Imf Lending

As the linchpin of the global financial system, the International Monetary Fund provides the balance of payments support, chiefly to developing countries, conditional on strict remedial policy measures. Its approach to policy remains highly controversial, however. While the Fund claims it has adapted, critics allege its policies are harshly doctrinaire, imposing hardships on already poverty-stricken people. For the critics, the half century of its existence is `fifty years too long' and radical change is essential. This book examines the arguments, tracing the extent of Fund adaption, presenting major new evidence on the consequences of fund programes, and considering its future role.

This book aims to develop and test a model of International Monetary Fund (IMF) decision-making that will offer a better understanding of how the IMF applies its lending terms to individual countries such as Jamaica, Zaire, Sudan, India, United Kingdom, Turkey and Argentina.

We analyze the determinants of IMF lending since the early nineties, a period during which the roles of financial cycles and interconnectedness as amplifiers and transmitters of economic crises have gained prominence. First, we show that the global financial cycle is an important driver of IMF lending cycles. Second, using a panel of 91 advanced, emerging, and frontier economies over 1992-2014, we show that global factors and interconnectedness, as proxied by a countries’ potential exposure to economic spillovers from trade partners, together with more traditional idiosyncratic factors, have a significant impact on the probability that a member country obtains financial assistance from the IMF. Our results are robust to various robustness checks. The approach presented in this paper can be used to assess future demand for IMF financial assistance.

This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970-2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, our results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. We also provide evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter.

Borrowing is a crucial source of financing for governments all over the world. If they get it wrong, then debt crises can bring progress to a halt. But if it's done right, investment happens and conditions improve. African countries are seeking calmer capital, to raise living standards and give their economies a competitive edge. The African debt landscape has changed radically in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Since the clean slate of extensive debt relief, states have sought new borrowing opportunities from international capital markets and emerging global powers like China. The new debt composition has increased risk, exacerbated by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic: richer countries borrowed at rock-bottom interest rates, while Africa faced an expensive jump in indebtedness. The escalating debt burden has provoked calls by the G20 for suspension of debt payments. But Africa's debt today is highly complex, and owed to a wider range of lenders. A new approach is needed, and could turn crisis into opportunity. Urgent action by both lenders and borrowers can reduce risk, while carefully preserving market access; and smart deployment of private finance can provide the scale of investment needed to achieve development goals and tackle the climate emergency.

The ideal book for students who need a clear and concise introduction to the IMF and an overview of its debates and controversies.

As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.

Extending previous work on the determinants of IMF lending in an interconnected world, we introduce a model of sample selection in which both selection and size dimensions of individual IMF arrangements are presented within a unified econometric framework. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity to create an additional channel for sample selection at the country level. The results suggest that higher external financing needs, larger exchange rate depreciation, lower GDP growth, as well as deteriorated global financial conditions, are associated with larger individual IMF arrangement sizes. Using the estimated parameters, Monte Carlo simulation of a wide spectrum of global shock scenarios suggest that the distribution of potential aggregate IMF lending exhibits a substantial right tail. Our approach may provide an insightful input to broader policy discussions on the adequacy of the IMF resources.