Indonesia Abandons Confrontation

Indonesia's foreign policy has been the topic of all too few scholarly works. This condition is, however, rapidly changing, and we can now look forward during the next few years to the publication of several important studies. Among the highly qualified authors presently engaged in completing books on various aspects of this subject are: Indonesia's former Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta; a former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamad Roem, and a former Foreign Minister, Anak Agung Gde Agung. Currently major studies are also well under way by Ambassador Howard Jones, Professor Frederick Bunnell, and Professor David Mozingo. None of these ongoing studies, however, focuses on the very recent period described by Mr. Franklin Weinstein in the Interim Report which the Indonesia Project is here publishing. His report is concerned with one of the most significant, but at the same time one of the most confusing, watersheds of Indonesian foreign policy. This is the process whereby Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia was brought to an end. A development of this significance, we feel, merits careful study now, even though the relevant data are as yet only partially available. It is our belief that a sufficient amount of pertinent material is on hand at this point to warrant the avowedly provisional account which Mr. Weinstein has undertaken with the encouragement of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. He, himself, wishes to emphasize the tentative character of his report and would appreciate it if those who read it, Indonesians in particular, would be kind enough to send him their criticisms and suggestions for the study's improvement. It is his hope, and ours, that a substantial amount of such commentary will be sent him so that following his current sojourn and research in Indonesia, he will be in a position to publish a study of recent Indonesian foreign policy which will be more comprehensive and definitive in character. - George McT. Kahin, October 1968

At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought.

The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore drove strategy and this confrontation became a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret and aggressive war against President Sukarno's Indonesia. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be overshadowed in the annals of history.

How can an underdeveloped country like Indonesia draw on outside resources for its national development without sacrificing its independence? Approaching the problem from the vantage point of the Indonesian elite, this important work explores the complex interactions between domestic political factors and the shaping of foreign policy. To illustrate the ways in which underdevelopment has affected Indonesia's international participation, Professor Weinstein presents a graphic picture of what Indonesia's leaders see when they view the outside world, and he systematically seeks out the sources of their perceptions. He shows that most of the elite see the international system as dominated by exploitative powers that cannot be relied on to assist Indonesia's development. He examines the relationship between perceptions and politics under both Sukarno and Soeharto and offers an illuminating comparison of the bases of foreign policy under each leader, revealing dramatic changes and surprising continuities. His cogent analysis helps to explain the sharp reversal of policy in 1966, and his conclusions form a convincing hypothesis that can be tested in other Third World countries. This book, now brought back to life as a member of Equinox Publishing's Classic Indonesia series, will attract specialists in Southeast Asia, as well as readers with a broader interest in the politics and economics of underdeveloped countries. FRANKLIN B. WEINSTEIN was Director of the Project on United States-Japan Relations at Stanford University, where he also taught in the Department of Political Science. A graduate of Yale University, he received his PhD from Cornell University.

Studies a high period of tension in the relations between the two countries, paying special attention to the impact of considerations of security in Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia. This period saw a concerned Australian Government become deeply involved in the Confrontation conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. In four chapters entitled 'Patterns of Australian Foreign Policy', 'The Setting of Australian Indonesian Relations During the Period of Confrontations Against Malaysia', 'Australia's Response to Indonesia's Opposition to the Malaysian Proposal', and 'Conclusion'. Contains an Appendix on the Manila Agreements.

Much has been written about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and about Indonesia’s foreign policy, but few scholars have specifically focused on Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism tries to fill this academic gap.

In this timely work, leading scholars analyze the causes of the social, political, and economic crises that erupted in Indonesia in the late 1990s, the responses of the elite and civil society, and the prospects for continuing reform. In the process, they explore such issues as the relevance of the nation-state in an age of globalization, the role of Islam in politics and violence, the strengths and weaknesses of a negotiated route to democratic governance, the relationship of corruption and structural reform to economic growth, and the prospects for stability in Southeast Asia. The first book to grapple with the scale and complexity of this historic transition, this work offers a clear and compelling introduction to the Indonesian experience for students with an interest in the problems of post-colonial states, to scholars in comparative Asian studies, and to anyone seeking a serious yet accessible introduction to the world's largest Islamic democracy. A Study of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University