Incommensurability And Its Implications For Practical Reasoning Ethics And Justice

If values conflict and rival human interests clash we often have to weigh them against each other. However, under particular conditions incommensurability prevents the assignment of determinable and impartial weights. In those cases an objective balance does not exist. The original thesis of this book sheds new light on aspects of incommensurability and its implications for public decision-making, ethics and justice. Martijn Boot analyzes a number of previously ignored or unrecognized concepts, such as ‘incomplete comparability’, ‘incompletely justified choice’, ‘indeterminateness’ and ‘ethical deficit’ – concepts that are essential for comprehending problems of incommensurability. Apart from problematic implications, incommensurability has also favourable consequences. It creates room for autonomous rational choices that are not dictated by reason. Besides, insight into incommensurability promotes recognition of different possible rankings of universally valid but sometimes conflicting human values. This book avoids unnecessary technical language and is accessible not only for specialists but for a large audience of philosophers, ethicists, political theorists, economists, lawyers and interested persons without specialized knowledge.

Adopting an evolutionary perspective, this Research Handbook presents novel and cutting-edge insights into the interdisciplinary field of legal evolution. Engaging with various scientific approaches, it provides a versatile analysis of legal evolution, examining the field as a whole as well as in the context of specific branches of law.

This book provides an interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between compromise and democracy. Compromises have played a significant role in our representative democracies and yet the nature of the relationship between compromise and democracy has generally raised tricky theoretical questions and generated ambiguous evaluations. This book focuses on the relationship between compromise and liberal democracies from both a cultural and institutional perspective and addresses new and lesser-explored aspects of the relationship. It explores a variety of topics including: compromise and in-commensurable values, antagonist paradigms, compromise and majority decisions, compromise and publicity, compromise and post-conflict societies, compromise and anti-system political parties, and compromise and the understanding of political representation. Compromises in Democracy offers an original perspective on the topic by assembling contributions from the fields of philosophy, sociology, political theory, political science and history of ideas.

New philosophical essays on love by a diverse group of international scholars. Topics include contributions to the ongoing debate on whether love is arational or if there are reasons for love, and if so what kind; the kinds of love there may be (between humans and artificial intelligences, between non-human animals and humans); whether love can explain the difference between nationalism and patriotism; whether love is an necessary component of truly seeing others and the world; whether love, like free will, is “fragile,” and may not survive in a deterministic world; and whether or not love is actually a good thing or may instead be a force opposed to morality. Key philosophers discussed include Immanuel Kant, Iris Murdoch, Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, Thomas Hurka, Bennett Helm, Alfred Mele and Derk Pereboom. Essays also touch on the treatment of love in literature and popular culture, from Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair to Spike Jonze’s movie her.

"This book focuses on the challenges associated with effective choice over time. In particular, it considers the challenges raised by cyclic preferences and by incomplete preferences, both of which interfere with the agent's neatly ordering her options, and which make the agent susceptible to self-defeating patterns of choice in which the agent is drawn into taking each of a series of steps that collectively lead her to a result that she deems unacceptable. The book's guiding questions are the following: What is an agent to do if she finds herself with cyclic preferences or with incomplete preferences? Is an agent or group of agents with such preferences necessarily irrational? It is argued that the answer to the latter question is "no"; rationality does not invariably prohibit disorderly preferences, but it does (to get back to the first question) prompt us to proceed with caution and with a readiness to show restraint, based on an awareness of larger dynamics, when our preferences are disorderly. Theories of rational choice often dismiss or abstract away from the sorts of disorderly preferences at issue here. They assume that rational agents can and should have neat preferences over their options; but this assumption is problematic. Rationality can validate certain disorderly preference structures while also protecting us from self-defeating patterns of choice. Rationality can thus handle quite a lot of messiness, which is important, since rationality wouldn't be all that helpful if, whenever messiness threatened, we could not turn to it for guidance"--

What is money and how does it acquire its value? How do we assign a measurable monetary value to human goods that do not seem quantifiable? What role does money play in the structure of society? Is money an illusion or is it real? Despite the enormous impact of money on the structure of human society, as well as its effect on our daily decision-making, surprisingly little philosophical work has been done on money to date. This book examines the metaphysical foundations of money as well as the power structures that characterize the world of finance, connecting the ontology of money to considerations about inequality and other real-life issues. By throwing light on the metaphysical structure of money and financial value, Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir seeks to further the philosophical discussion of money and contribute to a broader critique of the monetary system.

To what degree is technology in the form of products and processes capable of contributing human enhancement and wellbeing? In cases where the impact of a technology on society is not only very negligible but overall negative and harmful, what is technology good for? To answer these questions, Spence develops and applies a normative model based on rationalist and virtue ethics as well as stoic philosophy. Its primary purpose is to determine the essential conditions that any normative theory that seeks to assess the impact of technology on wellbeing must adequately address in order to be able to account for, explain and evaluate what contribution, if any, technology is capable of making to the attainment and enhancement of human wellbeing. Through developing this model, Spence offers a novel and important examination of the benefit of technology to our society as a whole.

In this book, using Adorno’s aesthetic theory more generally, a viable philosophical approach to the study of idiomatic, non- standard music is constructed. The links between Adorno’s work and its Kantian roots are explored, and a more general and inclusive aesthetic constructed.