Information And Revolutions In Military Affairs

Like the industrial revolution before it, the information technology revolution appears to be creating a new ruling class, a new economy and a new society. Information technology is also transforming military operations and warfare. A vast literature on the revolution in military affairs (or "RMA") cites the important (indeed, dominant) role of information technology in enabling a new military revolution. This volume challenges conventional wisdom not by claiming that information's impact on military operations is not "positive" or "transformative" but by claiming its impact is not "new". Previous periods of military revolution can also be characterized as information revolutions. Through the close examination of six case studies of military transformation during the industrial age, the contributors to this volume demonstrate how the employment of emerging information systems was critical to realizing a major boost in military effectiveness. The most successful adaptations to the new environment were made by the most skillful users of information. This volume draws upon the expertise of leading military historians, political scientists and defense practitioners to craft a set of original essays that provide the first retrospective examination of how information affects the process of military revolution. This book was previously published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

The contributors to this volume seek to explore the multi-dimensional (institutional, cultural, technological, and political) environments of several Asian states to determine the amenability of those host environments for the adoption/adaptation of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMS).

The remit of this study is to encourage further studies that make an honest and successful effort to achieve synergy between social science and history when analysing the impact of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).

The campaign in Afghanistan, the Gulf war, and Kosovo show how advances in information technology are driving a high-tech revolution in military affairs (RMA). This text outlines elements of the RMA and examines efforts of the US, and NATO.

The liberal world order, a euphemism for American global hegemony, is crumbling at an accelerating pace. While its collapse is tangible, the outcome of such a collapse remains a matter of speculation and public debate. The US is desperately seeking to preserve the status quo, which rests primarily upon recognition of its military supremacy. For millennia, warfare has been a driving force behind changes in the geopolitical status of power configurations (whether of peoples, states or empires), and it remains so, today. Accordingly, short of actual warfare, the assessment (modeling) of relative military power plays an inordinate role in the determination of national status. Models of emerging changes in military capability range from relatively simple to extremely complex ones. Viewing the evolution of the current system of international relations outside the framework of actual, rather than propaganda-driven, military capabilities is not only useless, it is dangerous since states’ mistaken assessment of their own and other states’ military power can lead to misadventures and catastrophic mistakes. The United States’ efforts to preserve not just its dominance but the perception of its dominance are bound to fail for many important reasons, none more important than what is often misidentified in past American military-theoretical hypotheses about the future of warfare, known generically as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This book explains why those hypotheses are failing and will continue to fail, and addresses the real RMA. In the end, technological development in weaponry as a response to tactical, operational and strategic requirements defines not only a nation’s geopolitical status but determines the global order. Assessments of military capacity, if reality-based, serve as good predictors of the level of volatility in international relations and the level of violence globally. This book gives an insight into the evolution of weapons and the way they influenced international relations in the 20th and 21st centuries. It also defines Revolution in Military Affairs as manifested via policy, politics, and technology. It reviews some models which are useful in assessing the current geopolitical situation. This book also tries to give a forecast of the future development of warfare and the ways in which it is going to change the whole system of the international relations, hopefully towards a new geopolitical equilibrium.

A generation after the First Gulf War, and in the wake of a decade of counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare, this book explores how the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs continues to shape the way modern militaries across the globe think about, plan and fight wars.

In April 1994, the Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute hosted the Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Jeffrey R. Cooper presented the following paper as part of an opening panel which sought to define the RMA. He urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as opposed to operational-- benefits might be derived from the RMA. He contends that making the internal reforms that will be required will be as challenging as coming to terms with the operational and strategic implications of the new technologies. The first requirement is to understand the parameters and dynamics of this particular revolution in military affairs. Mr. Cooper puts the RMA in historical perspective by discussing the relationships among technology, socioeconomic, and political change, and their implications for warfare during the Napoleonic era, the mid-19th century, and World Wars I and II. He argues that, in the past, dramatic technological change affected warfare in different ways. Mr. Cooper warns that by using the RMA to define a "technical legacy" we make three errors. First, such an approach could lead to a fruitless search for a "silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA. Second, the focus on technology could shift attention away from the critical issues of purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. Finally, committing the first two errors will compound the problem by wasting very scarce defense resources on new programs and projects which may have little or nothing to do with the strategic situation. Military professionals and defense planners alike need to remind themselves that while technology can provide new capabilities, the strategic equation is not necessarily driven by technological innovation.

This book studies the changes that have marked war in the Western World since the thirteenth century.