Illegal Markets And The Economics Of Organized Crime

This book showcases recent advances in the theoretical and empirical understanding of the economic aspects of organised crime and illegal markets. It provides new insights into defining and quantifying the influence of organised crime by drawing on innovative approaches to studying criminal networks and organisations such as the Hells Angels. The book includes analysis of the structure of illegal drug markets from international leaders in the field. Finally the text includes empirical case studies of the diverse markets where organised crime is currently active including the illegal market for crystal methamphetamine in Australia, tiger products in China and the falcon and fur trades in Russia. This book was based on a special issue of Global Crime.

The first book to apply economic theory to the analysis of all aspects of organised crime.

It is widely believed that monopoly control, based on violence, corruption or risk-spreading, is characteristic of markets for illegal goods and services, such as marijuana and bookmaking. This essay examines the effects on the organization of a market arising from changing the status of a good or service from legal to illegal. In general, it can be shown that illegal enterprises are likely to be smaller than their legal counterparts. The most important reasons for this are the lack of external credit markets, itself a consequence of the non-existence of audited records, the lack of court enforceable contracts, and the need to restrict knowledge of participation in the enterprise. The inability to advertise or to create goodwill for the enterprise itself, as opposed to goodwill for its agents, is also significant. Corruption is likely to affect the organization of the market only under special circumstances, where there is a single agency which monopolizes enforcement. Though that condition held for most illegal markets thirty years ago enforcement now is fragmented and overlapping, which inhibits an agency from granting a monopoly franchise. The introduction of violence does not in general change this result. The use of violence to acquire market power can occur only where there is a ready focus for that violence. Most illegal markets lack either time or space consistency that would permit exclusion of competition. Some comments about the optimal use of violence are offered. The final section offers some analysis of the plausibility of using illegal market enforcement as an instrument of organized crime control. There have been systematic changes in the set of opportunities available to organized crime members; illegal markets no longer are so central to the power and income of organized crime. The shift from gambling to narcotics markets has also weakened the link between organized crime and illegal markets.

Outraged by recent encroachments on citizens' rights that have been justified by claims that new and more restrictive laws will combat the ravages of international crime, Naylor contends that no police campaign that fails to address the demand for illegal goods and services has ever succeeded. He supports this claim with detailed - and often entertaining - accounts of past criminal operations and law enforcement's attempts to stop them. Wages of Crime makes a persuasive case for the need to address the underlying economic and political factors that encourage criminal enterprises rather than relying on restrictive laws.

Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice. Bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking are reputed to be major sources of revenue for organized crime, controlled by the "visible hand" of violence. For years this belief has formed the basis of government policy toward illegal markets. Drawing on police files, confiscated records, and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, Reuter systematically refutes the notion that the Mafia, by using political connections and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets. Instead, he suggests that the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral. Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. Disorganized Crime is included in The MIT Press Series on Organization Studies, edited by John Van Maanen.

From illegal drugs, stolen artwork, and forged trademarks, to fraud in financial markets - the phenomenon of illegality in market exchanges is pervasive. Illegal markets have great economic significance, have relevant social and political consequences, and shape economic and political structures. Despite the importance of illegality in the economy, the field of economic sociology unquestioningly accepts the premise that the institutional structures and exchanges taking place in markets are law-abiding in nature. This volume makes a contribution to changing this. Questions that stand at the centre of the chapters are: What are the interfaces between legal and illegal markets? How do demand and supply in illegal markets interact? What role do criminal organizations play in illegal markets? What is the relationship between illegality and governments? Is illegality a phenomenon central to capitalism? Anchored in economic sociology, this book contributes to the analysis and understanding of market exchanges in conditions of illegality from a perspective that focuses on the social organization of markets. Offering both, theoretical reflections and case studies, the chapters assembled in the volume address the consequences of the illegal production, distribution, and consumption of products for the architecture of markets. It also focuses on the underlying causes and the political and social concerns stemming from the infringement of the law.