Inflation Targeting In The United Kingdom

Especially since the operational introduction as central bank monetary policy framework in the early 1990s in New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Sweden, inflation targeting has gained both empirical and theoretical relevance as a monetary policy strategy. In this paper I relate to inflation targeting theory and its framework in the UK. For that purpose the author first regards the development of inflation targeting in respect to other monetary policy strategies. He answers the question what the actual target variable is and why one would want to have inflation being low and stable. Then there is some complexity because the development of inflation targeting has to be viewed in relation to paradigmatic debates between Monetarist and New-Keynesian insights. He present the two fundamental views of how an inflation targeting framework should be modelled. By stating some equations from basic theoretical literature, he gives an overview about the different characteristics of that monetary policy strategy and how there is still controversy about the way of modelling. One chapter is concerned with the operational framework in the UK, including statements to historical developments at the Bank of England. The present monetary policy framework will be reviewed in detail relating to the Bank's publication policy and the inflation forecasting process. The Bank of England's model of the transmission mechanism is reviewed. This includes the interest rate setting process, the role of money and the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations. Finally, he discusses some economic effects that changed the British economy since the introduction of inflation targeting.

The main objective of this paper is to identify a set of leading indicators of inflation for the United Kingdom, and discuss the conceptual issues pertaining to inflation targeting. The main conclusions are that narrow money has strong leading indicator properties for inflation, while broad money does not. Long yields appear to have some information for the GDP deflator, and headline inflation, and short yields for underlying inflation. Spreads between commercial paper and gilts, and the yield curve, have very little predictive information on inflation. An interesting conclusion is that while the nominal effective exchange rate is not a good predictor of inflation, the sterling-deutsche mark exchange rate appears to have weak predictive information on the targeted measure of inflation.

This paper reviews the first five years’ experience with inflation targeting in the United Kingdom. It concludes that inflation performance was not significantly different under inflation targeting than predicted by a VAR model estimated in the period prior to participation in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). Both short- and long-term interest rates were lower than predicted, however, which is consistent with the interpretation that some gains in credibility were achieved under the inflation targeting regime.

A leading academic authority and policymaker discusses monetary policy strategy from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner, offering theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies. This book by a leading authority on monetary policy offers a unique view of the subject from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner. Frederic Mishkin is not only an academic expert in the field but also a high-level policymaker. He is especially well positioned to discuss the changes in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years, in particular the turn to inflation targeting. Monetary Policy Strategy describes his work over the last ten years, offering published papers, new introductory material, and a summing up, “Everything You Wanted to Know about Monetary Policy Strategy, But Were Afraid to Ask,” which reflects on what we have learned about monetary policy over the last thirty years. Mishkin blends theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies of monetary policy in advanced and emerging market and transition economies. Throughout, his focus is on these key areas: the importance of price stability and a nominal anchor; fiscal and financial preconditions for achieving price stability; central bank independence as an additional precondition; central bank accountability; the rationale for inflation targeting; the optimal inflation target; central bank transparency and communication; and the role of asset prices in monetary policy.

This Selected Issues paper examines the operational independence and the conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom. The paper describes the inflation targeting framework and the analytics of the decision-making process. It suggests that inflation targeting, although not entirely new in terms of the basic idea, is a rather significant step toward establishing a workable and well-defined framework for monetary policy. The paper also describes structure, mandate, and policy issues associated with the financial services authority.

A growing number of countries are anchoring their monetary policy through explicit inflation targeting. This policy has already scored remarkable successes in several countries, establishing central bank credibility, and reining in inflation where it had long been stubbornly high. But implementing inflation targets raises many difficult questions. What prerequisites must an economy and its institutions meet for the strategy to work? What choices should central banks make from the menu of possible variations on the basic approach? This book summarizes the discussions in a seminar at which economists and policymakers from ten countries reviewed their experiences with inflation targeting.

The U.K. monetary policy framework, which combines inflation targeting with operational independence, provides a suitable arrangement for focused and credible monetary policy. However, potential weaknesses could result from features that have not yet been fully tested: the credibility and transparency of the inflation forecasts, which form the core of policy decisions, have diminished as a result of independence; and the framework could encourage excessive activism and frequent changes in interest rates. Although policy coordination could also suffer from independence, the new partly rules-based fiscal and monetary regimes will promote overall macroeconomic stability.