Indian National Security And Counter Insurgency

This edited volume focuses on India's experiences waging counterinsurgency campaigns since its independence in 1947. Filling a clear gap in the literature, the book traces and assess the origins, evolution and current state of India's counterinsurgency strategies and capabilities, focusing on key counterinsurgency campaigns waged by India within and outside its territory. It also analyzes the development of Indian doctrine on counterinsurgency, and locates this within the overall ebb and flow of India's defense and security policies. The central argument is that counterinsurgency has been an integral part of India's overall security policy and can thereby impart much to political and military leaders in other states. Since its emergence from British colonialism, India's defence policies have not merely sought to protect and preserve India's inherited colonial borders from threats by rival states, but have also sought to prevent and suppress secessionist movements. In countering insurgencies, the Indian state has fashioned strategies that seek to repress militarily any secessionist movement, while simultaneously forging a range of civilian administrative and institutional arrangements that attempt to address the grievances of disaffected populations. The book highlights key strategic and tactical innovations that the Indian Army and security forces made to deal with a range of insurgent movements. Simultaneously, it also examines how the civilian-military nexus enabled India's policy makers to utilize existing, and formulate novel, institutional means to address extant political grievances. India has been most successful where it has managed to use calibrated force, obtained the trust of much of the aggrieved population and made persuasive commitments to political and institutional reform. Examination of these elements of India's counterinsurgency performance can be compared to counterinsurgency doctrine developed by other countries, including the United States, and thus yield comparative policy prescriptions and recommendations that can be applied to other counterinsurgency contexts. This book will be of great interest to students of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, Indian politics, Asian Security Studies and Strategic Studies in general.

This book, based on extensive field research, examines the Indian state’s response to the multiple insurgencies that have occurred since independence in 1947. In reacting to these various insurgencies, the Indian state has employed a combined approach of force, dialogue, accommodation of ethnic and minority aspirations and, overtime, the state has established a tradition of negotiation with armed ethnic groups in order to bolster its legitimacy based on an accommodative posture. While these efforts have succeeded in resolving the Mizo insurgency, it has only incited levels of violence with regard to others. Within this backdrop of ongoing Indian counter-insurgency, this study provides a set of conditions responsible for the groundswell of insurgencies in India, and some recommendations to better formulate India’s national security policy with regard to its counter-insurgency responses. The study focuses on the national institutions responsible for formulating India’s national security policy dealing with counter-insurgency – such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian military apparatus. Furthermore, it studies how national interests and values influence the formulation of this policy; and the overall success and/or failure of the policy to deal with armed insurgent movements. Notably, the study traces the ideational influence of Kautilya and Gandhi in India’s overall response to insurgencies. Multiple cases of armed ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland in the Northeast of India and the ideologically oriented Maoist or Naxalite insurgency affecting the heartland of India are analysed in-depth to evaluate the Indian counter-insurgency experience. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgency, Asian politics, ethnic conflict, and security studies in general.

The Maoists have taken up arms. Their focus is on tribals and lower caste people for support. Stress is on militarisation with hierarchy and building of ‘People’s Guerrilla Army’ capable of destroying the state machinery. Violence and breakdown of law and order is causing loss of innocent lives and damage to property. The book has been covered in five chapters by the contributors. The first chapter deals with the Maoist insurgency in India and analyses the reasons that led to the Communist Party of India (CPI) taking up the cause of the lower castes and scheduled tribes. The second chapter deals with use of air power in combating the Maoist insurgency. The author has suggested deployment of drones to detect insurgent camps in the forests and use of helicopters for evacuation of casualties and other measures to facilitate logistics support for Countering Insurgency. An appraisal of India’s Intelligence agencies has been covered in Chapter Three. The fourth and fifth chapters are concerning the manner in which the United States has reacted after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA and how India reacted after the terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008. The author has suggested the need to evolve a Comprehensive Internal Security Policy covering all dimensions and all levels -- political, economic and social.

The geopolitics of South Asia makes it one of the most dangerous places to live in today. The collapse of the Soviet Union has destabilised long-established cold war equations and unleashed violent processes of transformation, of jockeying for power and c

In This Book A Deep Analysis Has Been Made Of The Several Invasions Of India, The Wars That Were Fought After Independence, The Counter-Insurgency, Internal Security And Peace-Keeping Operations Carried Out, And Focused Attention On The More Important Lessons That Should Be Learnt From These, To Ensure It As The Freedom Of The Countr Is Never Against Jeopardised.

This book, based on extensive field research, examines the Indian state’s response to the multiple insurgencies that have occurred since independence in 1947. In reacting to these various insurgencies, the Indian state has employed a combined approach of force, dialogue, accommodation of ethnic and minority aspirations and, overtime, the state has established a tradition of negotiation with armed ethnic groups in order to bolster its legitimacy based on an accommodative posture. While these efforts have succeeded in resolving the Mizo insurgency, it has only incited levels of violence with regard to others. Within this backdrop of ongoing Indian counter-insurgency, this study provides a set of conditions responsible for the groundswell of insurgencies in India, and some recommendations to better formulate India’s national security policy with regard to its counter-insurgency responses. The study focuses on the national institutions responsible for formulating India’s national security policy dealing with counter-insurgency – such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian military apparatus. Furthermore, it studies how national interests and values influence the formulation of this policy; and the overall success and/or failure of the policy to deal with armed insurgent movements. Notably, the study traces the ideational influence of Kautilya and Gandhi in India’s overall response to insurgencies. Multiple cases of armed ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland in the Northeast of India and the ideologically oriented Maoist or Naxalite insurgency affecting the heartland of India are analysed in-depth to evaluate the Indian counter-insurgency experience. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgency, Asian politics, ethnic conflict, and security studies in general.

The pace of U.S.-India defense cooperation over the past decade-and especially the past 2 years-has been unprecedented and impressive in many areas. These areas include defense technology cooperation, the discussion of a framework for military-to-military agreements, and the expansion of joint military exercises. U.S.-India defense cooperation, however, will remain limited in critical areas where India's historical independent interests remain firm. Among these areas of Indian reserve include strategic autonomy, the imperatives of domestic federalism, and the preference for a go-slow approach toward redressing civil unrest. Attempts by U.S. policymakers to press harder in these areas will likely prove counterproductive. India's long-running class-based, economic insurgency-the Naxalite insurgency (or Community Party of India [CPI]-Maoist insurgency)-is a case study in which external security partnerships will remain limited, if not mostly unwelcomed, in New Delhi. Known as "the greatest domestic security threat faced by India" from 2006 to 2011, the Naxalite insurgency has receded and largely been contained-albeit still far from eliminated-as of 2016. India's security response to the Naxalite insurgency from 2004 to 2015 demonstrates that New Delhi will prefer limited interaction with external security partners when addressing matters of domestic counterinsurgency. With this insight, U.S. policymakers should not expect that New Delhi will accept direct assistance for its domestic counterinsurgency units in the foreseeable future, and the United States should not press India too hard on this issue. Washington would be ill-served by an Indian backlash to such unwelcomed assertiveness. Any Indian backlash might curb or reverse far more important bilateral military-to-military interactions including joint maritime security activities in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific, bilateral interoperability exercises that improve Indian confidence and capabilities against potential Chinese encroachment in disputed Sino-Indian border areas, and military-to-military collaboration in global counterterrorism intelligence-sharing and operations. The United States instead should focus on not only its offers of major near-term bilateral military assistance for security cooperation but also, to the extent that Indian sensitivities will allow, actions by China that threaten mutually held security concerns in New Delhi and Washington.