Intelligence Surveillance And Reconnaissance Overarching Guidance Is Needed To Advance Information Sharing

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing

The DoD has numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems ¿ including manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems ¿ that play critical roles in support of current military operations. The demand for these capabilities has increased dramatically. This testimony addresses: (1) the challenges the military services and defense agencies face processing, exploiting, and disseminating the information collected by ISR systems; and (2) the extent to which the military services and defense agencies have developed the capabilities required to share ISR information. The auditor visited numerous commands, military units, and locations in Iraq and the U.S. Illustrations.

The military services and defense agencies face three long-standing challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, its capacity for processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited and has not kept pace with the increase in collection platforms and combat air patrols. For example, the Air Force has substantially increased the number of combat air patrols that ISR collection platforms are performing in the U.S. Central Command theater of operations. Specifically, the number of combat air patrols flown by the Air Force's Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft systems has increased from 13 to 36 since 2007. Moreover, in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,10 DOD stated that it will continue to expand the Predator and Reaper combat air patrols to 65 by fiscal year 2015. This increase in data collection will also increase the burden on the Air Force's ground processing system, which processes, exploits, and disseminates the ISR information collected by these platforms.

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, DoD established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tech'y., and counterimprovised explosive devices systems. This review determined: (1) what DoD entities exist for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DoD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) has DoD evaluated the potential for consolidations. Illus. This is a print on demand report.

With the vague intention of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan, the US government has mismanaged billions of development and logistics dollars, bolstered the drug trade, and dumped untold millions into Taliban hands. That is the sobering message of this scathing critique of our war effort in Afghanistan. According to this book, America has already lost the war. While conducting extensive research and fieldwork in Afghanistan’s war zones, a drumbeat of off-the-record and offhand remarks pointed the author to one conclusion: "We blew it." The sentiment was even blazoned across a US military fortification, as the author saw at Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam in insurgency-wracked Laghman Province: "I glanced over at a concrete blast barrier while waiting for a helicopter," Wissing says. "Someone had spray-painted in jagged letters: ‘The GAME. You Lost It.’" The author’s vivid narrative takes the reader down to ground level in frontline Afghanistan. It draws on the voices of hundreds of combat soldiers, ordinary Afghans, private contractors, aid workers, international consultants, and government officials. From these contacts it became glaringly clear, as the author details, that American taxpayer dollars have been flowing into Taliban coffers, courtesy of scandalously mismanaged US development and counterinsurgency programs, with calamitous military and social consequences. This is the first book to detail the toxic embrace of American policymakers and careerists, Afghan kleptocrats, and the opportunistic Taliban. The result? US taxpayers have been footing the bill for both sides of a disastrous Afghanistan war.