Infantry Division Components Of The Us Army

Amerikansk militærhistorie, amerikanske hær's historie. Army Almanac for 1959. Udkom første gang i 1950 (dette ex. er på DEPOT I-1159). KGB har1959-udgaven med ajourførte oplysninger på Læsesalen. En form for grundbog om US Army. Indeholder alle mulige nyttige oplysninger og informationer om den amerikanske hær, organisation, opdeling, enheder, uddannelse, officerskorpset, veteraner, material, våben, uniformer, udrustning, efterretningsvirksomhed, logistikområdet, militærlove, dekorationer og belønninger, oversigt over generaler, hærens relationer til det civile, m.m. samt afsnit om USA's deltagelse i krige og væbnede konflikter fra Uafhængighedskrigene i 1775 til Koreakrigen i 1950, væbnede konflikter, "småkrige", m.m.

"Infantry Division Components of the US Army 1917-2004" details every divisional unit during the period. It of historical interest for those who would like to know how units within divisions changed over the years, from 1917 to 1945, 1954, 1960, 1965 and 2004. Of particular interest is that the lists iclude all combat support and combat service service support units that served in each division.

The first of a two-volume study, this title records the organization, doctrine and equipment of US Army infantry divisions from 1943-1945. The author examines: the organization down to the lowest level possible; their training and tactical doctrine; and equipment, vehicles and weapons used.

In the first of a three-volume study, the author presents an extremely detailed record of the organization, doctrine and equipment of U.S. Army infantry divisions during the latter part of World War II. Yves Bellanger presents each of the divisions sub-units - from the divisional HQ to an infantry battalion and the divisional artillery to its combat engineer element. For each, the author examines their organization, their training and tactical doctrine.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

The involuntary soldiers of an unmilitary people such were the forces that American military planners had to pit against hardened Axis veterans, yet prewar unpreparedness dictated that whole divisions of such men would go to war under the supervision of tiny professional cadres. Much to his surprise and delight, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall found that the 88th Infantry Division, his first draftee division, "fought like wildcats" and readily outclassed its German adversaries while measuring up to the best Regular Army divisions. Draftee Division is at once a history of the 88th Division, an analysis of American unit mobilization during World War II, and an insight into the savage Italian Campaign. After an introduction placing the division in historical context, separate chapters address personnel, training, logistics, and overseas deployment. Another chapter focuses upon preliminary adjustments to the realities of combat, after which two chapters trace the 88th's climactic drive through the Gustav Line into Rome itself. A final chapter takes the veteran 88th to final victory. Of particular interest are observations concerning differences connected with mobilization between the 88th and less successful divisions and discussions of the contemporary relevance of the 88th's experiences. Draftee Division is especially rich in its sources. John Sloan Brown, with close ties to the division, has secured extensive and candid contributions from veterans. To these he has added a full array of archival and secondary sources. The result is a definitive study of American cadremen creating a division out of raw draftees and leading them on to creditable victories. Its findings will be important for military and social historians and for students of defense policy