Ieo Evaluation Report

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was established by the IMF’s Executive Board in 2001. It provides objective and independent evaluation of issues related to the IMF. The IEO operates independently of IMF management and at arm’s length from the IMF Executive Board. For more information on the IEO’s activities, visit the IEO website: www.ieo-imf.org.

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was established by the IMF’s Executive Board in 2001. It provides objective and independent evaluation of issues related to the IMF. The IEO operates independently of IMF management and at arm’s length from the IMF Executive Board. For more information on the IEO’s activities, visit the IEO website: www.ieo-imf.org.

IEO Annual Report 2021

This progress report presents key conclusions and recommendations from an IEO evaluation of the IMF’s response to the global financial and economic crisis and an update of the IEO evaluation of the IMF’s approach to capital account liberalization, both issued since October 2014. It also describes ongoing IEO activities.

The 2014 Annual Report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund.

This is a high-level report on progress in addressing recurring issues identified by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). The Board endorsed the proposal in the Chairman’s Summing Up for the Independent Evaluation Office Report on Recurring Issues from a Decade of Evaluation – Lessons for the IMF (BUFF/14/58, 6/11/14) that staff prepare a separate high-level report on the status of initiatives that address the recurring issues identified by the IEO, noting that the first staff report could be prepared within two years, followed by similar reports every five years thereafter. The September 2015 Management Implementation Plan set out the actions management would take to follow-up on the Board-endorsed recommendation. The IEO’s 2014 evaluation of Recurring Issues from a Decade of Evaluation: Lessons for the IMF identified five recurring issues: a) Executive Board guidance and oversight; b) Organizational silos; c) Attention to risks and uncertainty; d) Country and institutional context; and e) Evenhandedness. This high-level report provides a broad account of actions taken to address these recurring issues since the publication of the 2014 IEO report; it is not intended as an exhaustive account of initiatives undertaken. Takeaways. The report concludes that the Fund has made progress in addressing the recurring issues identified by the IEO, and acknowledges the need for taking actions on an ongoing basis to achieve the related objectives. The discussion of the Management Implementation Plan (MIP) left open the question of whether subsequent reports should be prepared, perhaps every five years. The Evaluation Committee concluded that the forthcoming external evaluation of the IEO could look at the monitoring mechanisms more holistically, to provide further input into considering whether or not to continue the preparation every five years of this high-level report.

We have been asked by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund to undertake an external review of the activities of its Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). This is the second such evaluation in the IEO’s twelve year history. The first review, led by Karin Lissakers (the “Lissakers Report”), was presented to the Board in 2006. That report considered the extent to which the Office had succeeded during its first five years of operation in fulfilling its mandates and made recommendations to enhance its role within the IMF’s institutional architecture. Our report thus focuses on IEO activities since 2006. As set out in the terms of reference of our Panel (see Appendix I), the central objective of this report is to evaluate how well the IEO has met its institutional mandates. The terms of reference, while not constraining the range of issues we could consider, also asks that we “assess the IEO’s effectiveness along several dimensions, including: (i) the appropriateness of evaluation topics; (ii) the independence of the IEO; (iii) the cost-effectiveness of the IEO and its operations; and (iv) the appropriateness and adequacy of the evaluation process including, but not limited to, how IEO recommendations are endorsed by the Board and implemented.”

This paper analyzes that the IMF has moved beyond its traditional fiscal-centric approach to recognize that social protection can also be macro-critical for broader reasons including social and political stability concerns. Evaluating the IMF’s involvement in social protection is complicated by the fact that there is no standard definition of social protection or of broader/overlapping terms such as social spending and social safeguards in (or outside) the IMF. In this evaluation, social protection is understood to include policies that provide benefits to vulnerable individuals or households. This evaluation found widespread IMF involvement in social protection across countries although the extent of engagement varied. In some cases, engagement was relatively deep, spanning different activities (bilateral surveillance, technical assistance, and/or programs) and involving detailed analysis of distributional impacts, discussion of policy options, active advocacy of social protection, and integration of social protection measures in program design and/or conditionality. This cross-country variation to some degree reflected an appropriate response to country-specific factors, in particular an assessment of whether social protection policy was macrocritical, and the availability of expertise from development partners or in the country itself.