Imperial Imperial Bandits

The Black Flags raided their way from southern China into northern Vietnam, competing during the second half of the nineteenth century against other armed migrants and uplands communities for the control of commerce, specifically opium, and natural resources, such as copper. At the edges of three empires (the Qing empire in China, the Vietnamese empire governed by the Nguyen dynasty, and, eventually, French Colonial Vietnam), the Black Flags and their rivals sustained networks of power and dominance through the framework of political regimes. This lively history demonstrates the plasticity of borderlines, the limits of imposed boundaries, and the flexible division between apolitical banditry and political rebellion in the borderlands of China and Vietnam. Imperial Bandits contributes to the ongoing reassessment of borderland areas as frontiers for state expansion, showing that, as a setting for many forms of human activity, borderlands continue to exist well after the establishment of formal boundaries.

On a spring afternoon in 1509 a local bandit found himself in the emperor's private quarters deep within the Forbidden City and in the presence of the Son of Heaven himself. This bizarre meeting was the doing of the eunuch Zhang Zhong, the emperor's personal servant and companion. In time court intrigue between competing palace eunuchs would lead to the death of this bandit-turned-rebel, setting off a massive uprising that resulted in China's largest rebellion of the sixteenth century. To understand how this extraordinary meeting came about requires a consideration of the economy of violence during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Here, for the first time in any language, is a detailed look at the role of illicit violence during the Ming. Drawing on court annals, imperial law codes, administrative regulations, private writings, and local gazetteers, David Robinson recreates in vivid detail a world where heavily armed highwaymen and bandits raided the boulevards in and around the Ming capital, Beijing. He then convincingly traces the roots of this systemic mayhem to economic, ethnic, social, and institutional factors at work in local society.

Why did the main challenge to the Ottoman state come not in peasant or elite rebellions, but in endemic banditry? Karen Barkey shows how Turkish strategies of incorporating peasants and rotating elites kept both groups dependent on the state, unable and unwilling to rebel. Bandits, formerly mercenary soldiers, were not interested in rebellion but concentrated on trying to gain state resources, more as rogue clients than as primitive rebels. The state's ability to control and manipulate bandits—through deals, bargains and patronage—suggests imperial strength rather than weakness, she maintains. Bandits and Bureaucrats details, in a rich, archivally based analysis, state-society relations in the Ottoman empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Exploring current eurocentric theories of state building, the author illuminates a period often mischaracterized as one in which the state declined in power. Outlining the processes of imperial rule, Barkey relates the state political and military institutions to their socal foundations. She compares the Ottoman route with state centralization in the Chinese and Russian empires, and contrasts experiences of rebellion in France during the same period. Bandits and Bureaucrats thus develops a theoretical interpretation of imperial state centralization through incorporation and bargaining with social groups, and at the same time enriches our understanding of the dynamics of Ottoman history.

This wide-ranging and informative survey of 'outsider' groups in the Roman Empire will contribute greatly to our understanding of Roman social history. Examining men such as as Viriatus, Tacfarinus, Maternus and Bulla Felix, who were called latrones after clashing with the imperial authorities, special attention is given to perhaps the best-known 'bandit' of all, Spartacus, and to those who impersonated the emperor Nero after his death. Topics covered include: * Whom did the Romans see as bandits (latrones)? * What did they understand as robbery (lactrocinium)? * How pressing was the threat that the bandits posed? * How did their contemporaries perceive the danger? We are shown that the term latrones was not just used to refer to criminals but was metaphorically and disparagingly applied to failed political rebels, rivals and avengers. The word also came to represent the 'noble brigands', idealising the underdog as a means of criticising the winning side. The author therefore presents 'the bandit' as a literary construct rather than a social type.

"Why did Vietnam invade and occupy Cambodia in 1978? And why did it eventually change its approach, shifting from military confrontation to economic reform and reconciliation with China in the late 1980s? Drawing on rarely accessed archival documents, Kosal Path explores this major change in Vietnamese leaders' objectives and strategies. Unlike most studies, which attribute the invasion to political elites' paranoia and imperial ambition over Indochina, Path argues that Hanoi's move was rational and strategic, intended to resolve its economic crisis and counter imminent threats posed by the Sino-Cambodian alliance by cementing its own alliance with the Soviet Union. As these costly efforts failed in the 1980s, Vietnamese thinking shifted from the doctrinal Marxist-Leninist ideology that had prevailed during the last decade of the Cold War to the approach that would come to characterize the post-Cold War era. Path traces the moving target of Vietnam's changing priorities: first from military victory to Socialist economic reconstruction in 1975-76; then to military confrontation in 1978-1984; and finally, in 1985-86, to the broad reforms dubbed Doi Moi ("renovation"), meant to create a peaceful regional environment for Vietnam's integration into the global economy. Path's sources include internally circulated reports from provincial authorities, ministries, and ad hoc Party committees--materials that have been largely masked by the Vietnamese nationalist history of Vietnam's selfless assistance to Cambodia's revolution and glossed over by the Cambodian nationalist narrative of Vietnam's longstanding imperial ambition in Cambodia"--

The wars of Napoleon are among the best-known and most exciting episodes in world history. Less well known is the uproar the armies stirred up in their path, and even more, the chaos they left in their wake. The 'knock-on effect' of Napoleon's sweep across Europe went further than is often remembered: his invasion of Spain triggered the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America, and his meddling in the Balkans destabilised the Ottomans. Many places had been riven with banditry and popular tumult from time immemorial, characteristics which worsened in the havoc wrought by the wars. Other areas had known relative calm before the arrival of the French in 1792, but even the most pacific societies were disrupted by these conflagrations. Behind the battle fronts raged other conflicts, 'little wars' - the guerrilla (the term was born in these years) - and bigger ones, where whole provinces rose up in arms. Bandits often stood at the centre of these 'dirty wars' of ambushes, night raids, living hard in tough terrain, of plunder, rapine and early, violent death, which spread across the whole western world from Constantinople to Chile. Everywhere, they threw up unlikely characters - ordinary men who emerged as leaders, bandits who became presidents, priests who became warriors, lawyers who became murdering criminals. In studying these varying fortunes, Michael Broers provides an insight into a lost world of peasant life, a world Napoleon did so much to sweep away.

The definitive account of one of the most important battles of the twentieth century, and the Black River borderlands’ transformation into Northwest Vietnam This new work of historical and political geography ventures beyond the conventional framing of the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, the 1954 conflict that toppled the French empire in Indochina. Tracking a longer period of anticolonial revolution and nation-state formation from 1945 to 1960, Christian Lentz argues that a Vietnamese elite constructed territory as a strategic form of rule. Engaging newly available archival sources, Lentz offers a novel conception of territory as a contingent outcome of spatial contests.