International Cooperation On Export Controls

Export controls definitively impact international cooperation in outer space. Civil and commercial space actors that engage in international endeavors must comply with space technology export controls. In the general discourse, members of the civil and commercial space community have an understanding of their domestic export control regime. However, a careful reading of the literature on space technology export controls reveals that certain questions relevant to international engagements have not been identified or answered. What is the legal-political origin of space technology export controls? How do they relate to the current international legal structure? What steps can be taken to evolve our current unilateral paradigm of space technology within the context of peaceful exploration and use of outer space? In this book, these and other relevant questions on space technology export controls are identified and assessed through an insightful case-study of the U.S. commercial communication export control regime. The findings of this case-study are used in an international legal-political analysis of international space law, public international law, and international cooperation. Breaking new ground in international legal theory, a self-justified security dilemma that is manifest in international law is identified and explained as the origin for the current paradigm of space technology export controls.

This dissertation provides an explanation for recent standardization and growth of international export control regimes. I argue that neoinstitutionalist organization theory contributes to an explanation of these organizations which coordinate efforts to limit the spread of weapons-related technologies. The neoinstitutionalist approach claims that organizational structures are often not selected for maximal effectiveness at tasks such as controlling weapons-related exports. Rather, they are selected for their fit with norms shared within communities of organizations that interact regularly or share common tasks. The dissertation adapts and applies this literature to the subject of export control cooperation through process-tracing case studies of export control regimes such as CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement. I argue that a transnational community of organizations, or organizational field, has developed in the issue area of nonproliferation export controls. While extant theories of International Relations help explain the origins of international export control cooperation, they do not explain the extent or form such efforts have taken today. Shared norms in this issue area and copying of organizations perceived as successful explain the growth and standardization of multilateral nonproliferation regimes and international export control practices. These factors are highlighted by the sociological theories I draw upon. The case studies are constructed from archival data, interviews with policy makers, trade literature, and secondary sources.

Like many cold war artifacts, the West's export control policies and institutions are being reevaluated after the tumult in the communist world at the end of the 1980s. Policymakers and scholars are being forced to reexamine the premises of export control policy and the very concept of export controls as a tool of national security and foreign policy. This volume brings together expert scholars and government officials who provide contrasting perspectives and address the prospects for export controls. The contributors discuss the role and function of export control policies from a variety of perspectives--security, commerce, diplomacy, the European region, and that of the newly industrialized countries. Among the topics covered are the problems the United States and the Western export regime will face in the 1990s in light of changing international political alliances and dependencies, in defining strategic exports, in enforcing export controls, and the role of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. Contributors. Sumner Benson, Beverly Crawford, Richard t. Cupitt, Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Paul Freedenberg, Martin J. Hillenbrand, Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, Bruce W. Jentleson, Kevin J. Lasher, William J. Long, Janne Haaland Matlary, Jere W. Morehead, Henry R. Nau, Han S. Park, Kevin F. F. Quigley, Alen B. Sherr, Christine Westbrook

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are not necessarily acquired as entire systems. They are often assembled from parts and materials, many of which are dual-use?i.e., of both commercial and military utility. Often, suppliers of these components do not ask who their customers are or inquire about the intended application. This has for a long time been the Achilles? heel of well-intentioned nonproliferation conventions. The answer lies in more stringent export controls of weapons-related technologies. In this eye-opening collection of essays, sponsored by the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia (USA), a group of outstanding experts in the nonproliferation field report on the efforts of five leading supplier countries?the United States, France, Russia, China, and India?to implement export controls on weapons and sensitive technologies used for producing WMD. The book is both reassuring and alarming in its very precise survey and analysis of export control regimes. At most national levels, regulation is rapidly making firms more accountable, and more industries are routinely implementing internal compliance programs. However, these advances are in a neck-to-neck race with intangible methods of transferring information, corporations with no national allegiance, and competition among international suppliers. Based on in-depth research?each of the contributors spent considerable time conducting interviews with government officials and other policy experts, observing policy making and implementation, and gathering empirical data?this detailed and thought-provoking book will be of great value to all concerned with security objectives for the twenty-first century.

Protecting U.S. security by controlling technology export has long been a major issue. But the threat of the Soviet sphere is rapidly being superseded by state-sponsored terrorism; nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation; and other critical security factors. This volume provides a policy outline and specific steps for an urgently needed revamping of U.S. and multilateral export controls. It presents the latest information on these and many other pressing issues: The successes and failures of U.S. export controls, including a look at U.S. laws, regulations, and export licensing; U.S. participation in international agencies; and the role of industry. The effects of export controls on industry. The growing threat of "proliferation" technologies. World events make this volume indispensable to policymakers, government security agencies, technology exporters, and faculty and students of international affairs.

The U.S. gov¿t. annually controls billions of dollars worth of U.S. arms and dual-use items exported to its allies and partners through a system of laws, reg¿s., and processes. Weaknesses in this system led the auditor to include export controls as part of a high-risk area and called for a reexamination, including evaluating alternative approaches. Increasing international collaboration on defense programs also makes it important to understand how other countries control exports. Proposed treaties would change the process for the export or transfer of certain U.S. arms to the U.K. and Australia. This report: (1) identifies how selected allies' systems differ from the U.S. system; and (2) assesses how the proposed treaties will change controls on arms exports. Illus.

The U.S. national security export controls systemâ€"which was instituted to impede Soviet acquisition of high technology from the Westâ€"is both necessary and appropriate. Balancing the National Interest provides a thorough analysis of this controls system, examining the current system of laws, regulations, international agreements, and organizations that control the international transfer of technology through industrial channels. Foreign Affairs calls it "the best on the subject to have been published in the 40 years that the United States has exercised controls on exports that might add to Soviet power."