Independant Regulatory Agencies Legislation

It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector. Independent Agencies in the United States provides a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US, focusing on traditional multi-member agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Trade Commission. It recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create innovative and idiosyncratic administrative structures including government corporations, government sponsored enterprises governance, public-private partnerships, systems for "contracting out," self-regulation and incorporation by reference of private standards. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. They provide a unique comparative review of the internal operations of US agencies and offer contrasts between US, EU, and certain UK independent agencies. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography.

Considers. H.R. 4800 and related H.R. 6774, to amend the Communications Act, the Federal Aviation Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Federal Power Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Securities Exchange Act to increase regulatory agencies power and independence of action. S. 1735, to amend the Communications Act to repeal the honorarium provision regarding presentation or delivery of publications to the FCC. S. 1736, to amend the Communications Act to eliminate required oath or affirmation on certain documents filed with FCC. S. 1738, to amend the Communications Act to lessen functions of FCC review staff. S. 1965, to amend the Federal Power Act to readjust succession and appointment policies for Commissioners of regulatory agencies. Includes "Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions" by Louis J. Hector, Sept. 10, 1959 (p. 336-411); and CAB "Comments on the Hector Memorandum" (p. 412-507)

A critical examination of the role of the independent regulatory commissions, attempting to develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental regulation and to appraise the independent commission as an agent of governmental regulation at the national level. Originally published in 1955. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Abstract: The government's role in establishing and enforcing regulatory policy and processes is discussed. The best solution to each problem raised by regulatory proposals can be found only afer all of the facts are examined. Major issues include: markets and regulation (which discusses the regulatory process and examines the economic and social performance goals that competition, regulation, and governmental techniques expect to achieve); regulatory justifications (which examines technical efficiency and welfare efficiency, complex problems with no single solution); equity (realms of values); and the politics of regulations (which examines legislation; administration, and reform). (kbc).

The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent Regulatory Agencies is an in-depth investigation on the law and practices of the political accountability arrangements of the 35 EU and 16 US independent agencies. The comparative analysis demonstrates similarities between the political accountability arsenals and challenges to political oversight in the EU and the US. The greatest differences are revealed in the organization of the political accountability of independent agencies, i.e., ‘excessive diversity in the EU vs. uniformity in the US’, and the design of accountability obligations. Based on comparative insights, the book concludes with three recommendations on how the EU agencies’ political accountability could be adjusted in the ongoing reform on agencies’ creation and operation.