Industrial Mobilization

Contents: Mobilization activities before Pearl Harbor day; education for mobilization; interwar planning for industrial mobilization; mobilizing for war: 1939-1941; the war production board; the controlled materials plan; the office of war mobilization & reconversion; U.S. production in World War II; balancing military & civilian needs; overcoming raw material scarcities; maritime construction; people mobilization: Rosie the RiveterÓ; conclusions. Appendix: production of selected munitions items; the war agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

This original book is a wide-ranging, radical and highly innovative critique of the prevailing orthodoxies within industrial relations and human resource management. It covers: central problems in industrial relations the mobilization theory of collective action the growth of non-union workplaces and the prospects and desirability of a new labour-management social partnership an historical account of worker collectivism, organization and militancy and state or employer counter mobilization a critique of postmodernism and accounts of the end of the labour movement Containing a detailed examination of the evolution of industrial relations, it argues that the area is often under-theorized and influenced by the policy agenda of the state or employers, and will prove informative reading for students of industrial relations.

Becoming the Arsenal discusses one of the three signal events that transformed the relationship of government and the private sector in directing the American economy. The first was the Great Depression and the government's New Deal recovery program. The second was the gradual abandonment of the monetary Gold Standard, or the "floating" of the dollar between 1933 and the 1970s. Third, and least appreciated, was the mobilization of the American economy to confront the threat of the Axis ascendancy in World War II. Becoming the Arsenal places the events of this economic mobilization in its political-economic context and evaluates its performance in terms of prevailing military and political realities. The book is structured in three parts. The first deals with the decision to mobilize in May-June 1940. The second part relates the importance of the World War I experience and the economic diplomatic environment of the late 1930s. The final part examines the shift from a partial mobilization to the commitment to a "Victory Plan" in the fall of 1941, and achievement of complete mobilization and its consequences, in early 1943.