serious problem which invariably merits a vigorous legal response. The shape of that response can be summed up in the phrase "every little bit helps," which in practice means that: prohibitions on bribery should capture a broad range of conduct; enforcement should target as broad a range of actors as possible; sanctions should be as stiff as possible; and as many agencies as possible should be involved in the enforcement process. An important challenge to the OECD paradigm, labelled here the "anti-imperialist critique," accepts that transnational bribery is a serious problem but questions the conventional responses. This book uses a series of high-profile cases to illustrate key elements of transnational bribery law in action, and analyzes the law through the lenses of both the OECD paradigm and the anti-imperialist critique. It ultimately defends a distinctively inclusive and experimentalist approach to transnational bribery law.

This edition of the OECD Business and Finance Outlook focuses on fragmentation: the inconsistent structures, policies, rules, laws and industry practices that appear to be blocking business efficiency and productivity growth.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention focuses on enforcement through the criminalisation of foreign bribery but it is multidisciplinary and includes key requirements to combat money laundering, accounting fraud, and tax evasion connected to foreign bribery. The first step, however, in enforcing foreign bribery and related offences is effective detection. This study looks at the primary sources of detection for the foreign bribery offence and the role that certain public agencies and private sector actors can play in uncovering this crime. It examines the practices developed in different sectors and countries which have led to the successful detection of foreign bribery with a view to sharing good practices and improving countries’ capacity to detect and ultimately step-up efforts against transnational bribery. The study covers a wide range of potential sources for detecting foreign bribery: self-reporting; whistleblowers and whistleblower protection; confidential informants and cooperating witnesses; media and investigative journalism; tax authorities; financial intelligence units; other government agencies; criminal and other legal proceedings; international co-operation and professional advisers.

Economic analysis is also the key to measuring the efficacy of current anti-corruption instruments, and in the light of this the book finds many existing legal counter-measures lacking. On the other hand, its assessment of new international instruments