Institutions And Norms In Economic Development

In order for economic specialization to develop, it is important that well-defined property rights are established and that suspicion and fear of fraud do not pervade transactions. Such conditions cannot be created ex abrubto, but must somehow evolve. What needs to develop is not only suitable practices and rules themselves, but also the public agencies and moral environment without which generalized trust is difficult to establish. The cultural endowment of societies as they have developed over their particular histories is bound to play a major role in this regard, and the matter of cultual endowment is one of the central themes of this book. On the other hand, division of labour does not only require well-enforced property rights and trust in economic dealings. It is also critically conditioned by the thickness of economic space, itself dependent on population density. This provides the second major theme of the volume: market development, including the development of private property rights is not possible, or will remain very incomplete, if populations are thinly spread over large areas of land. The book makes special reference to sub-Saharan Africa.

Experts address "the development puzzle"--unprecedented growth coupled with unequal distribution of that growth across different countries--and focus on the importance of institutional arrangements and norms and culture.

This book is a survey of the field of development studies from a political economy perspective. It first reviews the academic literature on development and highlights the fundamental importance of institutions and social values, over and above other alternative theories, as determinants in long-run development. In this context, the book draws from the works of Nobel Laureates Douglass North, F.A. Hayek and Elinor Ostrom, and argues that the ingredients of property rights, the rule of law, and market freedoms are essential in generating socio-economic progress. Successful reforms however are not simply a function of constructing formal institutions, but must cohere with the social values, norms, and cultural commitments of local communities. It is in this spirit that the book theorises on the oft-neglected role that political entrepreneurs play in driving endogenous institutional change. Specifically, this book integrates the theoretical discussion on market-driven development with a range of case studies from around the world, featuring the bottom-up efforts of local change agents to pursue institutional reforms and changes in social opinion.

Both economic research and the history of foreign aid suggest that the largest barriers to development arise from a society's institutions - its norms and rules. This book explains how institutions drive economic development. It provides numerous examples to illustrate the complex, interlocking, and persistent nature of real world rules and norms.

Informal institutions — family and kinship structures, traditions, and social norms — are often decisive factors in shaping policy outcomes and this book advocates a pragmatic way of dealing with them.

The definitive reference on the most current economics of development and institutions The essential role that institutions play in understanding economic development has long been recognized across the social sciences, including in economics. Academic and policy interest in this subject has never been higher. The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions is the first to bring together in one single volume the most cutting-edge work in this area by the best-known international economists. The volume’s editors, themselves leading scholars in the discipline, provide a comprehensive introduction, and the stellar contributors offer up-to-date analysis into institutional change and its interactions with the dynamics of economic development. This book focuses on three critical issues: the definitions of institutions in order to argue for a causal link to development, the complex interplay between formal and informal institutions, and the evolution and coevolution of institutions and their interactions with the political economy of development. Topics examined include the relationship between institutions and growth, educational systems, the role of the media, and the intersection between traditional systems of patronage and political institutions. Each chapter—covering the frontier research in its area and pointing to new areas of research—is the product of extensive workshopping on the part of the contributors. The definitive reference work on this topic, The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions will be essential for academics, researchers, and professionals working in the field.

This book is a timely reminder of the more fundamental determinants of capital accumulation and innovation. It provides a mixture of conceptual, empirical, historical and methodological approaches to the relationship between institutions, institutional change and economic development.

Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)