International Commodity Markets And The Role Of Cartels

The phenomenon of collusive international agreements (cartels) became widespread in the 1930s. At that time, attempts to control production and prices were mainly the prerogative of multinational firms operating in the developing (then colonized) world. The "modern era" of cartels began in the 1960s, when the governments of developing nations began to participate in commodity agreements to achieve increases and stability in the world price of their commodities. This book is principally concerned with the modern era of cartels. It goes beyond the singular example of petroleum and OPEC to examine the structure of international commodity markets for bauxite (aluminum ore), cocoa, coffee, rubber, sugar, and tin, and the conditions that led to the formation of cartels in those markets during the latter half of the twentieth century. Specifically, the work focuses on four major aspects of international commodity markets: patterns of production and consumption; economic dislocations to both importers and exporters due to price fluctuations; the formation of cartels as a solution to weak and variable commodity prices; and the likely effects arising from tightening raw material markets. The book concludes with a detailed examination of what the future holds for each of the cartels, and what role technology, 24-hour market trading, and decreasing foreign direct investment in producing countries will have on the management of commodity markets.

The author's post-World War II study of international cartels and inter-governmental commodity agreements emphasizes the differences between American and European attitudes.

The phenomenon of collusive international agreements (cartels) became widespread in the 1930s. At that time, attempts to control production and prices were mainly the prerogative of multinational firms operating in the developing (then colonized) world. The "modern era" of cartels began in the 1960s, when the governments of developing nations began to participate in commodity agreements to achieve increases and stability in the world price of their commodities. This book is principally concerned with the modern era of cartels. It goes beyond the singular example of petroleum and OPEC to examine the structure of international commodity markets for bauxite (aluminum ore), cocoa, coffee, rubber, sugar, and tin, and the conditions that led to the formation of cartels in those markets during the latter half of the twentieth century. Specifically, the work focuses on four major aspects of international commodity markets: patterns of production and consumption; economic dislocations to both importers and exporters due to price fluctuations; the formation of cartels as a solution to weak and variable commodity prices; and the likely effects arising from tightening raw material markets. The book concludes with a detailed examination of what the future holds for each of the cartels, and what role technology, 24-hour market trading, and decreasing foreign direct investment in producing countries will have on the management of commodity markets.

The Political Economy of International Commodity Cartels examines how international commodity cartels in the 1930s were impacted not only by commercial rivalry, but also by international trade political and diplomatic concerns. This work presents the rise and decline of the European Timber Exporters’ Convention (ETEC) and analyses how firms navigated through the cartel game under increasing international competition, pressures from the national governments, and the interventionist endeavours of the League of Nations. Cartels are often associated with, in the standard economic interpretation, business collusion. However, in using vast archive sources and historical methodology, the chapters in this book shed light onto how international relations shaped cartels. The rise of British protectionism, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an industrial power, and the economic rapprochement of the League of Nations in the early 1930s created a wave of political and diplomatic challenges in the timber trading countries and affected cartelisation. Timber firms in the biggest producer countries—Finland and Sweden—were uninterested in international cartel collaboration, but under pressure joined the ETEC nevertheless. This book makes a strong contribution to the fields of business history and cartel studies. It is an essential read for economic historians interested in how political pressure shaped international cartels and how cartels became avenues of diplomacy.

The Political Economy of International Commodity Cartels examines how international commodity cartels in the 1930s were impacted not only by commercial rivalry, but also by international trade political and diplomatic concerns. This work presents the rise and decline of the European Timber Exporters' Convention (ETEC) and analyses how firms navigated through the cartel game under increasing international competition, pressures from the national governments, and the interventionist endeavours of the League of Nations. Cartels are often associated with, in the standard economic interpretation, business collusion. However, in using vast archive sources and historical methodology, the chapters in this book shed light onto how international relations shaped cartels. The rise of British protectionism, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an industrial power, and the economic rapprochement of the League of Nations in the early 1930s created a wave of political and diplomatic challenges in the timber trading countries and affected cartelisation. Timber firms in the biggest producer countries--Finland and Sweden--were uninterested in international cartel collaboration, but under pressure joined the ETEC nevertheless. This book makes a strong contribution to the fields of business history and cartel studies. It is an essential read for economic historians interested in how political pressure shaped international cartels and how cartels became avenues of diplomacy.

November 1995 Support for international commodity agreements is waning, but the commodity problem remains. And producer cartels are the main alternative. International commodity agreements (ICAs) fit uneasily in a world in which markets are becoming globalized and increasingly competitive. Development policy -- both as preached by international agencies and as practiced by typically democratically elected and nonsocialist governments in the major producing countries -- emphasizes productive efficiency, product quality, and effective marketing. This is a long way from the ideology that gave central place to supply restrictions operating through central marketing boards and quota allocations. In today's less centralized, more competitive world, the winners and losers from commodity stabilization are more evenly distributed across producing and consuming countries. Commodity policy is no longer a matter of redistribution from consumers to producers. This institutional change has been reinforced by the widespread belief -- evidenced, for example, by the collapse of the international tin and coffee agreements -- that commodity market stabilization through international agreements cannot succeed. In earlier decades, the belief that stabilization could and would improve the position of commodity producers provided the impetus for resolving some of the problems that intervention threw up. Since the collapse of the tin market in 1985, the belief that commodity market stabilization cannot work has undermined producers' willingness to try to resolve difficulties within existing ICAs and has reinforced the suspicion of consumer governments that these agreements were in no one's interests. In the current climate, encouraging competitive markets, state interventions are seen as requiring clear justification in terms of market failure. The existence of active futures markets in all of the industries that have commodity agreements makes justification along these lines problematic. But the commodity problem has not disappeared, and producers may look for other mechanisms to raise prices from often very low levels in industries experiencing excess capacity. Developed country governments may be forced to decide whether they prefer to see markets controlled by producer cartels (where they will lack representation) or under the auspices of international commodity agreements. An earlier version of this paper -- a product of the Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit, International Economics Department -- was prepared as a background working paper for Global Economic Prospects 1994.

This book addresses the lack of binding multi-lateral international agreement on cartels, through analysis of trials and failures. It also suggests strategic approaches to overcome current standstills. In addition, the book contrasts international agreement on cartels with inter-governmental commodity agreement which has been developed separately through international law. Through this project, the author puts forth that successful international law on cartels needs to reflect the interests and arguments of developing countries.