Institutional Investors Power To Change Corporate Behavior

The aim of the book series is to explore public concerns and practical issues deeply and rethink theoretical debates and institutional policies critically in the broad area of corporate responsibility, corporate governance and sustainability around the world. It examines the social, economic and environmental impacts of corporations, and the real effects of corporate governance, CSR and business sustainability on societies in different regions. It facilitates a better understanding of how value systems, cultures and traditions in different societies may affect the policies and practices of corporate responsibility, governance and sustainability. It identifies the future development trends of corporate responsibility, governance and sustainability in contexts when examining and exploring those key issues.

Institutional Investors' Power to Change Corporate Behavior

This book examines the shareholder activism of institutional investors, and the effect of this activism on portfolio performance. By focusing on 118 institutional investors headquartered in the United States, the book is unique in addressing the shareholder activism of a large sample. Institutional shareholder activism is defined to include both traditional mechanisms of influence (i.e. filing shareholder proposals) and relationship investing. Institutional owners included private and public pension funds, mutual funds, bank trusts, insurance companies, endowments, and foundations. These institutional owners differ substantially, and these differences lead institutions to use their ownership power to pursue different philosophies and actions. Some institutions follow a passive governance policy, While others adopt an activist role. This book seeks to answer four questions: (1) Are institutional owners actively involved in the strategic affairs of companies in their portfolios? (2)Which forms of activism do institutional owners employ (either confrontational mechanisms, such as filing shareholder proposals, or relationship building mechanisms)? (3)Which forms of activism employed are most effective? and (4) Does the institutional type affect its pursuit of shareholder activism? In answering these questions the author suggests new important results that in many cases are contrary to what prior reports of the activities by a small number of institutional owners may intimate.

Drawing on personal interviews with top executives and money managers, this inside look at more than 20 large corporations--including IBM, ITT, AT&T, American Airlines, and General Motors--shows how the explosive growth of institutional investing is changing the way corporations are run. Charts & graphs.

Can increasingly predominant shareholders improve the performance of the corporations they own and should they attempt to do so?

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

Traces the rise of public and private pension funds, which now control as much as 50 percent of the equity in American corporations, and argues that shareholders in those funds could use their power to make corporations more responsive to social needs.