In Search Of Criminal Responsibility

What makes someone responsible for a crime and therefore liable tof punishment under the criminal law? Modern lawyers will quickly and easily point to the criminal law's requirement of concurrent actus reus and mens rea, doctrines of the criminal law which ensure that someone will only be found criminally responsible if they have committed criminal conduct while possessing capacities of understanding, awareness, and self-control at the time of offense. Any notion of criminal responsibility based on the character of the offender, meaning an implication of criminality based on reputation or the assumed disposition of the person, would seem to today's criminal lawyer a relic of the 18th Century. In this volume, Nicola Lacey demonstrates that the practice of character-based patterns of attribution was not laid to rest in 18th Century criminal law, but is alive and well in contemporary English criminal responsibility-attribution. Building upon the analysis of criminal responsibility in her previous book, Women, Crime, and Character, Lacey investigates the changing nature of criminal responsibility in English law from the mid-18th Century to the early 21st Century. Through a combined philosophical, historical, and socio-legal approach, this volume evidences how the theory behind criminal responsibility has shifted over time. The character and outcome responsibility which dominated criminal law in the 18th Century diminished in ideological importance in the following two centuries, when the idea of responsibility as founded in capacity was gradually established as the core of criminal law. Lacey traces the historical trajectory of responsibility into the 21st Century, arguing that ideas of character responsibility and the discourse of responsibility as founded in risk are enjoying a renaissance in the modern criminal law. These ideas of criminal responsibility are explored through an examination of the institutions through which they are produced, interpreted and executed; the interests which have shaped both doctrines and institutions; and the substantive social functions which criminal law and punishment have been expected to perform at different points in history.

Gideon Yaffe presents a theory of criminal responsibility according to which child criminals deserve leniency not because of their psychological, behavioural, or neural immaturity but because they are denied the vote. He argues that full shares of criminal punishment are deserved only by those who have a full share of say over the law.

In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, major offences committed by individuals have been subject to progressive systematisation in the framework of international criminal law. Proposals developed within the context of the League of Nations coordinated individual liability and State responsibility. By contrast, international law as codified after World War II in the framework of the United Nations embodies a neat divide between individual criminal liability and State aggravated responsibility. However, conduct of State organs and agents generates dual liability. Through a critical analysis of key international rules, the book assesses whether the divisive approach to individual and State responsibility is normatively consistent. Contemporary situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, 9/11 and the Iraq wars demonstrate that the matter still gives rise to controversy: a set of systemic problems emerge. The research focuses on the substantive elements of major offences, notably agression, genocide, core war crimes, core crimes against humanity and terrorism, as well as relevant procedural implications. The book is a useful resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, researchers and anyone interested in international law and politics.

This book considers the proper nature and scope of criminal responsibility in the light of its institutional and political role. Tadros begins by providing an account of the foundations, both ethical and political, of criminal responsibility, and moves on to reconsider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility. Part 1 examines the nature of criminal responsibility by employing a distinctive new conception of autonomy. Tadros explores the nature of autonomy, and asks what it means to respect autonomy. Building upon this consideration of autonomy, Tadros then explores the central conditions of responsibility. He provides the first systematic consideration of the relationship between criminal responsibility and liberal political theory, showing how the conditions of responsibility are articulated in, and restrained by, the institutional setting of the criminal law. In Part 2, Tadros moves on to consider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility. He examines the proper nature and role of causation, intentions, and beliefs; asking whether these concepts should be understood as descriptive or normative. The book moves on to provide a systematic normative investigation of the nature and role of criminal omissions and criminal defenses. Included are: a thorough account of the different ways in which mental disorders might ground defenses, the nature of justification defenses, the different kinds of excuse claim and the role that particular characteristics of the accused might have on the standards which the defendant must have met to escape criminal responsibility.

1.1 Opening Remarks and Objectives Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 2 be enforced. This is, perhaps, the most renowned citation from the judgment of the Int- national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”). In the six decades which have passed since the IMT judgment was handed down, the recognition of the c- cept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes has been significantly reinforced and developed, particularly since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) in the 1990’s and most recently the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The media has, of course, played a crucial role in increasing awareness of this concept, especially amongst the general populace. Indeed, the concept has, arguably, a much higher profile today, than ever before in its history. However, the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core inter- tional crimes is neither as straightforward nor as single-facetted, as might appear on first glance. While the general principle behind the concept does not generate too many difficulties, it is in its practical application that the more challenging aspects of the concept are brought to the fore. Each of these ‘challenging - pects’ can also be described as a ‘pertinent issue’ of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes.

Atrocities such as genocide or crimes against humanity are usually committed by a large number of perpetrators. Moreover, those who masterminded the crimes may not have actively participated. This book sets out how these people can be held responsible for their crimes by international criminal tribunals.

Few contemporary scholars have done more in their work to develop the idea of responsibility than Nicola Lacey. She ranks alongside thinkers and writers such as HLA Hart and Antony Honoré in developing approaches to understanding responsibility. Like these authors, the influence of her work has spread beyond academia to change the perception of responsibility amongst practitioners. Both Hart and Honoré have during their lifetime had volumes dedicated to their work. This book does the same for Nicola Lacey, marking her ongoing influence and accomplishments in the common law world through a collection of essays by leading international scholars reflecting and interrogating her contribution to understanding criminal responsibility. Additionally, the book aims to promote the best legal scholarship on responsibility in the common law world and inspire the brightest legal scholars through a collection of essays designed to mark Professor Lacey's ongoing contribution to the understanding of criminal responsibility. The role of Professor Lacey's work in this area (as well as others) cannot be overlooked: her scholarship includes not only a prize-winning biography of HLA Hart himself but numerous articles and tomes on the subject, culminating with her most recent work In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (OUP 2016). This Festschrift, one of few common law publications to pay homage to the erudition of a female jurist, can be seen as a continuation of the themes in this book via reflection and interrogation of her work by leading scholars on the topic. The Festschrift will therefore not only be a celebration of her work but also an attempt to take forward intellectual engagement with the topic of responsibility by continued engagement with her ideas. Each author brings new ideas to bear on her work, touching upon important aspects of responsibility that are current in the scholarship: categorization, frameworks for understanding criminal responsibility and the relationships between them, women in criminal law, the history of criminal law, blameworthiness and ascriptions of responsibility, moral responsibility, the role of politics and political economy. Nicola Lacey is a School Professor of Law, Gender, and Social Policy. From 1998 to 2010 she held a Chair in Criminal Law and Legal Theory at the LSE; she returned to the LSE in 2013 after spending three years as Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, and Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theory at the University of Oxford. She has held a number of visiting appointments, most recently at Harvard Law School and the Australian National University. She is an Honorary Fellow of New College Oxford and University College Oxford; and a Fellow of the British Academy. In 2011 she was awarded the Hans Sigrist Prize by the University of Bern for outstanding scholarship on the function of the rule of law in late modern societies; and in 2018, an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Edinburgh. In 2017 she was awarded a CBE for services to Law, Justice, and Gender Politics.

autonomy principally in tenns of the agent's conscious choice of ends or conduct. From this, the cognitivist emphasis on mental states and their contents naturally follows. The presence of specified mental states, as signifying agent choice, thus becomes the hallmark of responsible conduct. Capacities model theorists, by contrast, interpret personal autonomy and agent responsibility in tenns of the looser notion of 'control'. From this perspective, conscious choosing is but one (highly responsible) instance of such control, and the presence or absence of mental states is primarily relevant to detennining degrees of responsibility. The examination of these two models occupies the bulk of this manuscript. Exploration of the capacities model and criticism of the orthodox view also generate treatment of legal issues such as the use of negligence liability, the nature of criminal omissions, the character of various legal defenses, and so on. Chapters 2 and 3 set out some of the thematic arguments outlined above and introduce tenninology and useful distinctions. Chapters 4 through 7 provide substantive analyses of agent responsibility and of standards of criminal liability. In these chapters, I argue for the comparative superiority of the capacities model of responsibility and offer recommendations for changes in current legal conceptions and standards of liability. Each chapter centers on an element of individual responsibility and related legal concerns. The final chapter, Chapter 8, comprises an overview of the integrated theory of responsibility and liability and its comparison with the traditional view.