Information Operations Doctrine And Practice

A no-nonsense treatment of information operations, this handbook makes clear what does and does not fall under information operations, how the military plans and executes such efforts, and what the role of IO ought to be in the war of ideas. Paul provides detailed accounts of the doctrine and practice of the five core information operations capabilities (psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations) and the three related capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). The discussion of each capability includes historical examples, explanations of tools and forces available, and current challenges faced by that community. An appendix of selected excerpts from military doctrine ties the work firmly to the military theory behind information operations. Paul argues that contemporary IO's mixing of capabilities focused on information content with those focused on information systems conflates apples with the apple carts. This important study concludes that information operations would be better poised to contribute to the war of ideas if IO were reorganized, separating content capabilities from systems capabilities and separating the employment of black (deceptive or falsely attributed) information from white (wholly truthful and correctly attributed) information.

Introduced in 1998 by the Department of Defense, the concept of information operations (IO) proposed to revolutionize the ways in which warfare, diplomacy, and business were conducted. However, this transformation has not come to fruition. Two large gaps remain: between policy and theory, and between the funding needs of IO initiatives and the actual funds the federal bureaucracy is willing to provide to support these operations. These two discrepancies are central to the overall discussions of Information Operations Matters. Leigh Armistead explains why these gaps exist and suggests ways to close them. Also in discussing best practices in IO, he clarifies how the key agencies of the U.S. government can use the inherent power of information to better conduct future strategic communication campaigns. Information Operations Matters presents a more pragmatic approach to IO, recommending that IO policy be made surrounding usable concepts, definitions, theories, and capabilities that are attainable with the resources available. To meet the threats of the future as well as those facing us today, Armistead argues, it is necessary to use this new area of operations to the greatest extent possible.

The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.

Information is an element of combat power. Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to apply it. Focused IO-synchronized with effective information management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for achieving information superiority. Users of FM 3-13 must be familiar with the military decision making process established in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; the operations process, established in FM 3-0, Operations; and commander's visualization, described in FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. As the Army's key integrating manual for IO, this manual prescribes IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also establishes doctrine and TTP for the IO elements of operations security and military deception. This manual implements joint IO doctrine established in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations; JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security; and JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. This manual establishes the following as the definition of IO used by Army forces: Information operations is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. This definition supersedes the definition of IO in FM 3-0. It is consistent with joint initiatives.

This Joint Chiefs of Staff manual, Joint Publication JP 3-13 Information Operations Change 1 November 2014, sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operationsand for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidancefor the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders(JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force andexecuting the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effortin the accomplishment of the overall objective.

Information is an element of combat power. Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to apply it. Focused IO-synchronized with effective information management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance- enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for achieving information superiority. Users of FM 3-13 must be familiar with the military decision making process established in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; the operations process, established in FM 3-0, Operations; and commander's visualization, described in FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. As the Army's key integrating manual for IO, this manual prescribes IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also establishes doctrine and TTP for the IO elements of operations security and military deception. This manual implements joint IO doctrine established in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations; JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security; and JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. This manual establishes the following as the definition of IO used by Army forces: Information operations is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. This definition supersedes the definition of IO in FM 3-0. It is consistent with joint initiatives. The publication addresses IO doctrine in Part I and TTP in Part II. Part I also establishes Army operations security (OPSEC) and military deception doctrine.

Information operations involve the use of military information and how it is gathered, manipulated, and fused. It includes such critical functions as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and precision navigation. Separating myth from reality, this authoritative resource provides military professionals with a current and comprehensive understanding of information warfare operations planning, including offensive, defensive, and influence operations. The book identifies the features of information operations that differ from traditional military operations and reveals why this discipline is more important now than ever before. Professionals discover new planning tools that have been brought together under a single platform to become the next Information Operations Planning Tool for the U.S. Department of Defence. Additionally, the book defines and identifies new threats and opportunities, and explains why the U.S. is not yet winning the war for the minds.

The U.S. Army recognizes the ongoing threat posed by our adversaries' strategic efforts to integrate information operations (IO), cyberspace operations, and emerging technologies that challenge U.S. freedom of maneuver across all domains. As a result, the U.S. Army is posturing for a doctrinal shift toward multi-domain operations, which will increase the role of information in warfighting. As it does, the U.S. Army faces challenges and disparities regarding IO in design and practice. Current U.S. Army IO doctrine, terminology, and overall structure is insufficient and does not facilitate a conceptual shared understanding. This leads to systemic underperformance of tactical units in the information environment and suboptimal integration of IO in strategy and plans. Similarly, the U.S. Army community of IO practitioners faces an identity crisis that degrades the profession's cohesion, influence, and overall ability to operate effectively. To overcome these challenges, a critical examination of U.S. Army IO in design and practice is first required to reveal the scope of the disparity. Then, the application of social network analysis and social identity theories reveals potential solutions in IO training, education, and organization that will enable the U.S. Army to become more competitive in the information environment. This investment will enhance the Army's ability to seamlessly integrate and execute information warfare in current and future conflicts.