Individual Criminal Responsibility For Core International Crimes

1.1 Opening Remarks and Objectives Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 2 be enforced. This is, perhaps, the most renowned citation from the judgment of the Int- national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”). In the six decades which have passed since the IMT judgment was handed down, the recognition of the c- cept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes has been significantly reinforced and developed, particularly since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) in the 1990’s and most recently the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The media has, of course, played a crucial role in increasing awareness of this concept, especially amongst the general populace. Indeed, the concept has, arguably, a much higher profile today, than ever before in its history. However, the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core inter- tional crimes is neither as straightforward nor as single-facetted, as might appear on first glance. While the general principle behind the concept does not generate too many difficulties, it is in its practical application that the more challenging aspects of the concept are brought to the fore. Each of these ‘challenging - pects’ can also be described as a ‘pertinent issue’ of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes.

Anchored by the normative framework, this book aims to clarify the basis for individual criminal liability for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. The objective of this monograph is to clarify the rules to enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal liability of individual who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this book also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting. This is achieved through a thorough analysis of the applicable rules in the international arena, as well as through the comparative analysis.

This book offers a unique comparison between state and individual responsibility for international crimes and examines the theories that can explain the relationship between these two regimes. The study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relevant international practice from the standpoint of both international criminal law, and in particular the case law of international criminal tribunals, and state responsibility. The author shows the various connections and issues arising from the parallel establishment of state and individual responsibility for the commission of the same international crimes. These connections indicate a growing need to better co-ordinate these regimes of international responsibility. The author maintains that a general conception, according to which state and individual responsibility are two separate sets of secondary rules attached to the breach of the same primary norms, can help to solve the various issues relating to this dual responsibility. This conception of the complementarity between state and individual responsibility justifies co-ordination and consistent application of these two different regimes, each of which aims to foster compliance with the most important obligations owed to the international community as a whole.

With a foreword by professor Christine Van den Wyngaert, Judge at the International Criminal Court. --Book Jacket.

After a long period of relative stagnation, substantive international criminal law has been invigorated primarily by the activities of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both ad hoc tribunals have made immense advancements to this area of international criminal law by, for instance, laying down detailed rules on what constitutes culpable conduct and when responsibility should be attributed for the conduct of others. These important advances notwithstanding, much remains in flux. The elements of the core international crimes are still subject to controversy. Theories of individual criminal responsibility, such as command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, are highly controversial. There is as yet no knowledge of how international offenses should be graded according to different levels and degrees of culpability and harm. This book brings together a team of researchers and practitioners from the field of international criminal law, concerned with a new international agenda of refining substantive international criminal law. The diverse topics examined include the superior orders defense, the mental element, the defense of mistake, command responsibility, the crime of aggression, and the principle of legality.

In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, major offences committed by individuals have been subject to progressive systematisation in the framework of international criminal law. Proposals developed within the context of the League of Nations coordinated individual liability and State responsibility. By contrast, international law as codified after World War II in the framework of the United Nations embodies a neat divide between individual criminal liability and State aggravated responsibility. However, conduct of State organs and agents generates dual liability. Through a critical analysis of key international rules, the book assesses whether the divisive approach to individual and State responsibility is normatively consistent. Contemporary situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, 9/11 and the Iraq wars demonstrate that the matter still gives rise to controversy: a set of systemic problems emerge. The research focuses on the substantive elements of major offences, notably agression, genocide, core war crimes, core crimes against humanity and terrorism, as well as relevant procedural implications. The book is a useful resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, researchers and anyone interested in international law and politics.

Principles of International Criminal Law has become one of the most influential textbooks in the field of international criminal justice. It offers a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the foundations and general principles of substantive international criminal law, including thorough discussion of its core crimes. It provides a detailed understanding of the general principles, sources, and evolution of international criminal law, demonstrating how it has developed, and how its application has changed. After establishing the general principles, the book assesses the four key international crimes as defined by the statute of the International Criminal Court: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. This new edition revises and updates work with developments in international criminal justice since 2009. It includes new material on the principle of culpability as one of the fundamental principles of international criminal law, the notion of terrorism as a crime under international law, the concept of direct participation in hostilities, the problem of so-called unlawful combatants, and the issue of targeted killings. The book retains its highly-acclaimed systematic approach and consistent methodology, making the book essential reading for both students and scholars of international criminal law, as well as for practitioners and judges working in the field.

This book examines the concept of individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of international law, i.e. aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Such crimes are rarely committed by single individuals. Rather, international crimes generally connote a plurality of offenders, particularly in the execution of the crimes, which are often orchestrated and masterminded by individuals behind the scene of the crimes who can be termed 'intellectual perpetrators'. For a determination of individual guilt and responsibility, a fair assessment of the mutual relationships between those persons is indispensable. By setting out how to understand and apply concepts such as joint criminal enterprise, superior responsibility, duress, and the defence of superior orders, this work provides a framework for that assessment. It does so by bringing to light the roots of these concepts, which lie not merely in earlier phases of development of international criminal law but also in domestic law and legal doctrine. The book also critically reflects on how criminal responsibility has been developed in the case law of international criminal tribunals and courts. It thus illuminates and analyses the rules on individual responsibility in international law.