Inflation And Activity Two Explorations And Their Monetary Policy Implications

We explore two issues triggered by the crisis. First, in most advanced countries, output remains far below the pre-recession trend, suggesting hysteresis. Second, while inflation has decreased, it has decreased less than anticipated, suggesting a breakdown of the relation between inflation and activity. To examine the first, we look at 122 recessions over the past 50 years in 23 countries. We find that a high proportion of them have been followed by lower output or even lower growth. To examine the second, we estimate a Phillips curve relation over the past 50 years for 20 countries. We find that the effect of unemployment on inflation, for given expected inflation, decreased until the early 1990s, but has remained roughly stable since then. We draw implications of our findings for monetary policy.

We explore two issues triggered by the global financial crisis. First, in most advanced countries, output remains far below the pre-recession trend, suggesting hysteresis. Second, while inflation has decreased, it has decreased less than anticipated, suggesting a breakdown of the relation between inflation and activity. To examine the first, we look at 122 recessions over the past 50 years in 23 countries. We find that a high proportion of them have been followed by lower output or even lower growth. To examine the second, we estimate a Phillips curve relation over the past 50 years for 20 countries. We find that the effect of unemployment on inflation, for given expected inflation, decreased until the early 1990s but has remained roughly stable since then. We draw implications of our findings for monetary policy.

Current perspectives on the Phillips curve, a core macroeconomic concept that treats the relationship between inflation and unemployment. In 1958, economist A. W. Phillips published an article describing what he observed to be the inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment; subsequently, the “Phillips curve” became a central concept in macroeconomic analysis and policymaking. But today's Phillips curve is not the same as the original one from fifty years ago; the economy, our understanding of price setting behavior, the determinants of inflation, and the role of monetary policy have evolved significantly since then. In this book, some of the top economists working today reexamine the theoretical and empirical validity of the Phillips curve in its more recent specifications. The contributors consider such questions as what economists have learned about price and wage setting and inflation expectations that would improve the way we use and formulate the Phillips curve, what the Phillips curve approach can teach us about inflation dynamics, and how these lessons can be applied to improving the conduct of monetary policy. Contributors Lawrence Ball, Ben Bernanke, Oliver Blanchard, V. V. Chari, William T. Dickens, Stanley Fischer, Jeff Fuhrer, Jordi Gali, Michael T. Kiley, Robert G. King, Donald L. Kohn, Yolanda K. Kodrzycki, Jane Sneddon Little, Bartisz Mackowiak, N. Gregory Mankiw, Virgiliu Midrigan, Giovanni P. Olivei, Athanasios Orphanides, Adrian R. Pagan, Christopher A. Pissarides, Lucrezia Reichlin, Paul A. Samuelson, Christopher A. Sims, Frank R. Smets, Robert M. Solow, Jürgen Stark, James H. Stock, Lars E. O. Svensson, John B. Taylor, Mark W. Watson

Traditionally, economic growth and business cycles have been treated independently. However, the dependence of GDP levels on its history of shocks, what economists refer to as “hysteresis,” argues for unifying the analysis of growth and cycles. In this paper, we review the recent empirical and theoretical literature that motivate this paradigm shift. The renewed interest in hysteresis has been sparked by the persistence of the Global Financial Crisis and fears of a slow recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. The findings of the recent literature have far-reaching conceptual and policy implications. In recessions, monetary and fiscal policies need to be more active to avoid the permanent scars of a downturn. And in good times, running a high-pressure economy could have permanent positive effects.

Inflation is regarded by the many as a menace that damages business and can only make life worse for households. Keeping it low depends critically on ensuring that firms and workers expect it to be low. So expectations of inflation are a key influence on national economic welfare. This collection pulls together a galaxy of world experts (including Roy Batchelor, Richard Curtin and Staffan Linden) on inflation expectations to debate different aspects of the issues involved. The main focus of the volume is on likely inflation developments. A number of factors have led practitioners and academic observers of monetary policy to place increasing emphasis recently on inflation expectations. One is the spread of inflation targeting, invented in New Zealand over 15 years ago, but now encompassing many important economies including Brazil, Canada, Israel and Great Britain. Even more significantly, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the United States Federal Bank are the leading members of another group of monetary institutions all considering or implementing moves in the same direction. A second is the large reduction in actual inflation that has been observed in most countries over the past decade or so. These considerations underscore the critical – and largely underrecognized - importance of inflation expectations. They emphasize the importance of the issues, and the great need for a volume that offers a clear, systematic treatment of them. This book, under the steely editorship of Peter Sinclair, should prove very important for policy makers and monetary economists alike.

The contributions to this book examine the two main asymmetries of the Euro Area as they have intensified during the second decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the first between monetary union (more supranational governance) versus ‘economic’ union (less centralised governance); the second between those Euro Area member states of the so-called ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. EMU stands as one of the European Union’s (EU) flagship integration achievements. Set up in 1999, with the large majority of EU member states at the time, EMU was described as ‘asymmetrical’ even prior to its start. From the outset, it involved asymmetrical integration in monetary and ‘economic’ union. Although a major element of the blueprint that paved the way for the final stage of EMU, the concept of ‘economic’ union was insufficiently developed. The second decade of the single currency gave rise to a second asymmetry, namely one between those Euro Area member states of the ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. The ten contributions to this volume speak to one or both of these asymmetries, covering the major political, political economy and policy dimensions of EMU and the ongoing debates about necessary policy and institutional reforms to overcome these asymmetries and bolster Euro Area stability. The outbreak of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) Crisis in 2020 created unprecedented socio-economic challenges for Euro Area member states, heightening the perceived urgency of reform. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

Asia is expected to grow by about 51⁄2 percent this year, accounting for nearly two-thirds of global growth, and the region remains the world’s most dynamic by a considerable margin. But despite the strong outlook, policymakers must remain vigilant. While risks around the forecast are broadly balanced for now, they are skewed firmly to the downside over the medium term. Key risks include those of further market corrections—possibly triggered by inflation surprises and/or faster-than-expected monetary tightening in advanced economies—a shift toward protectionist policies, and an increase in geopolitical tensions.

For decades, economic policymakers have worshipped at the altar of combating inflation, reducing public deficits, and discouraging risky behavior by investors. That mindset made them hesitate when the global financial crisis erupted in 2007–08. In the face of the worst economic disaster in 75 years, they often worried excessively about the risks and possible losses from their actions, rather than moving forcefully to support financial institutions, governments, and people. Ángel Ubide's provocative thesis in Paradox of Risk is that central banks' fear of inflation and risk taking has hampered their efforts to revive global prosperity. In their confusion, he argues, policymakers made the recovery weaker. He calls on world leaders to abandon old shibboleths and learn the lessons from the financial crisis and its sluggish aftermath. Ubide mobilizes a wealth of research on the experience from the last decade, urging policymakers to leave their "comfort zone," embrace risk taking, and take bolder action to brighten the world's economic prospects. (The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) provided funding for this study).